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The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the Antarctic Treaty System has 
the level of legitimacy necessary to ensure adequate protection for and conservation 
of the fragile Antarctic environment. This work will provide considerable new 
information in the field of legitimacy as it relates to the Antarctic Treaty System 
(ATS) as to my knowledge it is the first time an in-depth analysis of the subject has 
been made using materials from within the ATS. 
To answer this question this thesis will begin with an investigation of the principle of 
legitimacy within international law. An overview of Antarctic exploration and 
exploitation, territorial sovereignty and the development of the ATS will follow this. 
This section will also contain a discussion on the issue of natural resource 
sovereignty, as it is this issue that is likely to develop as the major source of Antarctic 
conflict in the future. This introduction to Antarctic politics is intended to give the 
reader a complete picture of the political situation that currently exists in the region. 
The final eight chapters will contain the suhstantive arguments of this paper. They 
consist of the application of legitimacy theory to varies situations that exist within the 
ATS in order to estahlish whether these events have any adverse effects on the overall 
legitimacy of the ATS and therefore its ahility to adequately protect and conserve the 
Antarctic environment. The majority of the information for these chapters has 
resulted from in-depth research or the meeting repo11s of the Antarctic Treaty Party 
Consultative and Special Consultative Meetings. Chapter Seven looks at the 
continued criticism that the ATS represents a ·closed and exclusive cluh of rich and 
powerful states. Chapter Eight investigates whether the apparent contlict between 
Article IX(2) or the Antarctic Treaty contlicts with the ATS's environmental 
protection role. Chapter Nine looks al the circumstances surrounding the 
establishment or the permanent secretarial. Chapter Ten investigates whether the 
Ill 
inahilily of Lhe Parlies lo eslahlish a liabilily annex to the Madrid Protocol has 
effected lhe legitimacy of the Protocol and by association the ATS. Chapter Eleven is 
an analysis of lhe effects that China's non-compliance with the provision of the 
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources has on the 
legitimacy of the ATS. Chapter Twelve investigates whether the lack of jurisdiction 
over tourism in the Antarctic region has had any adverse effects on the legitimacy of 
the ATS. Chapter Thirteen is an overview of the status of recognition of the ATS 
within the United Nations. 
At the conclusion of the analysis of international law and the meeting reports of the 
ATS contained in this thesis it became clear that despite the current problems that the 
ATS is experiencing the organisation does have the level of legitimacy necessary to 
protect the Antarctic environment. The Parties must be aware however that this 
legitimacy may not continue if they do not address these problem areas in a timely 
manner. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Imagine if you will a continent 7 million square kilometres in area with mountain 
ranges towering to 4,800 metres. Cover this land mass with a 14 million square 
kilometre expanse of ice and snow to a depth of 1.5 kilometres. Despite the harsh 
climatic conditions the ice sheet is sprinkled with over 400 different plant species, 
with some communities over five thousand years old. Along the coast of your 
imaginary continent envision the homes of 17 species of penguins and 35 species of 
seabirds totalling millions of individual animals. Around your continent add 20 
million square kilometres of ocean. To this expanse of water add 75 million marine 
species such as plankton, krill, fish, seals, dolphins and whales. Now make your 
wonderland a pristine wilderness untouched by humanity. 
But wait you don't have to dream your wonderland exists. It lies south of 60° South 
latitude and called Antarctica 1• In the real world that 1.5 kilometre thick ice sheet 
represents 100,000 years of accumulated snow and contains 90% of the world's ice 
and 68% of its fresh water. The only difference between Antarctica and your pristine 
wilderness is that humanity has discovered it and as you would like to visit your 
dream continent humanity has been streaming to visit the real thing. And as with all 
things that touched hy humanity, their mere presence on this wondrous continent 
places its uniqueness in danger of destruction. 
Antarctica is in danger because while humanity is racing to the continent to perform 
scientific research and unlock its hidden treasures there is no clear delineation as to 
whom if anyone is in control of this inllux. For several decades the governance of the 
region has heen guided hy the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) and they have done a 
remarkahly good joh of preserving the environment of the continent. However we 
are now in a new millennium and the dynamics of international co-operation and law 
1 For the purposes of this paper Antarctica is used as an over-arching generic tenn. which encompasses 
boU1 the mntinental hmd mass. ice shelves ;md the Southern Ocean. 
2 
have changed. With this change in international dynamics it is necessary to ask the 
question: docs the ATS have the level of legitimacy necessary to continue as the 
protector or the Antarctic environment? The answer to this question is one of major 
international impollance because failure to preserve the Antarctic environment would 
he a tragedy of disastrous existential propollion. 
It would not he a tragedy in the normal dramatic sense2 but a 'tragedy of the 
commons'. A 'tragedy of the commons' develops when common land is 
administered under a system of shared use that inevitably leads to over-exploitation. 
Under the common land paradigm each actor has the right to exploit the resources of 
the common area but nobody has the mandate or the incentive to control over-
exploitation. The actors in this scenario are out to ensure the best possible outcome 
for themselves with no apparent regard for the effect their actions may have on the 
long-term sustainability of the resource. 3 In 1968 when Hardin first wrote about the 
tragedy of the commons he concluded that our oceans at that time were suffering due 
to this paradigm because each maritime nation applied the philosophy of the 'freedom 
of the seas'. "Professing to believe in the inexhaustible resources of the oceans".4 
Hardin also saw the American National Parks System as an example of this 
paradigm. 5 Antarctica is another area that many feel is deserving of classification as a 
'commons'. 
2 The essence or dramalic lragedy is 1101 unhappiness. It resides in lhe solemnity of the remorseless 
workings or things .... This inevilahlcness of destiny can only he illuslrated in tem1s or hurrnm life by 
incidcnls which in fact involve unhappiness. For it is only by them U1at U1e ru1ility llr escape can he 
made evidenl in Ule drama. Whitehead. A Science and the Modern World 17. As quoted in Hardin. G 
'The Tragedy ofU1e Commons" ( 1968) 162 Science 1243. 1244. 
3 I lardin. G "The Tragedy or U1e Commons" ( 1968) 162 Science 1243. 124-t 
4 lhid. 1245. 
5 The parks he slated arc open to all. wiU10u1 limit but U1e parks are not limilless. ··nearly we musl 
cease 10 treat U1c parks as commons or Oley will be of no Yalue 10 anyone". Ibid. 
Disco\'ery 
The identification or Antarctica as a candidate ror a ·commons· classification is due 
largely to its unique history of discovery and exploration. Although the discovery 
and exploration of Antarctica are relatively modern events humanity has been 
intrigued with the existence of the great southern continent almost since the 
beginning of recorded history. The Greek philosopher Aristotle postulated its 
existence over 2,000 years ago.6 The presence of Antarktikos7 he reasoned would be 
necessary to balance out the large northern continents. 8 There are also Polynesian 
legends that refer to a great white land to the south.9 European maps drafted in the 
Middle Ages po11ray Antarctica stretching southward below the equator. Ortelius, a 
l61h century cartographer, produced a world map that showed Terra Australis nondum 
cognita touching South America and meandering into the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian 
oceans and Australasia. 10 
In recognition of the accomplishments of his 1772-75 voyage Captain James Cook is 
acknowledged as the first modern Antarctic explorer. Although he was prevented 
from sighting the continent due to heavy pack ice he circumnavigated the continent 
and became the first European to cross the Antarctic Circle. 11 In 1819-21 the Russian 
Thaddeus Bcllingshauscn also circumnavigated the continent hut like Cook he too 
failed to sight land. 12 In 1820 an American Nathaniel Palmer and Edward Bransfield 
from the United Kingdom both reported sighting the continent 13, however it was not 
until 1821 that .John Davis, another American, became the first person to make 
6 Dctx:nham,F Anrnrcrica:7'l!e S101.- of a Conrinelll ( 1959) 19. 
7 Antarklikos mcm1s opposite U1e Bear ,md refers to Arktos (The Great Bear). U1e constellation or stars 
ahove the NorU1 Pole. Chester. J ,md Bangs. R "'Discovery or Antarctica" (21.l0.01) 
<http://www.terra4uest.com/va/history/agt:s/discovery.htm>. 
8 The Greeks knew alx>ut U1e Arctic and hl:causc in their world everything musl oc halanced, Uley 
reasoned U1at an Ant-arctic musl exisl. Dehcnham . supra n 6 at 19. 
'' One such story tells or Ui-le-Rangiara a Raratong,m traveller who ·'sailed souU1 to a place of hiller 
cold where white rock-like forms grew out or the frozen sea". Cht:ster. supra n 7. 
10 Livcrsidge. D The Lasr Co11rine111 (1958) 19. 
11 Brewster. B Anrarcrica: Wilderness ar Risk ( 1982) 11. 
I~ Ibid. 
u This latest wave of Antarctic explorers were drawn to Lhe region hy Cook's reports of greal seal 
stocks. [hid. 
4 
/a11c((al/. 1~ As a result of these events Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States 
have each laid claim to the official discovery or Antarctica.'--; 
1883 saw the start of a series of national expeditions to the Antarctic. The first to 
enter Antarctic waters was the American Lieutenant Charles Wilkes. At about the 
same time the French mounted an expedition led by Jules Dumont D'Urville. These 
were later followed by the two major British expeditions: the 190 I British expedition 
led by Robert Scott and another in 1909 which saw Ernest Shackleton journey to the 
Pole. Between 1900 and 1914 expeditions were made by Norway 16 , Sweden, 
Germany, Australia, France and Japan. 17 The American Richard Byrd mounted the 
first of his expeditions in 1928. This was followed in 1940 by another British 
expedition led by James Clark Ross. 18 
In the mid 1940's activities on the continent began to take on a military flavour. 
Byrd's fourth journey to the ice in 1946 had a strong military purpose. Named 
'Operation High Jump' it was seen both as a flag showing opportunity and a chance 
to conduct military manoeuvres in conditions not unlike those that would be faced in 
the Arctic region. The expedition consisted or twelve navy ships, including an 
aircraft carrier and nine planes. The expedition force consisted of 4,700 men of 
whom only 24 were scientists. 19 Between 1943 and 1945 Britain had secretly 
established two bases on the Antarctic Peninsula, k,r primarily military purposes.20 
I~ Ibid. 
Quigg.PA. Pole Apa 11: The Emerging lss11e ofAnrarctica ( 1983) 12. 
15The issue of whom in fact was tl1e first to discover tlie Antarctic continent is clouded hy two factors. 
Firstly. tl1e sighting of oil shore islands did not count toward discovery of the continent, however 
because mmiy of the isl,mds were in fact linked to tl1e continent by ice sheets it was in some instances 
centuries before the distinction could be made. Secondly because or the harsh conditions ;md long 
distances involved in Antarctic exploration records were sometimes lost. Therefore altlwugh tlicse 
tluee parties lay claim to discovery it is in fact unclear which. if any. or them was first Quigg, Ibid at 
w. 
16 Roald Amundsen raced Scott to tl1c Pole in I 911. Brewster. supra n 11 at 13. 
16Quigg. supra n 14 at 12. 
17 Brewster. supra n 11 at 13. 
13Quigg. supra n 14 at 12. 
19 Ibid. 45. 
~,, Ibid. 46. 
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This nebulous history or discovery and subsequent territorial claims has ldl the 
Antarctic subject lo exploration and exploitation by numerous nations. Therefore the 
international community and specifically the Antarctic Treaty Parties should heed 
Hardin' s warnings concerning the dangers or the commons as they debate the 
management of the Antarctica. The common land scenario as identified by Hardin in 
his l 968 article is one that could quite easily and rapidly develop south of 60° South 
latitude if humanity's intrusion into the Antarctic wilderness is not effectively 
managed. This concern has become more relevant in the modern era of Antarctic 
exploration because in the past humanity's presence in Antarctica has been kept in 
check by its geographic isolation and harsh conditions, however with advances in 
travel technology this situation is changing dramatically. 21 This is reflected in the 
increase over the past decade in the number of scientists, support personnel22 and 
tourists23 visiting the ice. While international instruments do exist to protect the 
Antarctic environment it is my thesis that they may lack effectiveness due to 
underlying legitimacy issues. While these issues have not yet invalidated the 
legitimacy of the ATS there is sufficient evidence to support the thesis that current 
problems that exist within the ATS may have developed beyond the point of 
acceptable glitches in procedure and reached the stage where they threaten the future 
legitimacy of the organisation. 
21 It is now possible to tly to the ice by commercial aircraft. C-130 llercules transports tly personnel 
in and out of Uie Antarctic on a regular basis. Once on Uie ice visitors c;ui travel inland using a variety 
or modem transport: helicopters. caterpillar snow vehicles. skidoos, mid motorised sledges. It is now 
also possible to enter Uie ice flows or the Southern Oee:m in the winter monUis due Uie advent or ice 
strengUiened expeditionary ships. COMNAP. "Antarctic Information" (21/ I 0/0 I) 
<http://www.comnap.aq>. 
22 According to a UNGA report in U1e 1989/1990 season Uiere were between 9.500 mid JO.OOO 
seientilic ,uid support staff in Antarctica. 3YJ of these personnel were Americ:m. UNGA. "Report on 
Antarctica" ( 1/11/0 I) <http://www.gndc.c:mterbury.ac.nz>. 
23 In I 990 Uie Antarctic tourism industry took 4.800 passengers to U1e frozen continent. By 2000 U1is 
number had risen tu 14.5UO. U1is represents more than a 150~ growth in numbers in 10 years. ASOC. 
"Antarctic Tourism Information Paper'' Tabled at ATCM XXIV July 200 I. (13/08/0 I) 
<http://www.asoc.org/curentpress/lP40Lourism.htm>. IAATO. "Oven-iew of Antarctic Tourism 2000" 
(5/4/.0 I) <11ttp://www.iaato.org/xxii_iaato_over2000.htm1>. 
Antarctic Governance 
The international instruments which currently constitute the system of governance for 
the Antarctic are those developed under the auspices of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty (the 
Treaty) and which are collectively known as the Antarctic Treaty System. 24 The 
Treaty as an international instrument is a communication of the express desire of the 
nations involved in Antarctic exploration that the region should be a place for the 
advancement of scientific knowledge and not a source of international contlict. The 
preamble to the Treaty states: 
Recognising that it is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue forever to be 
used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of 
international discord; 
Acknoll'ledging the substantial contributions to scientific knowledge resulting from 
international cooperation in scientific investigation in Antarctica; 
Convinced that ti1e establishment of a firm foundation for ti1e continuation and development 
of such cooperation on the basis of freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica as applied 
during the International Geophysical Year accords with ti1e interests of science and the 
progress of all mankind; 
Convinced also tiiat a treaty ensuring the use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only and the 
continuance or international harmony in Antarctica will further the purposes and principles 
embcxlied in the Charter of the United Nations; 25 
As a result the management system established under the Antarctic Treaty contained 
two priorities. Firstly, minimising the potential for international conflict. One of the 
consequences of this desire to avoid conflict was the development, and continuation. 
or an instrument whose primary role is to protect the political position, especially in 
relation to claims of sovereignty, of the original Treaty Parties. This role is clearly set 
out in Article IV(I) of the Treaty: 
I. Nothing in ti1e present Treaty shall be interpreted as: 
(a) a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted rights or or claims to 
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica: 
2~ The Antarctic Treaty System currently consists of: The Antarctic Treaty 1959 (ATS 1961 No. 12). 
!\greed ~kasures for ti1e Conservation of J\ntarctic Fauna and Flora 1964. Convention for ti1e 
Conservation of J\ntan.:tic Seals 1972 (J\TS 1987 No 11.). Convention for ti1e Consern1tion of 
J\ntarctic !Vlarine Living Resources 1980 (J\TS 1982 No 9.) amJ tJ1e Environmental Protocol to ti1e 
Antarctic Treaty 1991 (J\ TS 1998 No. 5). 
25 Pre.unble. Antarctic Treaty 1959. Ibid. 
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(h) a renunciation or diminution hy :my contracting Party of any basis of claim to h:rritoriaJ 
sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have wheU1er as a result of its activities or U10se 
of its nationals in Antarctica. or PU1erwise: 
(c) prejudicing U1e position of Ule contracting Parties as n:gards its recognition or non-
recognition of any other State's rights of or claim or basis of claim to territorial 
sovereignty in Antarctica. 26 
The second priorily or the management system was to ensure the freedom of 
scientific investigation. This role was established in Article II. 
Freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and co-operation toward Urnt end, as applied 
during U1e International Geophysical Year, shaJI continue, subject to U1e provisions of the 
present Treaty. 17 
Environmental Protection 
As a result of the Parties setting the proceeding two priorities for the continent there 
was no reference to conservation in the original text of the Antarctic Treaty. The idea 
of conservation of the Antarctic environment and associated ecosystems was only 
introduced in 1964 with the adoption of the Agreed Measures for the Conservation of 
Antarctic Fauna and Flora. There were two subsequent instruments that dealt with 
specific resource issues28 but until recently no overarching environmental instrument 
existed within the A TS. 
Over the course of lhe last decade there has been a steady growth in the level or 
public awareness concerning to lhe imp011ance of the Antarclic environment. This 
awareness has developed holh in relation lo its major contribution to the global 
environment and the intrinsic value or its pristine wilderness. This increase in public 
awareness has led to a fundamental shift in governmental attitudes toward the 
preservalion and conservation of the Antarctic environment. In response to this 
change in international focus in 1991 the ATS adopted the Environmental Protocol to 
co Ibid. Article IV( l L 
cl Ibid. Article II. 
cs The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Seals 1972 ( ATS 1987 No. 1 I) :md U1e 
Convention on U1e Conservation or Antarctic Living Marine Resources l 980 ( ATS 1982 No.9 ). The 
International Convention for Ule Regulation of Whaling 1946 ( 161 UNTS 72). Uwugh not an ATS 
instrwnents. was U1en and remains the principle instrument for U1e protection of Antarctic whales. 
Lhc AnLarcLic Trealy (Lhc Madrid Prolocol) ils firsl comprehensive AnLarcLic 
environmenlal inslrumenl. The preamhle Lo lhe Madrid Protocol clearly sets out the 
ATS's environmental agenda: 
The States Parties to this Protocol to U1e Antarctic Treaty ... 
Convinced of ilie need to enhance U1e protection of ilie Antarctic environment and dependent 
and associated ecosystems ... 
Reaffirming ilie conservation principles of the Convention on U1e Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources: 
Convinced iliat ilie development of a comprehensive regime for ilie protection of the Antarctic 
environment and dependent and associated ecosystems is in ilie interests of all mankind as a 
whole: .. . 2" 
This comprehensive environmental regime currently consists of the original Madrid 
Protocol and five annexes. 30 To date the Protocol has been ratified by 41 of the 
ATS's 45 member countries. 31 The preceding clauses and the level of ratification of 
the Protocol tends to indicate that, through the adoption of the Protocol, the ATS has 
adopted to a conservation paradigm. There are however other clauses that combined 
with the subsequent actions of the Treaty Parties32 raise questions concerning the 
commitment the Parties toward this new paradigm, as the Protocol is predicated upon 
the principle that: 
Bearing in mind U1e special legal and political status of Antarctica and ilie special 
responsibility of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties to ensure U1at all activities in 
Antarctica are consistent wiU1 the purposes and principles of U1e Antarctic treaty ... 
Acknoll'ledging further U1e unique opportunilies Antarctica offers for scientific monitoring of 
and research on processes of global as well as regional importance. 33 
2" Preamble. Environmental Protocol to U1e Antarctic Treaty 1991. supra n 24. 
'" Annex I: Environmental Impact Evaluations. Annex II Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora. 
Article III: Waste Disposal mid M,lllagement. Article IV: Prevention of Marine Pollution. Article V: 
Arca Protection ,llld Ma11a!!ement. 
31 This number represents ;11 27 ConsultatiYe Parties :llld 14 Contracting Parties. Four Contracting 
Parties have yet to ratify the Protocol: CUlada. Turkey. Venezuela mid Estonia. 
'~ These actions will he discussed in lcngU1 later in this paper. 
33 Premnble. Antarctic Treaty 1959. supra n 24. 
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Research Goals 
TIU! purpose of this paper is w inrestigate 1ihether the ATS, due to this possible lack 
of commitment and other associated factors, has the /ere/ of legitimacy necessary to 
ensure adequate protection for and conservation of the ji·agi/e Antarctic environment. 
In order to answer this question this thesis will address the following issues: Chapter 
One will contain a discussion on legitimacy and what is understood to be the meaning 
of the principle within international law. Chapter Two contains an overview of the 
history of the exploitation of Antarctic resources and the current instruments for 
environmental protection in the region. This chapter will establish why establishing 
the legitimacy of the ATS is a paramount necessity for the continued effectiveness of 
these instruments. Chapter Three contains an investigation of the territorial claims in 
the Antarctic region and their standing in international law. The status of the 
territorial claims is of importance to the issue of legitimacy because the claims are 
one of the underpinning principles of the Antarctic Treaty. While the questionable 
status of the claims may not remove the legitimacy of the ATS as a whole it does 
raise the threshold test somewhat. Chapter Four addresses the issue of sovereignty 
over natural resources. It is necessary to look at this issue in relation to Antarctica 
because while the Antarctic Treaty Parties claim that the Treaty has removed the 
potential for conflict in relation to sovereignty issues the current status of 
international law into relation to sovereignty over natural resources may have 
somewhat clouded the issue. Chapter Five is a hrief overview of the development of 
the Antarctic Treaty System. This overview is necessary to give the reader a 
complete picture of the political situation that currently exists in the region. The final 
eight chapters will contain the substantive arguments of this paper. They consist of 
the application of legitimacy theory to varies situations that exist within the ATS in 
order to establish whether these events have any adverse eflects on the overall 
legitimacy of the A TS and therefore its ability to adequately protect and conserve the 
Antarctic environment. The majority or the information for these chapters has 
resulted from in-depth research of the meeting repolls of the Antarctic Treaty Party 
I 0 
Consultative and Special Consultative Meetings. Chapter Seven looks at the 
continued criticism that the ATS represents a ·closed and exclusive club of rich and 
powerful states. Chapter Eight investigates whether the apparent conllict between 
Article IX(2) or the Antarctic Treaty conllicts with the ATS's environmental 
protection role. Chapter Nine assesses whether during the negotiations for the 
establishment of the permanent secretariat certain Parties violated accepted 
procedures thereby casting doubts of the continued legitimacy of the system. Chapter 
Ten investigates whether the inability of the Parties to establish a liability annex to 
the Madrid Protocol has effected the legitimacy of the Protocol and hy association the 
ATS as a whole. Chapter Eleven is an analysis of the effects that China's non-
compliance with the provision of the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic 
Marine Living Resources has on the legitimacy of the ATS. Chapter Twelve 
investigates whether the lack of jurisdiction over tourism in the Antarctic region has 
had any adverse effects on the legitimacy of the ATS. Chapter Thirteen is an 
overview of the status of recognition of the ATS within the United Nations. This is 
important to the issue of legitimacy because the United Nations is generally 
considered a reflection of the international community as a whole, the recognition of 
which is necessary in order to ensure legitimacy. The conclusion will contain an 
overall assessment of the current legitimacy standing of the ATS within international 
law and therefore their ability to ensure environmental protection for the region. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
LEGITIMACY AS A LEGAL CONSTRUCT 
In opening this discussion let me first stress that legitimacy in no way equates with 
legality. An instrument can be legal without being legitimate. Legality is an 
organization's standing in international law while legitimacy is the degree of its 
acceptance by the actors involved. There is no doubt in my mind that the Antarctic 
Treaty System is legal under international law, my only intent is to question its 
legitimacy. 
1.1 What is Legitimacy? 
Obtaining a legal definition of legitimacy has proven to be a wholly unsatisfactory 
activity. Black's Law Dictionary defines legitimacy as "lawfulness"34 with lawful 
being "not contrary to law"35 this definition is of coarse totally inadequate for the 
present purposes. This inadequacy is related to the manner in which legal theorists 
look at legitimacy. To the legal theorist legitimacy is a question of power and "power 
is legitimate when its acquisition and exercise conform to established law. To them 
legitimacy is equivalent to legal validity. ·' 36 Therefore in order to ascertain what is 
meant by legitimacy in the current context it is necessary to turn to common usage 
and political theory. Webster's New World Dictionary defines legitimacy as "the 
quality or state of being legitimate", legitimate in turn is defined as "conforming to or 
in accordance with established rules, standards or principles" . .11 
Legitimacy in the international context is an even more elusive creature. Martin 
Wight wrote in his 1972 essay International Legitimacy that "in none or the literature 
on diplomatic theory or international law is it easy to find a broad definition of the 
3~ Garner, B (cd) Block's Lmr Dic1iu11a1T (7111 ed) ( 1999) 912. 
3" Ibid. 892. . 
36 Bccthmn. D The Legirinwrion of Poirer (1991 J ..i. 
37 Webster's New World Dictionary (2 11 <1 college edition) (1980> 807. 
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theory or legitimacy."''8 .Jorgensen-Dahl commented that in 1991 the situation had 
not changed much. ·'Legitimacy as applied to international society has remained a 
. . .. . I I d . ., ' 9 very 111sutllc1ent y exp ore notion. The primary reason for the inadequate 
definition of legitimacy in international law is related to the fact that legitimacy was 
originally designed to convey an idea of constitutional law and it has subsequently 
been co-opted, unsuccessfully some would say,40 into the international arena. 
Therefore in order to get a feel for the requirements of legitimacy it is necessary to 
explore the principle within the confines of constitutional law and then apply these 
domestic principles to the international arena. 
1.2 Legitimacy in Constitutional Law 
The overriding principle of constitutional law under a parliamentary system is the 
sovereignty of Parliament41 under the auspices of this doctrine any enactment of 
Parliament is the highest source of law.42 Therefore a law that is enacted by a 
constitutionally elected government is always legal, but is it always legitimate? 
Socrates believed this to be the case. 
Anyone. and especially a clever rhetorician. will have a good deal to urge about the evil of 
setting aside the law which requires a sentence to be carried out: and we might reply, Yes; but 
the State has injured us and given an unjust sentence". Suppose I say that? ... And was that 
our agreement wiU1 you? The law would say; or were you to abide by the sentence of the 
State? And if I were to express astonishment at U1eir saying this, U1e law would probably add: 
"Answer, Socrates ... Tell us what complaint you have to make against us which justilies you 
in attempting to destroy us mid U1e State.·3 
38 As quoted in .Jorgensen-Dahl. A "The Legitimacy or the ATS" in Jorgensen-Dahl. A and Ostreng. W 
(eds) The A111arctic Trealr Srst em in World Politics ( 1991) 287. 
39 [hid. . . 
.iu Stokke. 0 "The Effectiveness and Legitimacy of International Regimes" in Stokke. 0 :md Vidas. D 
(eds) Governing the A111arctic: Tile l:.f/ecti1·e11ess and Legitimacr of the AntarCTic Treaty S,·stem (19961 
55. 
41 The doctrine or U1e Sovereignty of Parli:unent holds Urnt .. Parlimnent enjoys unlimited :md 
illimitable powers of legislation. Parliament· s won.I can be neiU1er judicially invalidated nor controlled 
by earlier enactment: its collective will. duly expressed. is law." Joseph, P Co11stit11tiu11al and 
Aclministratil'e u111· in Neu· Zealand (1993) 418. 
42 .. What a Statute itself enacts cannot be unlawful. because what U1e Statute says :md provides is itself 
U1e law. :md U1e highest lixm of law known in U1is country" Fit:.gera!d 1· Mu!c/0011 119761 2 NZRL 
615. electronic version <http://www.lexis.mm>. 
43 Plato. Crito (Harvard Classics Vo! 2) 36. 
Socrates clearly hdieved that ir a law is passed hy the State then it is hoth lawful and 
legitimate and as such it is the duty or all citizens to ahidc hy it. However in making 
this statement he has failed to address the possibility that a law can he lawful without 
heing legitimate. The following paragraphs will outline the different theoretical 
approaches to legitimacy in law in an attempt to ascertain what quality it is that 
makes a law not only legal hut also legitimate. 
1.3 The Legal Positivists and Legitimacy Theory 
1.3.1 John Austin 
John Austin discussed the theory of legal positivism in a series of lectures he gave in 
1832. Legal positivists he claimed see the law as a simple matter of "political 
superiors" imposing a system of rules on "political inferiors''. "Laws set by men to 
men".44 "Superiority signifies might: the power of affecting others with evil or pain 
and of forcing them ... to fashion their conduct to one's wishcs."45 Austin then 
explained that this superiority was present in the sovereign46 and then described how 
the sovereign obtained this superior position. 
If a determinate hwnan superior. not in the habit of obedience to a like superior. receives 
habitual ohcdience from U1e bulk of society, U1at determinate superior is sovereign in Urnt 
society. and U1e society (including U1e superior) is a society political and independenl.47 
Therefore, according to Austin. governments obtain the right to pass laws from a 
combination of their position or power and the hahitual acceptance of the people. 
However there is a basic !law when you try and apply Austin's theory to legitimacy. 
The citizens over whom the government has control confer legitimacy on the law 
through acceptance. lt is however difficult to see how acceptance by force could 
ever he deemed legitimate. Therefore, while Austin's theory is a good starting point 
H Austin. J ··A Positivist Conception or Law" (1832) reprinted in Feinlmrg. J and Gross. 11 (eds) 
Philosplwy uf Lmr (5 111 ed) ( I ()95) 31. 
4~ Ibid. 36 
46 The sovereign c:rn he eiU1cr ;m individual or a system of government. 
47 Austin. supra n 44 at 40. 
hccausc it is hased on power and not consent it docs not adequately explain the 
principle of legitimacy within the conlcxt or the law. 
l.3.2 H.L.A. Hart 
In the 1960"s H.L.A Hart added a more modern construct to Austin's hasic theory 
because he believed that the idea of the sovereign ruling through coercive power 
failed to address some of the salient features of the modern legal system.48 The main 
reasons for the failure of the theory says Hart are: 
First. .. a criminal statute ... commonly applies to those who enact it and not merely to others. 
Secondly, there are other varieties of law, notably those conferring legal powers to adjudicate 
or legislate (public powers) or to create or vary legal relations (private powers) which cannot, 
without absurdity. be construed as orders backed by threats. 
Thirdly. U1cre are legal rules ... [which] are not brought into being by anything analogous to 
explicit prescription. 
Finally. U1e analysis or law in terms of the sovereign. habitually obeyed and necessarily 
exempt from all legal limitation, failed to account for the continuity of legislative auU10rity 
characteristic of a modem legal system, and the sovereign, person or persons could not be 
identified wiU1 eiU1er the electorate or the legislature of a modem state.49 
Hart believed that in order to understand a system as complex as a modern legal 
system it is necessary to differentiate between two different types of rules. Firstly 
there are primary rules. These rules are of the type that requires humans to do or to 
abstain from certain acts. Primary rules are mandatory and must be followed whether 
the individual wishes to or not. These primary rules are supported by secondary 
rules. Secondary rules allow humans to introduce new primary rules, modify and 
extinguish existing rules and to devise ways to ensure the implementation of the 
rules. To put it simply primary rules impose duties while secondary rules confer 
power. Application of the secondary rules leads to the establishment or structures 
such as legislatures and cou11s. 50 
The application of these primary and secondary rules says Hart will remove the basic 
tlaw in Austin's theory. The theory or law as coercive power is a good start he 
~8 Hart. II.LA. ··A !\fore Recent Positivist Conception of Law'' in Hart. II.LA. (ed) The Concepl of 
Lmr ( 1961) reprinted in Fcinhurg . .I ,md Gross. 11 (l:ds) Philusphu_r of Lmr (.'i 11 ' ed) ( 199.'i) 42. 
~,, !hid, 4J. 
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helicves hut docs not difkrentiatc hctwccn ohligation and duty. Power can create an 
ohligation through fear or harm and will force compliance hut it does not instil in the 
person a feeling or duty. In making this assumption I helieve Hart has estahlished 
one of the main differences between legal and legitimate. A law is legitimate because 
individuals, whether persons or states, feel they have a duty to comply with it, not 
because they are forced to do so. This is a major factor when applying legitimacy 
within the field of international !mi·, ·where no coercive force is present. 
1.4 Natural Law Theory and Legitimacy 
Natural Law theorists see the law in the totally different light than the Positivists. 
They see the law as created by humanity for humanity. Natural law theorists define 
natural law as the way the law should be and refer to the principle that the law should 
represent the correct answer to a moral question. 51 Following this principle of law 
and morality theorists have attempted to develop answers to the questions; where did 
natural law originate and what makes individuals comply with it? Upon reading the 
following theories it will become apparent to the reader that while the natural law 
theorists are fairly consistent as to the source of natural law they vary dramatically as 
to its application. Grotius considered the application of natural law to be a system of 
governance, while for Hohhes natural law was illustrated in the power governments 
exerted over the people. Rousseau on the other hand saw the application of natural 
law as an instrument of democracy. Like Hohhes it was about power hut the power 
rested in the people. Therefore the issue of what is legitimate under natural law 
theory depends to a large extent on which theory is applied. 
l.4.1 Hugo Grotius 
While the concept of natural law was first postulated in Ancient Greece, Hugo 
Grotius is considered hy many to he both the rounder of modern natural law theory 
so Ibid. 
' 1 Dworkin. R ··Natural Law Revisited'' Unin:rsity or Florida Law Review ( 1982) reprinted in 
Fcinburg. J and Gross. H (eds) Philosplwr ofLmr (5 11i ed) (1995) 156. 
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and the father or international law. Grotius believed that Divine Law ( natural law) 
was the source of all law and bound both states and individuals. 
The Law to which we appeal is one such as no king ought to deny to his subjects ... For it is a 
law derived from nature. to I.he common mother or us all.' 2 
The laws of nature hind nations, states Grotius, hut for a slightly different reason 
from that which binds individuals. 
The civil power is tl1e sovereign power of tlle state. A state is a perfect body of free men, 
united togetller in order to enjoy common rights and advantages. The less extensive right. is 
not derived from tlle civil power itself, altllough subject to it. is various. comprehending tl1e 
autl10rity of parents over children. masters over servants and tl1e like. But tl1e law of nations 
is a more extensive right, deriving its autl10rity from tl1e consent of all, or at least of many 
nations. 
It is proper to add many. because scarce any right can be found common to all nations. e.rcepl 
the !all' of nature, ll'hich itse(f 100 is generally called the !all' of nations. 53 (my italics) 
These divine laws or the laws of nature were given to man claims Grotius at three 
times in their history. 
Now tl1is law was given either to mankind in general. or to one particular people. We find 
tluec periods, at which it was given by God to tl1e human race, tlle first of which was 
immediately after tl1e creation of man, tlle second upon tlle restoration of mankind after the 
flood. and tl1e third upon tlle glorious restoration through Jesus Christ. These tluee laws 
undoubtedly bind all men, as soon as tl1ey come to a sufficient knowledge of them.54 
Therefore the laws of nature, which come from God, mandate the conduct of both 
nations and individuals. The question that must then be asked is how do the laws of 
nature bind individuals and nations that don't believe in the Christian God? Grotius 
answers this which a clarifying point. The law of nature is eternal and everlasting 
and would exist even if God did not, therefore as God is just his rules would never 
conflict with the laws of nature, as a consequence the same laws can hind believers 
and non-believers alike."" That is once they have knowledge of their existence. 
l .4.2 Thomas Hobbes 
Hobbes as a proponent of natural law theory was greatly inl1uenced hy Grotius 
however he !ell that while Grotius clearly established where laws originated his 
' 2 Grotius. II On Freedom of the Seas (tnms) Van Dcrrnm Magortin. R ( 1916) 10. 
53 Groitus. 11 011 rhe Lall' of War one/ Peuce (trru1s) C:unpbcll. A (2rn)I) 11. 
5~ Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 16. 
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Lheory did not fully eslahlish why people followed them. In an attempt to answer this 
question in his 165 l work Leriathan Hohhes advanced the theory of the social 
conlract. According to Hobbes man originally lived in a state of nature and the first 
law of this state was: 
A law of nature. (lex naturalis) is a precept, or general rule. found out by reason. by which a 
man is forbidden to do. that. which is destructive of his life. or taketh away tl1e means of 
preserving tl1e same: and to omit. tliat, by which he thinketl1 it may be best preserved. 56 
However the condition of man under this first law of nature was one of constant 
warfare. As a result of this constant warfare man desired peace so they developed the 
second law of nature: 
[T]hat a man be willing. when otl1ers are so too. as far-fortl1, as for peace. and defence of 
himself he shall tl1ink it necessary, to lay down tl1is right to all tl1ings; and be contented witl1 
so much liberty against otl1er man. as he would allow oilier men against himself. 57 
By accepting the second law of nature man transferred those rights necessary for 
peace and security to another person. This transfer constitutes a contract and 
acceptance of the contract can be either express or inferred.58 Therefore according to 
Hobbes' theory governments have the legitimate right to pass laws because each 
person by their continued membership in society has given implied acceptance of the 
social contract. 
1.4.3 Rousseau 
In l 762 Rousseau advanced the belief that acceptance of the social contract did not 
transfer an individual's rights to the sovereign but rather made him a part or the 
sovereign: 
Each of us puts his person and aJI his power in common under tl1c supreme direction of the 
general will: and we as a body receive each mcmhcr as :m indivisible part of tl1e whole. 
Immediatc:ly. U1is act of association produces. in place of tl1c individual persons ... a moral 
collective body. which is composed of as numy members as there arc votes in the 
assembly ... As regards tJ1e associates tJ1ey arc collectively called tl1e people. mid arc 
individual citizens as being participants in sovereign autJwrity and subjects as being hound hy 
tJ1c laws of the state.'" 
56 llohbcs. T Le1·imlw11 (World's Classics cdJ (1996) 86. 
57 Ibid. 87. 
58 Ibid. 
5'' Rousseau. J Tfw Social Co11tract (World's Classics cd) Betts. C (tr:ms) (1994) 56. 
U~Jl\'~RS!TY OF WAIKATO 
UE!HARY 
18 
Therefore laws arc legiLimalc nol only hccausc Lhe people have given consent Lo Lhe 
govcrnmenL to enact Lhcm hul hecause hy the nature of Lhe social conlract each 
memher or sociely is a part or the sovereign law making hody. If this approach is 
applied to international law then hy comparison a law would he legitimate for each 
member or the international community that is a part or the law making body. This 
definition is however still not fully satisfactory within the context of international law 
because it fails to address two issues. Firstly that of legitimacy within those bodies 
where the law making is done by a selected group of the membership60 and secondly 
the issue or legitimacy in relation to Parties outside the organisation. 
1.5 David Beetham 
In 1991 David Beetham developed a theory of legitimacy which contains aspects of 
both positivism and naturalism. In it he stated that power is legitimate if it is 
exercised with consent and in accordance with the rules. 61 
Disputes about the legitimacy. or rightfulness, of power are not just disputes about what 
someone is legally entitled to have or to do; lhey also involve disagreements about whether 
lhc law itself is justifiable, and whelhcr it confonns to a moral or political principle that arc 
rationally defensible. 62 
Legitimacy then according to Beetham concerns the moral or normative aspects of 
power relationships.6' Power is legitimate if; 
a. it conforms to established rules 
h. tlie rules cm be justified hy reference to beliefs shared hy lhe dominant and subordinate. 
and 
11H:re is cvitknce of consent hy the subordinate to t11c particular power rclationship.6~ 
1.6 Legitimacy in International Law 
While the afore mentioned principles or constitutional law have provided the 
foundations for the estahlishment or legilimacy in international law it has nol merely 
r," Examples or such groups arc the Security Council of the United Nations as well as the Consultative 
Group of t11e Antarctic Treaty System. 
61 Bect11am. supra n 32 at -l 
6 : !hid. 4. 
63 !hid. 25. 
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heen an exercise or transporting one to the other. This is hecause the entities that arc 
the agents or international law while having individual sovereignty do not maintain 
·'Parliamentary Sovereignty"' in the international arena. Therefore there is no over 
arching mandate in international law that states a law is a law because it was legally 
enacted hy a supreme authority. 
1.6.1 Thomas Franck 
Thomas Franck in attempting to adapt the constitutional law concept of legitimacy to 
international law developed the following and most widely accepted two-part 
definition of international legitimacy. 65 International legitimacy is primarily the 
"property of a rule or rule-making institution which itself exerts a pull towards 
compliance on those addressed normatively"66 and secondarily it is the perception 
"that the rule or institution has come into being and operates in accordance with 
generally accepted principles of right process." 67 
The principle concept in Franck' s definition is "normative". Webster defines 
normative as "of or establishing a norm". A "norm" is "a standard model or pattern 
for a group, a standard of conduct that should or must be followed". 68 Therefore the 
legitimacy of an international regime can he defined as the persuasive force of its 
norms, procedures and rules. Or in other words a regime is legitimate when the 
various actors associated with the organisation accept specific rules because they 
recognise their normative basis and accept that they should he followcd. 69 
Alternatively if the actors involved do not accept the normative nature or the rules the 
organisation lacks legitimacy. The actors associated with the organisation in turn fall 
into two different categories those who ltJrm part of the organisation (internal actors) 
6~lbid.16. 
6s Stokke. supra n 36 al 22. 
66 Franck. T The Pmrer uf Legiti111acr Among Nmiuns ( 1990) 16. 
67 lhid. 19. 
68 Webster. supra n 3 7 al 970. 
6~ Stokke. supra n 40 at 23. 
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and those who are nut pat1 of the organisation hut are associated with the activities of 
the organisation in some manner (external actors). 70 
l .6.2 Olav Schram Stokke 
The proceeding discussion on the various theories of legitimacy serve to show that 
there is no universally accepted understanding or application of the principle. The 
choice of what constitutes legitimacy is therefore based very much on individual 
philosophies. As such the selection of an analytical method for the assessment of the 
legitimacy of the ATS became a pragmatic issue. In this light I decided that the 
analytical method advanced by Stokke in 1996 would best suit the purposes of my 
thesis. However, in making this selection I am fully aware that this method may not 
suit the philosophical beliefs of all readers. 
Stokke developed his method of assessment by building on the work of Beetham and 
Franck and applying it specifically to the international arena. For the purposes of the 
analysis of legitimacy within the construct of international organisations Stokke 
divided legitimacy into two broad categories. both of which must be complied with 
before a regime may be called legitimate. 
Firstly the extent of the applicability of the rules of the regime. Applicahility refers to 
the quality of the rules, roles and procedures that the regime sets up. Applicability can 
he further divided into two parts. Firstly an internal aspect which addresses the 
extent to which the rules and procedures address the problem for which the 
organisation was designed. 71 Secondly an external component which requires that the 
"normative and structural components or a regime" comply with the major 
developments in the international community. This external component addresses the 
changing nature of legitimacy in that it requires that an organisation adapt to 
changing international norms in order to maintain its legitimacy. 
71 ' Ibid. 
71 Stokke. supra n 40 al 23. 
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The second category deals with the level of acceptance or the organisation's rules. 
Stokke's second category also has internal and external components. The degree to 
which it members acknowledge, implement and adhere to the rules and procedures or 
the organisation is used to gauge internal acceptance. 72 The strength and persistence 
or third party criticism is used to access external acceptance.7' 
In relation to the Antarctic the internal actors would he defined as the State Parties to 
the Antarctic Treaty and associated instruments developed under the auspices of the 
Treaty. 74 The external actors are those groups that are associated with the Antarctic 
Region in some manner but are not members of the A TS. 75 
1.6.3 The Consequences of Acceptance and Applicability on International 
Legitimacy 
As a result of the ability to have varying degrees of acceptance and applicability 
international legitimacy is not always an absolute. It is a continuum ranging from 
absolute acceptance to total rejection. 76 This continuum principle also means that 
legitimacy is not eternal, because an organisation was legitimate yesterday does not 
guarantee it will have legitimacy today and vice versa. This aspect is related to the 
fact that the nature or the problem or subject matter addressed hy the organisation 
I . 77 may c 1ange over time. As such because part of an organisation's legitimacy is 
based on the ability of its rules and procedures to resolve the problems for which the 
organisation was designed if these rules and procedures fail to change with the 
organisation, the organisation loses legitimacy. 78 
72 Ibid, 24. 
n Ibid. 25. 
74 SC AR will also he classified as an internal actor, for reasons that will he discussed in detail later. 
75 The main categories in this group arc non-party States. U1c United Nations and NGO's. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Rothchild. J ··Political Legitimacy in Contemporary Europe" in Denitch. B (ed) Legitimation uf 
Regimes ( 11)79) 39. 
78 Bceth,un. supra n 36 at 208. 
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1L also stands to reason that at some point on the continuum an organisation that races 
a legitimacy issue must hegin to lose some of its effectiveness. Because if the actors 
don't believe in the normative values been advanced hy the organisation they are 
going to feel under no obligation to comply with them. This situation applies both to 
those actors within and outside the organisation. 
1.7 Compliance and Legitimacy in International Law 
Under international law it is not sufficient to merely establish that laws are legitimate. 
It is an accepted principle of international law that a sovereign nation has nearly 
absolute authority to deal with its internal and external affairs in any manner it 
pleases. As such under the doctrine of national sovereignty, even if the laws are 
legitimate sovereign nations are under no legal obligation to comply with them. This 
then raises the question why do sovereign nations obey international law? 
It is generally acknowledged that nation-states accept international law because of 
consent. 79 It is however a different type of consent, unlike the individual who gives 
implied consent through his membership of society the consent of nations requires a 
formal acceptance process. However this process of formal acceptance is not 
absolute because even this voluntary acceptance is limited by the doctrine of national 
sovereignty. While the doctrine of national sovereignty has to a certain extent been 
eroded hy a numher of international instrumcnts80 to all intense and purposes it 
arguably remains the overarching doctrine of international affairs. Therefore a 
nation-state is under a moral duty hut not a legal obligation to adhere to international 
7'J Fawcett. .I The u111· of Notions ( 1968) 6. 
xr, This issue by its \'t:ry nature leads one into the controversy between universality and cultural 
relativism. I !owevcr I have neiU1cr the time nor space to enter into this debate in U1e current context. 
Sufficient lo say that U1c Western dominated political Uwught supports U1c contention U1at instruments 
such as U1c I lurnan Rights Declaration and U1c Geneva War Crimes Conventions are universal in 
nature and apply to all nations willwut U1c need for U1eir individual consent. Cultural relativists 
however believe the opposite and sec such instruments as U1c imposition of Western culture on non-
consenting nations. For furU1er in-depth debate read: Mal11cw. P ··[ lum;m Rights" in Puhlic 
/111erna1io11al u111·: An A11s1ralia11 Perspectii·e. (eds) Blay. S Piotrnwicz. Rand Tsmnenyi. M ( 1997). 
I (annum. ! I .. The Status of U1e Universal Declaration of I luman Rights in National ;md International 
Law ( 1998/91 12 lntcrights Bulletin. Ghai. Y ··The Critics of U1e Universal Declaration" ( 1998/9) 12 
lnterights Bulletin. 
instruments it has ratified and is under no ohligation what so ever Lo comply with 
instrumenLs it has nol ralified. The issue of compliance with international law is 
complicated further hy the fact that the international community, due Lo the doctrine 
of national sovereignty, ultimately cannot force compliance 81 even when a nation has 
given their consent to he bound by an instrument. As such if a sovereign nation does 
not feel any given rule of international law is legitimate Lhen they are under no legal 
obligation to comply with it and are not likely to feel a moral obligation to do so. 
All this places the Antarctic continent in a unique position in international law. With 
no clear sovereign authority its governance is subject to the consent principle of 
international organisations. However international law appears unable to adequately 
define the extent of this consent and who must give consent for what and which 
Parties have which rights in the region. As such the legitimacy of any system of 
Antarctic governance would at best be clouded. Therefore any organisation that 
professed to he the legitimate organ of governance for the region would need to be 
particularly diligent in ensuring that their claims have the support of the international 
community. 




THE HUMAN PRESENCE IN ANTARCTICA: A CHRONOLOGY 
OF OVER-EXPLOITATION FOLLOWED BY CONSERVATION 
The historic relationship of humanity with the marine living resources of Antarctica 
has followed an established and disturbing pattern of discovery, over-exploitation, 
moving on to the next resource, followed by belated attempts to conserve what has 
already been destroyed. Today it is recognised that the fragile Antarctic environment 
cannot tolerate this level of abuse and if the region is to be preserved for future 
generations then the legacy of over-exploitation must be reversed. This realisation has 
led to the emergence of a new environmental ethos, which has resulted in the 
development of environmental instruments to protect the Antarctic environment from 
further harm. However while these instruments should in theory be adequate to 
ensure environmental protection they can only maintain their effectiveness as long as 
the organisations propounding them have international legitimacy. 
2.1 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Seals 
Fur seals became the first Antarctic victims of over exploitation in the late 1800's. 
Due to extensive over-exploitation or the resource the population of Antarctic fur 
seals, in some locations, had heen virtually eliminated by the end of the 1820's82 , at 
which point the scalers moved on to the harvest or elephant seals for oil. 83 Within 10 
years they had reduced the elephant seal population by 70%. 84 The commercial 
sealing industry although not maintaining the unsustainable annual harvests of the 
1820s and 30s did not end in Antarctic waters until 1964. 85 
82 In 1920 alone 91 ship harvested 1.2 million seals. Hanson. J and Gordon. J Antarctic Environments 
and Resources: A Geographical Perspective ( 1998) 198. 
Sl [t,iJ. 
8~ lhiLI. 199. 
8' Sealing ceased at this time because it was nn longer commercially viable. Ibid. 
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In response lo Lhis hislory of over exploilalion Lhc J\nlarclic Trcaly Consultalive 
Parties (J\ TCPs) in 1972 adopted the Convention for the Conservalion of J\nlarctic 
Seals. The purpose of the Convention was to protect the Antarclic seal population 
from furlher exploitation. 
Recognizing the general concern about the vulnerability of Antarctic seals to commercial 
exploitation and the consequent need for effective conservation measures ... 
Recognizing tliat the stocks of Antarctic seals are an important living resource in the 
marine environment which requires an international agreement for its effective 
conservation: ... 
Recognizing t11at t11is resource should not be depleted by over-exploitation. and hence that 
any harvesting should be regulated so as not to exceed the levels of the optimum 
sustainable yield: ... 
Desiring to promote and achieve the objectives of protection, scientific study and rational 
use of Antarctic seals. and to maintain a satisfactory balance within the ecological 
system .... 86 
At the time of the drafting of the Seal Convention the Antarctic seals were not in any 
immediate danger of commercial exploitation. The Convention was in fact created to 
prevent future over-exploitation should there be a return of commercial sealing to the 
Antarctic. Therefore it is both proactive and reactive in nature. Subsequent events 
indicate that the ATCPs may indeed justified in their concerns over the return of 
commercial harvesting to the Antarctic. In 1987 the Russian's announced that in 
accordance with their rights under Article IV of the Convention87 , they had culled 
5,000 seab from Antarctic waters, "to clarify possible ways of utilising Antarctic 
seals for the needs of the national economy.''88 More recent events could have 
repercussions not only for Antarctic seals but also for seals world-wide. Over the 
86 Convention for l11e Conservation of Antarctic Seals. Preamble. 
87 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, 1972. Article IV. 
I. Not11wit11stamJing t11e provisions of this Convention, any Contracting Party may issue permits to 
kill or capture seals in limited quantities and in conformity with t11e objectives and principles of this 
Convention for l11e following purposes. 
(a) to provide indispensable food for men or dogs: 
(h) to provide for scientific research; or 
(c) to provide specimens for museums, educational or cultural institutions. 
2. Each Contracting Party shall. as soon as possible. inform t11e ot11er Contracting Parties and 
SCAR of the purpose and Ilic content or all permits issued under paragraph ( 1) or the Article and 
subsequently of Ilic numbers killed or captured under t11ese pcnnits. 
ss Environmental Defence ... Soviets Conlirm Start or Commercia.l Seal Harvest" (1987) Ncwslellcr 
Vol XVIIL No .5 ( IO/I0/0 I) 
<http://www.en vironmcntaldeft:nse .org/pubs/E DF-Let tcr/ 1987 /Nov/d_seals.h trnl>. 
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past few years there has heen a marked increase in holh Lhe price or and demand ft1r 
sealskins on the Canadian market. 89 In 200 l the annual No1th American Fur and 
Fashion Exposition displayed a collection of seal skin garments. As a resull of the 
success of the collection there is talk of the establishment of a seal tannery in order to 
make the product more available to the market.90 
It is possible that these events, while appearing to be isolated and insignificant, may 
be signalling a resurgence in the commercial viability of sealing operations and if this 
is so the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals may soon be facing its 
first big test. Therefore the question of legitimacy becomes one of major impmtance. 
The Sealing Convention operates under the auspices of the A TS. As such if the A TS 
lacks legitimacy then it is unlikely that the Convention, even in the face of the return 
of the seal populations to their pre-exploitation levels 9 1, can maintain its effectiveness 
and adequately protect the Antarctic seals the in the event of a resurgence of 
commercial activity. 
2.2 The International Whaling Convention and The Convention on the 
Conservation of Antarctic Living Marine Resources92 
It is one of Antarctic science's ironies that one of the major factors in the return of 
seal numbers to their pre-exploilation numbers has been the increase in the 
availability or their primary food source, krill, due to the reduction in Lhe number of 
whales.'n 
8" Northern News Service ... Seal Markel Comeback" (Augusl 2001) <hllp://www.nnsl.com>. 
•)(I Ibid. 
91 Hanson. supra n 82 at 209. 
'12 Some readers may he questioning what relevance the legitimacy or CCAMI.R has on U1c legitimacy 
of the ATS. While it is acknowledged that CCAMLR is a free-standing Convention with its own 
Commission and Secretariat. these two groups have a high degree of interaction :md U1eir decision-
making groups arc essentially identical. As such the evidence supports U1e contention Urnt the 
Iegiti1nacy. or lack there of. of one of these entities directly rcllects on U1e other. For an in-depth 
analvsis of this issue sec Chaptcr Eleven infra at 103. 
93 !hid. 
27 
The exploitation or Antarctic whales hegan in 1904 with the estahlishment uf a shore 
hased whaling station on South Georgia Island. One whaling hoat operated from this 
station and in that year harvested 195 whales. By 1912 the region was home to six 
shore stations, 21 tloating factories and 62 whale catchers who were responsible for 
the harvesting of 10,670 whales. 94 The British Colonial Office controlled these 
I b d . . f 1· 9 ' s 10re- ase operations through the 1ssumg o 1censes. · However by 1925 
technology had developed to the point where the factory ships could follow the 
whalers into the open sea where the British had no authority to pass regulations and 
by 1930 41 factory ships and 232 catchers were working the Ross Sea area. The 
combined catch for the year was 40,000 whales.96 Whaling declined during WWII 
but soon returned to pre-war levels because of the high demand for whale oil. This is 
despite the fact that there had been no recovery in the whales stocks. As a result by 
196 l the blue and fin whale stocks had collapsed and the whalers moved on to the 
smaller sei and minke whales.97 
The over-exploitation of the Antarctic whales, and indeed whales world-wide, was of 
concern to many in the international community and several attempts had been made 
during this period to prevent further exploitation beyond sustainable levels. In 193 l 
the international community negotiated the Convention for the Regulation of Whaling 
(the Whaling Convention) in order to protect the Right Whales. Article 4 of the 
Convention clearly prohibits the harvesting of these whales: 
The taking or killing of right whales. which shall be deemed to include North-Cape whales. 
Grcenl,md whales. southern right whales. Pacific right whales :md southern pygmy whales is 
prohibited.98 
In 1937 a new agreement extended this protection to grey whales and placed certain 
prohibitions on the harvesting or other species. 
9~ Ibid. 202. 
9 ' Ibid. 
'!6 Ibid. 
97 Ibid. 204. 
98 Convention for the Regulation of Whaling 1931. Article 4. 
Article 5 includes a restriction of U1e talking of calves. immature whales and mothers wiU1 cal\'es. 
Article 9 declan:s U1e limits of the Convention Lo be all U1e waters of t11e world. including the high 
seas. territorial ;md national waters. Article 3 carries an exception for aboriginal whaling. 
28 
Article 4 
It is forbidden to take or kill Grey Whales and/or Right Whales. 
Article 5 
It is forbidden to take or kill any Blue, Fin, Humpback or Sperm whales below the following 
lengU1s, viz. : 
(a) Blue whales ................. 70 feel, 
(b) Fin whales .................. 55 feet, 
(c) Humpback whales ............ 35 feet, 
(d) Sperm whales ............... 30 feel. 99 
Article 7 of this agreement placed a restriction on the length of the whaling season, 
for baleen whales 1°0 , in Antarctic waters; 
ll is forbidden to use a factory ship or a whale calcher attached lhereto for lhe purpose 
of taking or treating baleen whales in any waters south of 40° South Latitude, except during 
ilie period from U1e 8ili day of December lo ilie 7th day of March following, both days 
inclusive, provided Uiat in U1e whaling season 1937-38 the period shall extend to the l5ili day 
of March, 1938, inclusive. 101 
The current international body for the regulation of whaling is the International 
Whaling Commission (IWC), which was established under the authority of Article 3 
of the Whaling Convention. In 1982 the Commission made a decision that came into 
effect in 1985 which introduced a zero catch quota for all commercial harvesting; 
NotwiU1standing U1e other provisions of paragraph 10, catch limits for ilie killing for 
commercial purposes of whales from all stocks for the 1986 coastal and the 1985/86 pelagic 
seasons and U1ereafter shall be zero. This provision will be kept under review, based upon U1e 
best scientific advice, and by 1990 at the latest the Commission will undertake a 
comprehensive assessment of the effects of this decision on whale stocks and consider 
modification of this provision. 102 
This action was followed in 1994 by the addition of Article 7(b) to the Whaling 
Convention, which created the Southern Ocean Sanctuary and prohibited commercial 
whaling in the region. 
In accordance wilh Arlicle V(l)(c) or the Convenlion, commercial whaling. wheilicr by 
pelagic opcrations103 or from land based stations, is prohibiled in a region dcsignaled as U1e 
94 Intcmalional Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling, 1937. Australian Trealy Series 1946 No 11. 
( 4/l 1/0 I) <www.austlii.edu.au/au/0U1cr/dfal/lreaties/l 946/ 11.html>. 
100 Baleen whales arc defined in Article 18 of the agrcemenl as being all whales. which arc not toothed 
whales. 
101 Intcmational Agreement on U1e Regulation of Whaling 1937, Article 7 .. 
102 Article I O(e) of U1e Schedule to the lnlcmational Convention for ilic Regulation of Whaling, 1946 
as modilied hv U1c 1982 meeting of U1e Commission. 
(6/8/01) <http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/iwcoflice/Schcdulc.lllm>. 
103 Pelagic whaling is Urnt done on U1c open sea Uuough the use of factory ships. 
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SouLhm1 Ocem1 S:mctuary. This Sanctuary comprises Lhe waters or U1e S0uU1em I kmisphere 
southwards or the following line: starting from 40 degrees S. 50 degrees W: U1ence due east to 
20 degrees E: thence due souU1 to 55 degrees S; U1ence due east to I 30 degrees E: U1ence due 
norU1 to 40 degrees S: U1ence due easL to 130 degrees W: U1ence due souLh to 60 degrees S: 
thence due east to 50 degrees W: Ulence due norU1 Lo point of beginning. This prohibition 
applies im:spcctive of the conservation status of baleen and toothed whale stocks in U1is 
Sanctuary. as may from time to time be determined by U1e Commission. Nothing in this sub-
paragraph is intended to prejudice the special legal and political status of Antarctica. 104 (my 
italics) 
Article 56 of the 1982 United Nations Law of the Seas Convention states: 
I. In U1e exclusive economic zone, Lhe coastal State has: 
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing 
U1e natural resources. whetller living or non-living, of the waters supcrjacent to Ule sea-bed 
and of Ule sea-bed and its subsoil. and wilh regard to ot11er activities for Ule economic 
exploitaLion and exploration of t11e zone ... 105 
Although the extent of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) has not been defined in 
any international instrument review of national legislation indicates that it is 
customary for this area to be set at the 200 mile limit. 106 This has lead to the 
development of an unique situation in the Antarctic whereby certain of the Claimant 
States have enacted national legislation establishing a 200 mile EEZ in relation to 
their Antarctic claims but have chosen not to enforce them preferring instead to apply 
the collective measures of the ATS. 107 The application of these ATS instruments is 
however voluntary and under international law the Claimant States would be fully 
entitled to exercise their exclusive rights to ihe resources of this zone. As such the 
political rights of the Claimant States recognised by the IWC in Article 7(h) includes 
the right of access to the marine resources. 
Article I of the or the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources (CCAMLR) states; 
This ConvcnLion applies to U1e Antarctic marine living resources of the area south of 60 
degrees south latituJe and Lo U1e Antarctic marine living resources of t11c area between Lhat 
latitude :md the Antarctic convergence which form part or the Antarctic marine ecosystem. 
10~ I hid. Article 7(h) of the Schedule to t11e lnLemational Convention for the Regulation of\Vhaling, 
1946 as modified hv the Commission in 1994. 
1'1' Article 56 !982 LJniteJ Nations Law of Sea convention. ATS 1994 No JI. 
1" 6 Orrego Vicuna. F 11Je E1cl11sil'e Ecunomic Zone ( 1989) 245. 
H•7 IhiJ. 178. 
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However Article VI dearly states that on the issue or whales CCAMLR deters to the 
IWC. 
Nothing in u1is Convention shall derogate from U1e rights ,md obligations of Contracting 
Parties under u1e International Convention for U1e Regulation or Whaling and the Convention 
for U1e Conservation of Antarctic Seals. 
These two aniclcs in essence create a circular situation with each organisation 
deferring to the authority of the other. As such if the ATS loses its legitimacy then it 
cannot grant to the IWC the right to exercise control over the Antarctic whales. 
Likewise if the ATS were to lose its legitimacy the Claimant States would likely opt 
to exercise their EEZ rights under UNCLOS. ff this occurred there is currently no 
international instrument that could prevent them from exploiting the Antarctic 
Whales. Therefore the legitimacy of the ATS is essential for the continued 
conservation of the whales. 
2.3 The Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
and the Fishing Industry 
The harvesting of Antarctic finfish 108 species began in the 1969/70 season and the 
activity rapidly reached unsustainable levels. Reported catches of marbled rockcod 
peaked at 399,700 tonnes in 1969/70 then declined to 101,506 tonnes in 1970/71 and 
2,740 in 1971/72 as the fishery collapsed due to over-fishing. 109 Mackerel icefish 
were also exposed to intensive fishing during this period with peak annual catches of 
71,260-146,450 tonnes in the early 1970s however these catches dropped in the mid 
1980s. It has been theorised that the drop in catch was due to localised depletion of 
stocks. 110 As a result of these and other associated instances of unsustainable 
harvesting it is estimated that 12 of the 13 commercial species in the region can 
currently he classiried as deplcted. 111 
11 '~ Finlish is a term used to separate true fish from shelll'ish. LTayfish. jellyfish etc. Fishhasc ... Fish 
Base Glossary·· ( 15/8/0 l) <http://www.lishhase.org>. 
1'"' CCAMLR Scientific Committee ... Fisheries Monitoring" (12/l 0/99,l 
<http://www.ccmnLr.org '!I :nglish/c_sci_ct tec/e_lish_moint/e_lish_mon it_intro.h lm>. 
11 " Ibid .. 
111 Hanson. supra n 76 at 211. 
11 
With the depletion of the finfish stocks the fishing industry turned its attenlion to 
krill. Krill, which consists of 49(7< protein, is the major source of energy in the 
Antarctic marine food chain. With a nutritional value that is slightly less than whole 
egg protein but higher than milk protein krill has been viewed as a potential protein 
source for the developing world. 112 Given this simple nutritional fact it is easy to see 
why the potential for the over-exploitation of this resource is so high. It is of major 
importance that krill in the region are not over-exploited because as a keystone 
species at the bottom of the Antarctic food chain any significant reduction in its 
biomass could have dramatic repercussions for the entire Antarctic marine 
11, ecosystem. -
The commercial harvesting of Krill began in 1972 with annual catches exceeding 
300,000 tonnes, the peak reported catch was 425,870 tonnes in 1985/86. Following 
the 1992 season the annual reported catches have dropped to between 80,000 and 
l 00,000 tonnes, 114 but even with these reduced catches krill fishing is the principle 
economic activity in the Southern Ocean. 115 
In the late 1970' s the history of over-exploitation of Antarctic marine resources 
(seals, whales and finfish) combined with concerns about the harvesting of krill 
inspired the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCP) to commence negotiations 
which resulted in the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources 1980 (CCAMLR). 116 While at its conception the main concern of the 
parties was the effects of the over-exploitation of krill on the Antarctic marine 
112 Ibid. 216. 
113 Ibid. 217. 
11 ~ The decline in catches has been attributed to economic factors rat11er Uian decline in U1e fishery. 
Among tJ1ese were; a shift from krill to linfish and U1e break-up of the Soviet Union which was U1c 
dominate party in t11e lishery. CCAMLR, "'Fisheries" (2 l/10.99) 
<http://www.ccamlr.org/English/e_sci_cttec/e_fish_monit/c_harvested_species_intro.l1tm>. 
11 \'CAMLR. CCAIVII.R Newsletter No 22. J,m 2001 (IJ/2/01) 
<http://www.ccmnlrorg/English/e_nltr/e_nltr 22_p l .Uun>. 
116 C'CAMLR. "M:magcment of tlH: Antarctic" (8/l l/01) d1ttp://www.ccamlar.org>. 
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ecosystem Lhe Convenlion has effectively established control over all Anlarclic 
fisheries. 
1. The objective or this convention is the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources. 
2. For the purposes of the Convention, the tenn "conservation" includes rational use. 
3. Any harvesting and associated activities in tJ1e area to which tJ1is Convention applies 
shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Convention and with tJ1e 
following principles of conservation: 
(a) prevention of decrease in the size of any harvested population to levels below those 
which ensure its stable recTUitment. .. 
(b) maintenance of ecological relationships between harvested, dependent and related 
populations of Antarctic marine living resources and restoration of depleted 
populations to tJ1e levels defined in sub-paragraph (a) above: and, 
(c) prevention of changes or minimisation of tJ1e risk of changes in the marine 
ecosystem which are not potentially reversible over two or three decades .... 117 
Since its establishment, under Article 7 of the Convention, the CCAMLR 
Commission has adopted numerous conservation measures 118 in order to prevent 
further over-exploitation of Antarctic finfish. While I believe that many of these 
conservation measures have been very effective in the battle against over-exploitation 
the Commission nevertheless has it critics. 119 The most common complaints revolve 
around the issue of illegal fishing in the Southern Ocean 120• Illegal fishing has been 
identified hy the Commission as the most significant issue currently facing the 
Convention Parties 121 however critics such as Greenpeace claim that the Commission 
is only paying lip service to the problem and continues to buckle to the economic 
pressure placed on them hy Lhe fishing industry. 122 Also researchers outside the ATS 
have raised doubts about the quota system established hy the Commission. They 
117 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Mm·ine Living Resources 1980. Article II. 
118 These include tJ1e establishment of quotas for tJ1e various fisheries and tJ1e regulation of marketing 
tJ1rough tJ1e catch documentation scheme. CCJ\MLR, "Conservation Measures" (8/11/01) 
<http://www.ccmnlr.org>. 
11 ') Fifteen countries participated in the CCJ\MLR fisheries progrmn in tJ1e 1998/99 season. The main 
species controlled by CCJ\MLR progr,uns in tJ1at year were: krill ( Euphausia superba). Patagonian 
toothfish (Dissostichus eleginoides), Antan.:tic toothfish (Dissostichus mawsoni) and mackerel icelish 
(Charnpsocephalus gunnari>. lndeptJ1 detail concerning tJ1e effectiveness of the conservation measure 
can be accessed on tJ1e CCJ\MLR website. <www.ceamlr.org>. 
1 eu The issue of illegal fishing m1d its effects on tJ1e legitimacy or the ATS will be discussed in deptJ1 in 
chapter eleven. 
1e1 CCAMLR. supra n 108. 
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hdieve that the due to slow growth rates, late achievement or sexual maturity and low 
reproduction the Antarctic l"infish cannot survive the high level of harvest allowed by 
the Commission quotas. 121 
The Commission has also adopted conservation measures for two Antarctic krill 
fisheries. 124 The measures establish a total catch for the two areas of 1.95 million 
tonnes for the 98/99 and 99/2000 seasons. These figures allow a catch that is 
currently considerably higher than the actual catches for the respective seasons. 125 
While the Commission is attempting through these measures to establish a 
sustainable harvesting regime there appears to be an anomaly in their current 
approach. In 2000 the Commission scientists conducted extensive research on the 
extent and nature of the krill stocks. This program collected a large volume of data 
on the krill stocks, which the Commission reported would take years to fully analyse. 
In January and February 2000, vessels ... took part in the CCAMLR-2000 Krill Survey in the 
Southwest Atlantic (Area 48) .. .The survey has yielded a substantial amount of complex data. 
Analrsis 11·i/l rake many years and ll'ill result in a significant increase in the knml'ledge of 
krill distribution ... Already work carried out. .. has enable the Commission to set more 
accurate limits for krill fishing in 2001. 126 (my italics) 
Following the publishing of this report the Commission increased the krill quotas for 
the 2000/0 I season. 127 This action raises questions as to the management policies of 
the Commission. They had already reported that they had a large amount of data on 
the krill stocks yet to be fully analysed. The total catch of krill for the pervious two 
seasons had been well below the set quota. Therefore in the absence of any apparent 
pressure to increase quotas it is difficult for the casual observer to understand why the 
122 Greenpeace ... Business as Usual for CCAMLR as Antarctic's Fish and Wildlife Hang in tl1e 
Bal:mce" (3 Nov 2000) <Greenpeace.org/oceans.html>. 
123 Hanson. supra n 76 at 211. 
12~ Conservation measure 32, which covers area 48 and conservation measure 45. which covers an:a 
58.4.2. CCAMLR .. Conservation measures·· (7 / 11/0 I) 
<htlp://www.ccamlr.llrg/English/e_pubs/e_measures/c_cm98_99/e_cm98_99p3.hun>. 
12 ) The reported catches for tl1e seasons were 103.318 for 1998/99 and l O 1.286 for 1999/2000. 
CCA.1\11.R "Newslcller" No 21 Dec 1')99 and No 22 .Jan 2001 (13/2/01) supra n !05. 
12r. Ibid. 
127 The catch for tl1c 2000/01 season was increased from 1.95 lo 4.45 million tonnes. CCAMLR. 
··Newsletter" 22 J,m 200 I. supra n I 05. 
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Commission did not leave the quotas unchanged unti I all the in formation had heen 
analysed. Anomalies such as this are not sufficient in themselws to threaten the 
legitimacy or the Commission. However, if such anomalies continue to occur they 
could result in the development of concerns among the external actors as to the 
continued ahility of the Commission to adequately prevent the over-exploitation 
Antarctic marine resources. 
While it is difficult at this point to access whether the criticisms of the Commission's 
efforts are justified, for our purposes it does not matter. Because the conservation 
measures established by the Commission are voluntary in nature the Commission 
must be seen to be legitimate before it can adequately protect the Antarctic fisheries. 
The legitimacy of the Commission is particularly vital in relation to the krill fishery 
because what exists here is a unique situation in the history of Antarctic resource 
exploitation; a chance to establish a sustainable fishing regime prior to over-
exploitation. 
2.4 Conclusion 
It is clear from the above discussion that the legitimacy or lack there of the ATS and 
its associated organisations has definite ramifications for environmental protection in 
the Antarctic. This is because the environmental protection mechanisms in place in 
the region, as with all international instruments, rely on voluntary compliance. 
Therefore ir the ATS as the initiator of these instruments lacks legitimacy the 
countries involved in the Antarctic are not likely to led obligated to comply with 
them. This would normally only he of nominal concern because one would assume 
that if one group or international conventions failed to oiler the required protection 
that another would expand to fill the void, however in relation to the Antarctic this 
may not be the case. It would appear that these instruments may have expressly or 
implicitly waved jurisdiction over the Antarctic region. We have already discussed 
this paradigm in relation to the IWC, however it has been suggested that the United 
Nations Convention on the I ,aw or the Sea (UNCI ,OS) has also implicitly waved its 
jurisdiction over the region in favour of the ATS. 
According to some autJwrs. the Convention of 1982 is deprived of all effect wiU1 respect to 
U1e S0ut11 Pole. any reference to U1e Antarctic having been carefully avoided in t11e 
preparatory work owing to U1e divergence of opinion on this 4uestion. 1~8 
It must be acknowledged at this point that the international law situation as it relates 
to Antarctica's environmental protection instruments is no different from the 
problems faced by the rest of the international legal community. That is the doctrine 
of national sovereignty and the need for formal consent compounded by an inability 
to enforce. However the situation in the Antarctic is somewhat different from that 
which exists in the rest of the world. Antarctica is the last great wilderness the 
majority of which remains untouched by humanity. The majority of international 
instruments are dealing with the existing problems of humanity and as such they have 
a certain leeway in regards to getting it right. In Antarctica however, we have a 
unique situation where if humanity gets it right the first time they can prevent harm 
from occurring. Although it would be an optimum situation to have the current 
problems solved for the entire international law arena it is critical that the 
imperfections be corrected in relation to the Antarctic. With this in mind the 
legitimacy of the ATS becomes and issue of paramount importance because the ATS 
cannot hope to overcome the problems that exist in the international legal system 
unless it maintains an optimum level of legitimacy. In Antarctica the legal 
community has an opportunity to demonstrate to the world that international law can 
work. To lose such a great opportunity would be a tremendous loss for international 
law, but if this oppottunity were loss due lo lack of legitimacy it would he a tragedy 
for Antarctica. 
128 Gautier. P ··The Maritime Area of U1e Antarctic and t11e New Law of the Sea" in The Anrarcric 
E111'iron111ent and l111ernmiunal urn· Verhoeven . .J Sands. P and Bruce, M (eds) (1992) LB. 
CHAPTER THREE 
THE LEGITIMACY OF TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY CLAIMS 
IN ANTARCTICA 
Before commencing an in-depth debate on the legitimacy of the ATS it is first 
necessary to hriefly analyse the Antarctic territorial sovereignty claims both 
historically and in their current context. This analysis is necessary because under the 
doctrine of national sovereignty if the territorial claims are legitimate and recognised 
by international law then a debate surrounding the legitimacy of the ATS would be 
irrelevant because the national governments of the Claimant States could do as they 
wished within their territorial boundaries. However if the legitimacy of the territorial 
claims is questionable and they are not recognised in international law then the 
legitimacy of the ATS as the organ of governance for the Antarctic becomes an issue 
of paramount importance. 
Sovereignty claims in the Antarctic are currently held in limbo by Article IV of the 
Antarctic Treaty. Article IV while preventing the filing of new claims or the 
extension of existing claims acknowledges the existence of and gives priority to those 
claims filed prior to the drafting of the Treaty. 
1. Nothing in U1e present Treaty shall be interpreted as: 
(a) a renunciation or diminution by ,my Contracting Party of previously asserted rights of 
claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica; 
(b) a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party or any basis of claim to territorial 
sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have wheU1er as a result of its activities or U1ose 
or its nationals in Antarctica, or 0U1erwise; 
(c) prejudicing U1e position of any Contracting Party as regards its recognition or non-
recognition of any other State·s rights of or claim or basis of claim to territorial 
soven:ignty in Antarctica. 
2. No acts or activities taking place while U1e present Treaty is in force shall constitute a 
basis for asserting. supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or 
create any righls or sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing 
claim. to territorial sovereignty in Antan:tica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in 
forcc. 1'') 
1'" Antarctic Treaty 1951. Article IV. 
There are seven states that have such claims, Australia, Argentina, Chile, France. 
Great Britain, New Zealand and Norway. 130 We will also look at the positions of 
Russia and the United States in relation to territorial claims because although they 
ha vc not filed official claims they have reserved the right to do so at a later date. 131 
3.1 Basis for Claims to Territorial Sovereignty in International Law 
One of the essential elements of statehood under international law is the occupation 
of a territorial area. The supreme authority vested in the state in relation to this area 
is called territorial sovereignty. 132 The Permanent International Court of Justice 
(PICJ) suggested in the Legal Status of Greenland case that: 
[A] claim to sovereignty based not upon some particular act or title such as a treaty of 
cession but merely upon continued display of authority, involves two elements each of which 
must be shown to exist; tl1e intention and will to act as sovereign. and some actual exercise or 
display of such autl1ority. 133 
They later added in the Island of Pa/mas Arbitration that, 
Sovereignty in tl1e relations between States signifies independence. Independence in regard 
to a portion of the globe is tl1e right to exercise therein. to the exclusion of any other State, tl1e 
functions or a State .13~ 
110 It is interesting to note tliat Japan while been a major player in the Antarctic region has no territorial 
claim. This is a result of Article 2(c) of the Treaty of Peace 19.'i I. "Japan renounces all claim to any 
right or title to or interest in connection with any part of the Antarctic area. whether deriving from tl1e 
activities of .Japanese nationals or otherwise." Treaty of Peace with .Japm1. signed 8 September 19.'i I. 
entered into force 28 April l').52. (27/9/01) 
<http://www.vcn.bc.ca/alpha/slpt/SanFranciscoPcaccTreatyl 9.51.htm>.<iSPAN><Sl';\N 
sryk="'F( lNT-Sl/:1: !,!pt; msn-bitli-f, ,nt-,ill': l 2.f )pr">d)P></0:P:.-,.<fSPAN> 
111 The possihility that tl1esc two powerful nations could file a claim at some point in tl1e future is a 
matter of some importance. Especially as claims based on tl1c doctrine or discovery would cnahle 
111cm to make claims to large areas of lhe Antarctic tliat are cum:ntly subject to claim by other States. 
1.i~ Shearer. I Starl,/.1· /11ternatio11al u.111· (11' 11 ed) (1984) 144. Shaw. M /111ernatio11al u.11r (3"1 ed) 
(1991) 278. 
in Legal Sw111s of fa stern Greenland ( Norl!'lir 1· Denmark I ( I 933) PICJ Series NB No 53. Electronic 
version <http://www.ksumail.kcnncsavi.cdu-cli/green.hUn>. 
rn The /slancl c!f Palma.,· Arbirration 22 J\JIL ( 1928) 87.'i. 
Sovereignly therefore equates Lo the ahility or an entity to adequatdy perform the 
functions of a State and territorial sovereignty is the ahility or that 'State· entity to 
exercise those functions within a defined space. 
This definition however leaves unanswered two vital questions: 
1. What are the functions of the state? 
2. How does the State initially acquire the territory over which it wishes to exercise 
control? 
3.1.1 Functions of the State 
The independence that allows a state to claim territorial sovereignty over a region 
creates a system of powers and rights that correlate with the functions of the state 
within that territory. Although these powers and rights are numerous there are three 
central to the current debate. 
1. The state has the power to control domestic affairs within the territory. 
2. In a Westminster style government both common law and statute give the state 
broad powers of discretion over the admission and deportation of aliens to and 
from their territory. 
3. The state has the exclusive jurisdiction over crimes committed within the 
• J1'i temtory. · · 
3.1.2 Territorial Acquisition 
There are five methods or teITilorial acquisition currently recognised under 
. . l l Th · 116 • 117 . . 118 . J1C) mternat10na aw. ese are; annexatmn, · accretton, · prescnpt10n, · cessmn, · · 
rn Shearer. supra n 122 at 91. 
m Annexation occurs when a state takes over the territory of another state. This ecm occur in two 
ways: I. Conqll(:ring or subjugation. 2. Annexation or territory subject to virtual subordination. In 
both U1ese situations possession of the land must he followed by a formally declared intention to 
annex. The international community will not. or should not. recognise ,m m111exation tl1at is U1e result 
of an aggressive act U1at is contrary to the provisions of t11c United Nations Charter. Ibid. 152. 
and occupation. Occupation i.s the predominant method or territorial acquisition 
claimed in Antarctica. 
Occupation often follows discovery and i.s the estahlishment of sovereignty over 
territory that is not under the sovereign intluence or any other state (terra nullius). 
Occupation is an important aspect of claiming sovereignty over new lands because it 
is an accepted principle of international law that discovery is not sufficient to 
establish sovereignty unless followed by a significant acts of occupation. These acts 
must demonstrate that the state has both the intention to act as sovereign (animus 
occupandi) and the ability to exercise adequate sovereignty over the territory. 
Intention and ability can be demonstrated through physical possession, symbolic 
acts, 140 legislative and executive action 141 or recognition of the claim by other 
states. 142 
3.2 The Occupation Requirement in Antarctica 
Because of the severe climatic conditions, which exist in Antarctica, habitation in the 
normal sense could never be achieved. The uniqueness of occupation in relation to 
uninhabitable areas such as the Antarctic has been addressed by PICJ. 
Manifestations of territorial sovereignty assume. it is true. different forms. according to 
conditions of time and place. Although continuous in principle. sovereignty cannot be 
exercised in fact at every moment on every point of a territory. · The intermittcncc and 
discontinuity compatible with U1c maintenance of the right necessarily differ according as 
inhabited or uninhabited regions arc involvcd. 1~3 
137 This occurs when new territory is added to a state· s boundaries by U1e intervention of natural 
causes. No formal action is required for U1c state to claim territorial sovereignty over such areas. Ibid. 
1 38 This situation occurs when a state exercises peaceful de facto jurisdiction over U1e sovereign 
territory of another state for an extended period of time or as U1c result or lengU1y adverse possession. 
!hid. IH 
13') Cession occurs when one sovereign state transfers its territory tu :mother sovereign state. Ibid. 
1 ~·1 An ex:unple or such a symbolic act can be seen in U1e Clippe,1011 Island Arbitrarion ( 1931) 26 AJIL 
( l 932J 390. In this situation the fact Urnt Fr:mce had published a declaration of sovereignty in English 
in a I lawaii:rn journal was deemed to be sufficient to constitute a symbolic act or sovereignty. Shearer. 
supra n 122 at. 
1 ~1 •• •.• Legislation is one or the most obvious forms or U1e exercise or sovereign power. .. " Legal 
Status of Eastern Greenland, supra n 123. 
1~2 Shearer. supra n 72 at 147. 
w Island uf Pa/mas Arbitration 2 RIAA 840. 
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The Cm111 discussed the issue again in 1933 in its decision concerning the legal status 
or Eastern Greenland. 
II is impossible to read the records of the decisions in cases as to territorial sovereignty 
without observing that in rrnmy cases the tribunal has hcen satisfied with very lillle in U1e way 
of U1e actual exercise of sovereign rights .... This is particularly true in U1e case of claims to 
sovereignty over areas in U1inly populated or unscllled countries .... 14.i 
Therefore while not establishing any over arching principle as to what constitutes 
occupation in uninhabitable areas the proceeding judgements indicate that the 
threshold for occupation of such areas would likely he lower than that required in 
other regions. 
3.3 Basis for Claims of Territorial Sovereignty in Antarctica145 
Although the International Court has indicated that they may lower the occupation 
threshold for Antarctica the Claimant States must still provide evidence that their 
territorial sovereignty claims comply with international law. 
3.3.1 Argentina (Antartico Argentino) 
The Argentinean claim is declared as the region between 25° West and 74° West 
longitudes, extending south of 60 ° South to the Pole. Although Argentina did not 
issue a formal statement of claim to this territory until 1957 the claim is based on the 
premise that the area has always been part of their metropolitan territory. 146 The basis 
of this claim is inheritance from Spain of lands granted to them hy a Papal Bull issued 
144 Lego/ St mus c!f Eastern Green/mu/. supra n 121. 
14~ There arc five interesting points surrounding U1e territorial sovereignty claims in Antarctica: 
l. The States involved are merely Claimant States. as U1eir status in relation to Uie areas Uiey claim has 
not been legally established. 2. The claims or Argentina. U1e United Kingdom ~md Chile currently 
overlap. 3. There is a large portion of the Antarctic. which is not subject to claim from any State. 4. 
While some territorial claims are recognised by other Claimant States 110 0U1cr States have recognised 
U1e territorial claims in Antarctica. 5. Non-Claimant States are divided into two groups. U10se who 
have no basis or desire to assert claims and a group of two. Russia and America. U1at have reserved U1e 
right to file a claim in U1e future. 
146 In 1904 Argentina took possession of the Souili Orkneys by Executive Decree and in l 946 dd'ined 
U1e western limits of its claim. On February 28 1957 U1e government re-established The National 
Territory of Tierra dcl Fuego. U1e Antarctic :mtJ U1e lslm1ds of the S0uU1 Atlantic. Hanessian. J 
.. National Interests in Antarctica'" in I IaU1erton. T (ed) Antarctica ( 1965) 12. 
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hy Pope Alexander VII in l 49J. 147 The effect or this Bull was to divide the world in 
two, giving Africa to Portugal and the New World to Spain. In 1494 the Treaty of 
Tordesillas moved the prior houndaries to a line drawn from the Arctic to the 
Antarctic Poles hetween 46°and 49° west krngitude. 148 Argentina maintains that as 
the maps of the time showed Terra Australis as a continent almost touching South 
America it can he inferred that what ever lay to the south belonged to Spain and its 
heir. 
Although inheritance is the historic basis of the Argentinean claim they hase the 
continued legitimacy of their claim on occupation 149 and administrative acts. 150 In 
147 The Papa! Bull followed the arbitration of a dispute between Lhe kingdom of Portugal and lhe kings 
of Castille and Aragon over newly discovered territories. "Furlhermore, under penalty of 
excommunication late sententie lo be incurred ipso facto, should anyone tlrns contravene. we strictly 
forbid aJl persons of whatsoever rank. even imperial and royal, or of whatsoever estate, degree, order, 
or condition, to dare. witl1out your special permit or tliat of your aforesaid heirs and successors, to go 
for lhe purpose of trade or any olher reason to tl1e islands or mainlands, found and to be found. 
discovered and to be discovered. towards tl1e west and sout11. by drawing and establishing a line from 
tl1e Arctic pole to tl1e Antarctic pole, no matter whelher tl1e mainlands and islands. found and to be 
found, lie in tl1e direction of India or toward any olher quarter whatsoever, t11e said line to be distant 
one hundred leagues towards tl1e west and soutl1, as is aforesaid, from any of the islands commonly 
known as tl1e Azores and Cape Verde: apostolic constitutions and ordinances and otl1er decrees 
whatsoever to tl1e contrary notwitl1sta.nding. Pope Alex:mder VI The bull Inter Caetera May 4 1493. 
<http://www.nativeweb.org/page/legal/indig-inter -caetera.htrni>. 
1~8 That, whereas a certain controversy exists between tl1e said lords, U1eir constituents. as to what 
lands. of all t110se discovered in U1e ocean sea up to tl1e present day, tl1e date of this treaty. pertain to 
each one of the said parts respectively: tl1erefore. for tl1e sake of peace and concord, :md for U1e 
preservation of the relationship agreed U1at a boundary or straight line be determined and drawn nortl1 
and souU1. from pole to pole. on tl1e said ocean sea. from tl1e Arctic to tl1e Antarctic pole. This 
boundary or line shall be drawn straight. as aforesaid. at a distm1ee of tl1ree hundred and seventy 
leagues west of t11c Cape Verde lsl:mds. being calculated by degrees .... And all 1:mds. botl1 islands and 
mainlands. found and discovered already. or to he found and discovered hereafter. hy the said King of 
Portugal and by his vessels on tJ1is side of tl1e said line and hound determined as ahove. toward U1e 
east. in eilher norU1 or soutl1 latitude. on t11e eastern side of lhe said bound provided t11e said bound is 
not crossed. shall belong to. and remain in U1e possession of. and pertain forever to. U1e said King of 
Portugal and his successors. J\nd aJI otl1er l:mds. tx,t11 islands ;md mainl:mds. found or to he found 
hereafter. discovered or to he discovered hereafter. which have been discovered or shall be discovered 
by U1e said King and Queen of Castile. Aragon. elc .. ;md by U1eir vessels. on tl1e western side of the 
said hound. detennined as ahove. after having passed U1e said bound toward tl1e west. in eit11er its norU1 
or sout11 latitude. shall belong to. and remain in the possession of, and pertain forever to. U1e said King 
and Queen of Castile. Leon. de .. ,md to tl1eir successors. 
Treaty of Tordesillas l..ll)4. <hllp://www.yale.edu/1awweh/avalon/modcur/mod00 I .htm>. 
,~,J Argentina claims U1at t11ey have demonstrated continuous ;md uninterrupted occupation of the 
Antarctic region since 1904. The basis or this claim are U1e activities conducted at t11eir weather station 
on t11e South Orkneys. Quigg. supra n 14 at 118. 
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facL of all Lhe ClaimanL SLaLes J\rgenLina has heen Lhe musL acLive in asserLing Lhcir 
claim through dtecLive occupation. 151 The region of Lhe Antarctic claimed by 
Argentina hecamc suhject Lo Lheir domestic laws in 1957 when it was placed under 
the administration of the Gnvernor of Tierra de! Fuego. Since that Lime the 
government of J\rgcntina has engaged in numerous officia! 152 and symbolic 15:i 
activities in order to further advance their sovereignty claims. Argentina currently 
maintains an active scienLific presence on the ice, operating six permanent and seven 
summer stations in the 2000 season. 154 
3.3.2 Australia (Australian Antarctic Territory) 
Although Australia had been active in the Antarctic since before 1908 they did not 
file a formal claim to territorial sovereignty until 1933. On February 7 of that year a 
British Order-in-Council claimed the territory south of 60° South latitude and lying 
between 160° and 45° East longitudes, excluding that area claimed by France, and 
1' 0 Argentina has in Uie past claimed two other principles to support Uieir territorial claim, however 
neiUier of these arc currently recognised by international law. 
Geographical Contiguity/Proximity: Contiguity is a principle of international law used in Uie 
nineteenili century as the basis for claiming sovereignty over offshore islands. However it is 
considered unlikely Uiat Uiis principle could be effectively used in tlie case of Antarctica as such a 
large expanse of ocean separates U1e two land masses. Therefore Argentina has adjusted its claim to 
one of proximity, Uiis has Uie result of giving Chile a superior claim but discrediting Uiat of Britain. 
Quigg. supra n 14 at 114. 
Geographical Affinity: Both Argentina and Chile have argued iliat structurally the Antarctic Peninsula 
and Ellsworth Land arc a continuation of Uie Andes and Uierefore natural extensions of U1c territory of 
both States. However, if Uiis argument were accepted Uie claims would not extend lo Uic Pole as Uie 
TransAntarctic Mountains and Uie polar plateau have no geographical relationship to Uie Andes. Ibid, 
115. 
1' 1 As a demonstration of Uicir effective occupation Argentina colonised Hope Bay in 1978. Soon after 
Uie colony was established Emilio Marcos Palma became Uic first child to he born in tllc Antarctic. By 
March Uie settlement consisted of eighteen men. eight women :md nineteen children. This group 
included two teachers who subsequently set up a school. The families spent one year on Uic ice. The 
next summer they returned home mid mwUier group of families arrived for a year long stay. Emilio mid 
subsequent children who have been born on Uie ice have been declared citizens of Argentina ancJ U1c 
Antarctic. Beck. P .. Argentina micJ Britain: t11c Antarctic Dimension" in Hennessy. A and King . .I (ccJs) 
The umcl 1h01 E11gla11d Lu.1·1: Argenri110 and Briwin. a Special Relariunship ( 1992) 262. 
1 '~ In 196 l Argentine President Frondizi made a presidential visit to the Antarctic ice. The 1961 visit 
was followed up in August 1973 by a government decree-in-law which declared Marambio base to he 
tlie provisional scat or government ,mcJ for one monUi the entire Argentine cabinet conducted their 
daily business from Uierc. Ibid. 
1' 3 Such as Uie regular issue or postage stmnps. Uic erection or n:une plates in Uie Antarctic ,rnd Uic 
frc4uent publication of articles stressing Argentina's involvement in Antarctica. 
placed it under Australian authority. The Australian claim is the largest on the 
continent at 6.5 million square kilomcters. 1:-:'i Australia hases its territorial claim on 
discovery':'i6 and continued administrative acts. 1' 7 Australia currently has four 
permanent year round stations in Antarctica. 158 
3.3.3 Chile (Territorio Chileno Antartico) 
In 1831 the Repuhlic or Chile submitted a letter to the British Government asserting 
a claim that Chilean territory in Antarctica extended at least to the 65°south latitude. 
In l 940 Chile filed an adjusted claim which covered the sector from 53° West to 90° 
West longitudes. This sector overlaps the claims of both Britain and Argentina. 159 
Chile bases its right to claim sovereignty on the basis of inheritance from Spain 160, 
Contiguity/proximity and geographical affinity 161 , and administrative acts. 162 Chile 
currently has four permanent and five summer bases in the Antarctic region. 163 
15~ COMNAP. "Stations and bases" (20.09.01) <http://www.comnap.aq>. 
155 Hanessian, supra n 136 at 13. 
156 The claim to discovery is based on t.he British expeditions of Biscoe, Kemp, Balleny and Ross in 
t.he first part of the nineteenth century and U1e Australian expeditions U1at followed. Two expeditions 
the Australasian Antarctic Expedition in 1911 and U1e British-Australian-New Zealand Research 
Expedition in 1929. both led by Sir Douglas Mawson. arc considered to be actions Urnt cemented t.he 
Australian claim. Ibid. 
157 In 1954 Australia enacted U1c Australian Antarctic Territory Act. which provides for U1e application 
of Australian Capital Territory laws in U1e AAT. Ibid 14. 
The CommonwcalU1 Electoral Act 1918 allows for U1e appoinonent ofan Electoral Returns Officer for 
Antarctil:a. The Australian I Iorticultural Corporation (Export Control) Regulations 1990 ddines 
Antarctirn as part of the Austrafom domestic market. Australian Legislation. (28/9/01) 
<hllp://www.scaleplus.law.au>. 
158 Australian Antarctic Division. ''Antarctic Information'' ( 17.09.01) <http://www.aad.au/stations>. 
15" l Ianessian. supra n 136 at 15. 
w, In 1539 Charles U1c V of Spain allegedly gnmted Pedros S:mchez de la Hoz U1e territory from U1c 
Strait of Magellan to U1e S0uU1 Pole. west of 40°' longitude and Uu:refore Chile Jeclarcs Urnt U1ey arc 
U1e only legitimate Spanish heir to Antarctica. Since U1is time Chile claims de la 11oz mid his 
successors have been the bona tide governors or Antarctica. Quigg. supra n 14 at 114. 
J(,J The arguments put forward for U1is claim are U1e same as U10se already discussed in relation to 
Argentina. Supra at n 94. 
ir,, In 1948 Chilean President. GonzaJcz Vidcla hecmne U1e first I lead of State to visit U1e Antarctic. In 
1956 U1e governmmt enacted U1e Statute or Lhe Chilean Antarctic Territory placing U1c region under 
U1c aJministralion or the governor of U1e Magallanes Province and as such subject to Chilc:m domestic 
law. Il:messi,u1. supra n 136 at 15. 
In 1955 U1c adoption or a special regime for U1e administration or U1e Territory incorporated it into U1e 
political structure or Chile. Sahuric. E 111e Imernmiorwl Lr.nni( A111arcrica (1992) 25. 
lH COMNAP. ··stations mid bases" (20/09/01) <hllp://www.comnap.aq>. 
-l-l 
3.3.4 France (Terre J\dclie) 
In 1924 hy presidential decree France announced its formal claim to Terre J\delie the 
limits or which were defined as the narrow quadrilateral hctween 136° and 142°East 
longitudes and between 66°and 67° South longitudes. 164 The French base their 
territorial claim on discovery1 65 and continued administrative acts 166 . France currently 
maintains four permanent and one summer station in Terre Adelie. 167 
3.3.5 New Zealand (Ross Dependency) 
In 1923 the British Government passed the Ross Dependency Boundaries and 
Government Order in Council. This order gave authority to the Governor-General of 
New Zealand to administer the Ross Dependency on behalf of the United Kingdom. 
The said Governor is further authorised and empowered to make all such rules and 
regulations as may lawfully be made ... for the peace, order and good government of the said 
Dependency ... 
The Governor is authorised to make and execute on his Majesty's behalf, grants and 
dispositions of any lands ... 168 
By adoption of this Order in Council Britain filed claim on behalf of New Zealand to 
all the islands and territory lying between l 60°East longitude and 150° West 
164 Hanessian. supra n 136 at 16. 
1~5 In U1c sixtieU1 century French explorer Palmuyer de Gonneville returned from a two year 
exploration wiU1 exlraordinary tales of a southern IIopicaJ paradise. The resulting legend of 
Gonnevilleland persisted for 2()()ycars until U1e first modem explorers discovered the Antarctic 
continent. The first modem French sighting of the continent was in 1739 when Jean Baptiste sent 
Charles Bouvet de Lozier 10 find new trading ports in Far East and explore the souU1cm regions of 
Gonnevillcland. This expedition led to U1c discovery Bouvel Island. Yves Kcrguelen who discovered 
and took possession of the archipelago of Kerguclcn followed this expedition in 1772. f lowcvcr it was 
not until 1840 Urnt Dumont d' Urville hccame U1c first Frenchm,m lo reach the Antarctic continent. he 
suhsc4ucn1ly named U1e area Terre Adclic after his wife. !hid. 
ir,r, The adminislration of the French Antarctic territories was placed under the jurisdiction of the 
Governor or Madagascar in 1924. However in 1955 U1c French Government reconfirmed U1t:ir 
administration of the Antarctic and cslahlishcd it was m1 overseas territory under U1c control or the 
Atlministralcur Superieur des Terres Auslrales et Antan:tiqucs Francaises. This acl movctl the scat of 
atlminislration for U1e region to Paris. In 197 l Fr:rnce enacletl Law No. 71-.569 which applietl U1c penal 
antl civil law of Fr:mce to U1e French Antarctic Territory. Sa.hurie, supra n 1.52 at 27. 
In 1956 U1c J\tlministrator adopted his own !lag. allJ1ough U1e flag of France remains U1e official one 
for U1e region. ( I/ 10/0 I J 
<h ltp://www.geocites.com/Capital l lills/Senatc/27 8.5/Fr _An larct ic _hmds.h tm I>. 
1(, 7 COl\1NAP. ··stations and bases" t20/09/0l l <http://www.comnap>. 
ir,s Ross Depentlcncy Bountlaries ,mtl Government Order in Council 1923 (Imp) ss IV ,md V. 
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longiLude and soulh or 60° Soulh laLiLude. Lhis area includes Lhe Ross Ice Shelr. 1<'9 
The claim was hased on discovery hy British explorers 170 and continues to he 
supported through New Zealand's administrative acts. 171 New Zealand maintains one 
· · h · 177 permanent station 111 t e region. -
3.3.6 Norway (Dronning Maud Land) 
The Norwegian claim was established through an Order-in-Council in 1939, which 
was enacted in order to pre-empt an anticipated German claim. 173 The proclamation 
declared Norwegian sovereignty over that part of the Antarctic mainland coast that 
lies between 20° West Longitude and 45° West Longitude. 174 Because Norway does 
not recognise the sector principle it is assumed that the claim does not extend to the 
Pole. The basis of the Norwegian claim is Norway's history of extensive whaling 
dating back to 1892 and Roald Amundsen's expedition to the Pole in 1911. 175 
Norway"s claim is supported hy continued administrative action. 176 
169 Hanessian, supra n 136 at 18. 
170 This claim is based on the activities or British explorers James Clark Ross, Scott and Shackleton in 
U1e late 18 and early 1900s. 
171 In 1908 Shackleton was appointed postmaster to U1e Antarctic and specially overprinted New 
Zealand stamps bearing Uu: insc..Tiption "King Edward VII Land" were issued to him. In 1923 New 
Zealand gazetted whaling regulations for U1e Ross Dependency, these were issued under U1e auU10rity 
of the 1926 Order in Council but formed ,m amendment to the Fisheries Amendment Act 1912. 
Brewster. supra 11 11 at 22. Tempkton. MA Wise Adventure: Neir Zealand and Antarctica 1920-1%0 
(2000) 38. 
Over t11e years U1e governor General of New Zealand has appointed magistrates :md coroners for the 
Ross Dependency both to date none has exercised U1eir auU10rity Uiere. A returning officer is appointed 
for t11e Dependency but no electoral roll exists. Auckl:md District Law Society, How Strong is Neir 
Zealand's Claim to the Ross Dependencr ~ ( 1979) 4. 
The Antarctica Act 1960 gives U1e New Zealand court system jurisdiction over crimes committed in 
U1e Ross Dependency. The Conservation Act 1987. Part II gives the Deparunent or Conservation U1e 
responsibility for U1e conservation or U1e natural and historic resources of U1e Ross Dependency. The 
Immigration Act 1987. rc4uircs all non-New Zealand nationals to apply tor a New Zcal:md entry 
permit prior to visiting the Dependency. 
17~ COMNAP. "Stations m1d bases" (20.9.01) <http://www.comnap.aq>. 
m In 1938 wiU1 the idea or establishing a claim Herman Goering despatched U1e Schwabenl:md 
expedition whose goal was to lay sovereign claim to as much or Antarctica as possible. Over a six-day 
period pl:mes Hew over m1d photographed 600.000 sq km and dropped metal swastikas at 25km 
inh.:rvals. However. U1e Gcnmm sovereignty claim was lost in the chaos or WWII. Brewster. supra n 
11 at 24. 
1 H Sahurie. supra 11 152 at 29. 
11 ·' Amundsen was U1e lirst person to reach UH.: Pole in December 1911 and he claimed a circular 
region around U1e Pole which he muned King I laakon VII Plateau. AIU1ough Norway has never taken 
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Norway opened a permanent station in I 958 hut was rorced to vacate it in I %0 due 
to lack or funding. The station was suhsequently loaned to South Africa. Norway 
currently operates two summer only stations on the ice. 177 
3.3.7 United Kingdom (British Antarctic Territory) 
The British claim asserted by the filing of Letters of Patent in 1908, created the 
Falkland Islands Dependencies and consisted of all the land hetwecn 20° and 80° 
West Longitudes to the Pole and Scotia Arc Island. Further Letters of Patent were 
filed in 1917 as the 1908 letters had inadvertently included part of the Argentine and 
Chilean claims. The new Letters of Patent delimited the claim to include all islands 
and territories between 20° and 50°West Longitudes and south of 50° South Latitude 
and between 50° and 80° West Longitudes and south of 58° South Latitude. 178 The 
basis of the British claim is discovery 179, extensive exploration 180 and administrative 
acts181 . Britain currently has six bases in the region (four permanent and two 
summer). 182 
action on this claim in 1929 and 1939 they reminded the United States U1at U1ey had a priority interest 
in the area. Hanessian, supra n 136 at 21. 
176 Dronning Maud Land is currently administrated by the Norwegian DeparUnent of Polar Affairs a 
division of Uie Ministry of Justice and Police. The Department also acts as Uie Secretariat for U1e 
Intenninisterial Committee on Polar Affairs which was established by Royal Decree in 1965 to co-
ordinate Uie actives of all government departments involved in Polar affairs. Norwegian Government 
Information, (2/10/01) <http://www.odin.dep.no>. 
177 COMNAP. "'Stations and bases" (20.9.0 I) <http://www.comnap>. 
178 Hanessi:m, supra n 136 at 27. 
I 7'l Captain .hunes Cook was the first to circumnavigate Uie Antarctic during his 1772-75 voyage. In 
1819 Edward Bransfield while completing a survey of the S0uU1 Shcthmds Islands is believed lo have 
first sighted the continental land mass. The following year in 1820 James Weddell became the first 
person to sail south of 74° 15' and reported seeing open water extending far south in longitude 34° 
Wcsl. In 1830 Biscoe sailed further south than :my pervious expedition. It was Biscoe·s voyage Uiat 
confirmed what up until U1en had only been speculation. a large land mass did exist in the Antarctic. In 
1833 Pcler Kemp sailed south from Kerguclen and bec:une U1e lirst person to sight Heard Islmid and 
U1cn proceeded on to discover what is now called tl1e Kemp Coast. In 1838 John Bcllcny sailed souUi 
from New Zealand and achieved a higher latitude tli:m any pervious explorer and discovered U1e 
Ballcny Islands. In 1841 a British expedition under Jmnes Clark Ross SUl:CCssfolly crossed Ilic ice pack 
:md reached Ilic open water of the Ross Sea. Fogg. GA Historr u/Anrarctic Science (l 992)41-83. 
18" In 1872 Ilic Challenger expedition conducted an oceanographic survey of Antarctic waters. The 
British Antarctic expedition 1901-1904 produced :m extensive description of Lhe physical geography of 
McMurdo Sound. In 1909 Ernesl Shackle!Oli pionecm.l Uie mule lo Uie Soutli Pole. climbed Mount 
Erchus :md became Uie tirst explorer lo use motor transport in Antarctica. lhid. 99-120. 
is I In 190..J Uic British auU10rities commenced U1e issuing of licences lo control whaling and sealing in 
Uie claimed territory. From 1910-30 British magistrates were in residence on South Georgia lshmd. 
The 1908 :md 1917 Lellers or Patent placed Ule BAT under the jurisdiction or tl1e Governor of the 
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.1.18 United States 
The United States has never riled a formal claim to any territory in the Antarctic, this 
is despite that fact that such a claim would he as strong as any or those already 
filed. 183 Much or the area subject to such a claim would likely overlap with areas 
already subject to claim hy other States. The basis for an American claim would be 
discovery 184 and extensive exploration 185 . America currently has three permanent 
stations on the ice. 186 
3.3. 9 Russia 
Russia bases their eligibility to file a territorial claim on Thaddeus Von 
Bellingshausen' s 1819 voyage. 187 However, fo Bowing this voyage Russia showed 
no interest in the region until Norway filed their territorial claim in 1939. 188 
Falkland Islands. In 1919 the British government decide U1at the entire Antarctic continent should 
ultimately be included in U1e British Empire. In 1962 tlle British area claimed on the continent was 
separated from U1c Falkland Islands part of the claim and renamed U1e British Antarctic Territory. The 
Governor of the Falkland Islands was named High Commissioner for U1e Territory. Brewster. supra n 
21 at 23. Hanessian. supra n 136 at 27. Sahurie, supra n 152 at 13. 
182 British Antarctic Survey, .. Stations and Bases" (20/9/01) <http://www.antarctica.ac.uk >. 
183 Quigg. supra n 14 at 127. 
isi In 1820 Natllaniel Brown Palmer sailed into Antarctic waters and became one of Uuee persons who 
claim to have been U1e first to sight the Antarctic continent. His discovery was contemporaneous with 
the Russian Bellingshausen and U1e Englishman William Smith. Hanessian. supra n 136 at 34. 
185 The first official government expedition was lead by Charles Wilkes in 1838. In 1928 Richard Byrd 
conducted an expedition to U1e ice and the following year made tlle first Hight over U1e Soutll Pole. As 
a result of ByTd·s expedition America laid basis for a claim to over 2 million sq km of U1e continent 
and in 1938 President Roosevelt announced a plm1 to pennanently occupy Antarctica as a basis for 
future claims . 
.. The most important thing is to prove (a) U1at human beings can permanently occupy a 
portion of U1e Continent winter and summer: (b) Uiat it is well worth a small mrnual 
appropriation to maintain such permanent bases because of their growing value for four 
purposes - national defence of U1e Western hemisphere. radio. meteorology and minerals.'' 
FD.R. Roosevelt to Byrd. 12 July 1939 in Elliott Roosevelt (ed) FD.R. His Personal Leflers 
( 1950) 906. 
As a result Byrd travelled to Antarctica a U1ird time mid established two penrnment bases. which were 
subsequently abandoned in 1941 because of the deteriorating international situation. America returned 
to Antarctica in 1946 wiU1 Operation I ligh Jump. This was a military operation designed to prepare 
troops for possihle confrontation wiU1 USSR across U1e Arctic Basin. This was followed by anoU1er 
military operation in 194 7. ll;messi,m. supra n 136 at 34-3 7. 
186 CO!VINAP ... Stations and bases" (20.9.01 J <hltp://www.comnap.aq>. 
187 In 1819 Thaddeus Von Bellingshausen circwnnavigated the Antarctic Continent and discon:rcd 
Peter I Oy and Alex;mder Islm1d. Russian interest in Antarctica was revived in 1939 as a direct result 
of Norway's claim of sovereignty over Dronning Maud Lm1d. In response to that claim Russia sent a 
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3.4 Status of Antarctic Claims in International Law 
Although some of the Antarctic claims have been recognised by other Claimant 
States they have yet to be recognised by the international community and 
international acceptance is a requirement for the legitimisation of modern territorial 
claims. While historically it was an accepted fact that the discovery of unknown 
lands would be accompanied by territorial claims that did not require international 
acceptance, the claims to Antarctica differ in one important aspect. That difference is 
these claims arose in the twentieth century, a time described by Gautier as 
a period when it was already no longer possible for the concerned states to take exclusively 
for themselves a continent wiU1out U1e agreement of the principle members of a fast-changing 
international community. 189 
Besides the issue of acceptance by other nations the territorial claims in Antarctica 
face another problem that effects their standing in international law. 
3.5 Sector Claims 
The territorial claims in the Antarctic region are unique in international law in that 
they are sector claims. The principle of sector claims applies only to the Polar 
Regions and alleges that a basis for sovereignty over a sector can he established hy 
obtaining sovereignty over land at the fringe hounded on the eastward and westward 
margins of longitude and extending that control toward the Pole. 190 Basically this 
creates a pie like structure with the Pole as the centre. 191 The justification for this 
type of claim is the inapplicability of the normal principles of geographical control to 
the Poles. 192 Proponents of the system claim that they represent a just and equitable 
division of Polar lands. However critics maintain that the acceptability of sector 
.. Note or Protest" to Norway observing that it would "n:scrve its opinion as to U1e national status of 
territories discovered by Russian citizens.·· I lancssim1. supra n 136 at 27-30. 
188 Beck. P The /11tern{lfimwl Politics o{Allfarctica ( 1986) 37. 
18 '-' G . 118 I"' I -Jaut1er. supra n at - . 
'')"Shearer.supra n 122 al 149. 
,,n Sec map or Antarctic claims infra at .'iU. 
t•J: Ibid. 
49 
claims rests on nothing more than the mutual consent or the Claimant States and at 
hest they represent nothing more than notification or future intention to assume full 
controJ. 19·' Therefore even if there was an acceptance or the possihle legitimacy of 
the Claimant States right to sovereignty it is likely that before they could he fully 
recognised in international law they would need to redefine the houndaries without 
resorting to the use of the sector principle. 
3.6 Conclusion 
While it is not possible to state categorically that the territorial claims in the Antarctic 
have no legitimacy in international law it is fair to say that they are questionable at 
best. If we go back to Stokke's analytical method 194 then in order for the claims to 
have external legitimacy they must comply with the normative structure of the 
international community. The evidence suggests that none of the Claimant Nations 
could successfully met the traditional occupation requirement necessary under 
international law that would allow formal recognition of their claims. 195 With the 
possible exception of Argentina 196 the Claimant States would also have difficulty 
establishing their sovereign rights under the more liberal test applied to sparse areas 
by the PICJ. The inability of the Claimant States to comply with the normative 
structure for territorial sovereignty necessarily means that their claims have not heen 
recognised hy the international community therefore can not be considered legitimate. 
193 Ibid. 
19~ Supra at 20. 
19) This is particularly true of a possible Russian claim as they had no established iniercst in the region 
until nearly 120 years after the 4ualifying act of discovery. 
The lack of effective occupation in relation to New Zcalluid" s claim to the Ross Dependency was 
addn:ssed in a study conducted by I.he Auckhuid Law Society in 1979. The report pointed out that 
there appeared to be l'ew acts that pointed to New Zealand having established sovereignty in the 
region. In actual fact there existed actions that tended to point away from the existence of New 
Zcahuid sovereignty. Most nolablc of U1esc is U1at in 1979 New Zealandcr·s not only re4uircd a 
Reserve Bank export permit to take New Zealand dollars to the Pole but U1ey were rc4uired to use US 
dollars for purchases made at Ute American base located within Ute Dependency. Auckhuid DisLrict 
Law Society. Ho11· Strong is Ne11· Zt'alancl's C/ai111 to the Ross Dependency'.' ( 1979) 4. 
I% Presently as tJtings stand even Argentina would have difficulty maintaining tJtcir claim in 
international law. This is because the majority of actions stated by Lhem :md tJ1c oUtcr Claimant States 
as supporting evidence for the legitimacy of their claims occurred post 1959. ,md Article IV(2) of tJ1c 
1959 Treaty clearly states Uiat no actions taken while tJtc Treaty is in force can be used to support a 
territorial claim. 
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As such if a strict application of international law were advocated then the Antarctic 
region is suhjcct to the sovereign rule of no nation. In the absence of sovereign 
authority a legitimate system of governance is of major importance in relation to both 
political stability and environmental protection. The Claimant States and those 
interested in Antarctic science had the foresight to recognise this and developed the 
Antarctic Treaty System. However in order to ensure that this organisation functions 
at its optimum level of effectiveness it must be shown to have legitimacy. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SOVEREIGNTY OVER NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE 
COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND IN ANTARCTICA 
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In order to fully understand the issues surrounding the potential for loss of legitimacy 
within the ATS it is necessary to have a basic understanding of current international 
law as it relates to natural resource sovereignty. This is because resource sovereignty, 
that is the question of who controls the natural resources of a region, is one of the 
underpinning issues for many of the challenges to the legitimacy of the ATS. Natural 
resource sovereignty is also currently the number one candidate as a potential flash 
point for cont1ict in the region. 
4.1 Natural Resources Sovereignty in International Law 
Natural resource sovereignty has been the object of a great deal of international 
debate over the last two decades. The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 
established the Commission on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources in 
1958. The mandate of the Commission was to investigate whether there was a 
necessity tcir strengthening the sovereign rights over natural resources and to consider 
the rights and duties of States under international law. 197 The rep011 or the 
Commission resulted in the recognition or the sovereignty of a state over its natural 
resources as an accepted principle or international law. 198 
111e General Assemblr. 
Declares Uiat: 
1. the right of peoples and nations to penn;ment sovereignty over U1eir natural wealU1 rn1d 
resources must be exercised in U1e interest or U1eir national development ,UH.I of the well-
being of U1e people of U1e State concerned: ... 
1" 7 United Nations. ··study or Sovereignty over Natural Resources" l'earhuok of the United Nm ions 
( l9:i9) 416. 
1 ') 8 Chowdhury. S ··Permanent SoVl:reignty over Natural Resources" in Ilossain. K and Chowdhury. S 
(eds) Pem11111e111 Sovereigntr m·er Nm11ral Resources in flllemational u11r ( 1984) 1. 
7. Violation of the rights of peoples and nations to sovereignty m·cr tJ1eir natural wealtJ1 mid 
resources is contrary to tJ1e spirit and principles of the Charter or tJie United Nations mid 
hinders tJJC development of international co-operation ,md tJ1c maintenmiee or peace. 1''0 
While assisting with the clarification of the issue of natural resource sovereignty the 
UN Report is of limited use within the context of resources not confined within the 
national boundaries of a state. As a result of the legal vacuum left by the UN Report 
as to the status of such resources a new principle evolved, 'the common heritage of 
mankind'. 200 While this doctrine was originally applied to Outer Space and the High 
Seas there were soon calls to have it extended to Antarctica. 
4.2 Mineral Resources and the Common Heritage of Mankind 
Prior to the introduction of the 'common heritage of mankind' the leading doctrine of 
Maritime Law was the freedom of the high seas. This doctrine was based on four 
assumptions, originally derived from the work of Grotius. These assumptions were: 
1. That the sea cannot be the object of private or state appropriation. 
2. That the resources of the sea are inexhaustible. 
3. That the use or the high sea by one state should not limit the use of another. 
4. That mankind was not capable of seriously harming the marine environment and 
that the oceans were so vast that there was limited chance of serious contlict.201 
These common law principles were codified in Article 2 or the 1958 Convention on 
the High Seas. 
The high seas being open to all nations. no State may validly purport to subject any part or 
tJiem to its sovereignly. Freedom of the high seas is exen:ised under tJ1e conditions laid dovm 
by these articles and by otJicr rules of international law. It comprises. inter alia. for coastal 
and non-coastal States: 
(I) Freedom of navigation: 
(2) Freedom of fishing: 
0) Freedom to lay submarine cables ,md pipelines: 
10') Unitt:d Nations Resolution 180.1 (XVIII) 1962 as reprinted in Brownlie. I (ed) Baisic dornme111s in 
lntematio11af Lmr 1995) 2.15. 
:,,
11 Schrijvcr. N Sm·ereigllfY orer N(l[11raf Resources (1997) 202. 
:,it Ibid. 214. 
(-1-) Freedom to tly mn U1c high seas. 
These freedoms. and others which arc recognised by U1c general principles or international 
law. shall be exercised by all States with reasonable regard for U1c interests of 0U1cr States in 
U1eir exercise of the freedom of the high scas. 2" 2 
The situation on the high seas that had lead to the development of these laws changed 
in the 1960s when manganese was discovered in the deep seabed. With the advent of 
deep-sea mining it became clear that the more technologically advanced states were 
in a position to exploit the situation to the detriment of the equal access guaranteed to 
the less advanced countries by high seas law. 20:i This combined with the concerns 
surrounding increasing fish catches as a result of improved fishing technology lead to 
the commencement of a global debate concerning the future of high seas law. These 
factors combined with the fact that forty-one nations had joined the United Nations 
since the establishment of the 1958 Convention, many of whom challenged the 
principles and rules of the laws codified in the Convention, lead to the convening of 
the third Law of the Seas Conference in 1973.204 
The tenet that the resources of the high seas205 and the seabed should be considered 
the 'common heritage of mankind' became one of the focal points, particularly 
among the developing countries, or debate for this conference. Prince Wan 
Waithayakon the President of Thailand had first mentioned the principle at the 1950 
conference but the idea did not gain any support. 206 However the concept gained 
momentum in 1966 when US President .Johnson stated: 
Under no circumstances. we believe. must we ever allow U1c prospects of rich harvest ;rnd 
mineral wcalU1 to m:ate a new form of colonia.l competition :unong U1e maritime nations. We 
must be careful to avoid a race to grab and to hold U1c lands under U1c high seas. We must 
2112 United Nations Convention on The Iligh Seas 1958. Article 2. 
2'-'3 Schrijver. supra n 187 al 215. 
211~ Ibid. 216. 
205 At U1is point U1e I ligh Seas consisted of the Seas outside U1c 12 mile territorial limit. not U1c current 
200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone. 
2u6 Ibid. 
ensure that the deep seas ,md the ocean tmltom arc. mid remain. U1c legacy or all hum,m 
beings.:, '7 
In 1967 Malta proposed that the General Assembly place the seabed and ocean-floor 
beyond national jurisdiction and declare it to be the 'common heritage of 
mankind'. 208 Earlier in that same year the UNGA had given such a designation to 
209 I outer space. In an exp anatory memorandum presented to the first committee 
Malta stressed: 
The sea-bed cilld ocean floor covered approximately five sevenths of U1e earu1·s surface: Ule 
ocean floor under U1e abyssal depilis was Ule only area of U1e world which had not yet been 
appropriated for national use because until recently its use for defence purposes or the 
exploitation of natural resources had not been technologically feasible. Recent developments 
in science and technology, however, had made Ule exploitation of such resources a practical 
possibility wiiliin Ule next decade. These resources promised to be considerable .... there was 
now a real dcillger .... Uiat the technically equipped countries might wish to appropriate the 
ocean floor for tl1eir national use ... The result would be a competitive scramble for sovereign 
rights over Ule ocean floor leading to an escalating arms race, widening U1e gap between Ule 
rich, technologically developed countries and U1e poorer countries and endangering the 
traditional freedom of Ule high seas.21° 
The First Committee was in general agreement that Malta had raised some points of 
considerable international interest and requested more information on the issue. 211 
The result of this further investigation was the adoption in 1970, although there was 
reluctance toward this move from both Western countries and those from Eastern 
Europe212 , of the Declaration r~f Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean 
Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof. Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction. 
The General Asse111hl_,· .... 
Solemnlr declares U1at: 
I. The sea-bed and ocean tloor. ,md U1e subsoil Ulereof. beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to as U1e area), as well as U1e resources or the area. are 
tl1c common heritage of mankind. 
207 UN Doc. NC. IPV. 152-t I Novemeber 1967.at 4. As reprinted in Schrijver. N Sovereignt,· over 
Natu rat Resources (1997) 216. 
2118 United Nations. 'The (...)ucstion of Promoting the Peaceful Uses or the Sea-bed mid the OcecUJ 
Floor'' Unired Nations Yearhook /967 Yol 21 (1967) 41. 
211; Schrijver. supra n 187 at 216. 
:: H• United Na1ions. supra n 194 at 42. 
211 Ibid. 4-l 
212 Ibid. 
2. The area shall not he subject to appropriation hy any m;ms hy States or persons. natural 
or juridical. ;md no State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any 
part U1ercof. 
3. No State or person. natural or juridical. shall claim. exercise or acquire rights wiU1 
respect to U1e area or its resources incompatible wiU1 U1e international regime to be 
established ;md U1e principles of this Dec.:laration .... 
7. The exploration of U1e area and U1e exploitation of its resources shall be carried out for 
U1e benefit of mankind as a whole. irrespective of tile geographical location of States, 
whetiler lcmdlocked or coastal. and taking into particular consideration tile interests and 
needs of the developing countries? 3 
Although there remains intense debate as to its position within the legal system the 
adoption of this resolution established the 'common heritage of mankind' as a 
principle of international law. 214 
On the same day that the UNGA adopted the above resolution they passed another 
resolution calling for the convening of the third UN Conference on the Law of the 
Sea.215 This conference, the third in the UN process, involved numerous sessions 
over the space of nine years resulted in the development in the 1982 United Nat ions 
Convention on the Law of the Sea. The preamble to the Convention clearly restates 
the UN's commitment to the seabed as common heritage: 
Desiring by this Convention to develop U1e principles embodied in resolution 2749 (XXV) of 
17 December 1970 in which U1e General Assembly of the United Nations solemnly declared 
inter alia U1at U1e area of the sea-bed and U1e ocean lloor and U1e subsoil U1ereof. beyond U1e 
limits of national jurisdiction. as well as its resources. are U1e common heritage of mankind, 
U1e exploration and exploitation of which shall be carried out for U1e benefit of m;mkind as a 
whole, irrespective of the geographical location of States .... 216 
However it is clear from some of the comments voiced by developing States after the 
signing of the Convention that they were not happy with the extent that the principle 
of common heritage was carried into the Convention. 
213 Unih:d Nations ... GA Res. 2749 (XXV) 17 Decemher 197()'' Yearbook of The U11i1ed NaTions 1970 
Yol 24 ( 1979) 222. 
21 ~ Schrijver. supra n 187 al 216. 
" 5 Ibid. 
21 (, Preamble to U1c 1982 United Nations Convention on U1e Law or the Sea as reprinted in Brownlie. I 
(cd) Basic documents in International Law (4111 cd) (1995) 14-J. 
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... UH: sealx:d provisions larel a complex of concessions made by the great majority or nations 
to U1e kw Uiat aspire to reap greater ;md more immediate prnrits.: 17 
Mauritius and Yugoslavia shared U1e position or the Group of 77 Uiat U1e sea-bed provisions 
represented U1e upper limits or concessions; to go furU1er would render U1e common heritaue 
. . . 11s o 
prmc1ple meanmgless.-
... U1e Convention did not adequately reflect U1e concept of U1e sea-bed as common heritage: it 
believed that a few industrialized countries would be Ule major beneficiaries.219 
Given the success of the developing nations in getting the common heritage principle 
into the Law of the Sea Convention, combined with their frustration at the apparent 
limitations placed on its application, it is hardly surprising that this principle was to 
raise its head again in relation to the debate over Antarctic resources. 
Before moving on to a discussion of natural resource sovereignty in Antarctica it is 
necessary to add that though the principle of common heritage gained a great deal of 
favour in the 1980s opponents of the system have eroded its acceptance over the past 
decade. 220 In fact some international law commentators have expressed the opinion 
that it has now reached the point where it is of historical significance only. 221 
4.3 The Status of Natural Resources in Antarctica 
While Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty is purported to have forestalled any potential 
contlict concerning sovereignty in the Antarctic this does not appear to he the 
situation in relation to sovereignty over natural resources. Sovereignty over natural 
resources was in fact one of the major points of conllict during the drafting of the 
217 United Nations. ··statement from Brazil in Summary of UNGA Debate" Yearbook of the United 
Nariuns 1982 Vol .36 (1982) 221. 
218 United Nations. "Sununary of UNGA Debate" Yearhook of the U11ited Nations 19S2 Vol 36 ( 1982) 
221. 
21 '' United Nations. "Stati.:ment from Pakist:UJ in Summary of UNGA Debate" Yearbook uf the U11ited 
Nmio11s 1982 Vol .36 (1982) 221. 
22" The US is a major opponent of the common heritage principle :md has managed ovi:r U1e years to 
have U1e principle essentially remuvetJ from UNCLOS. In tJoing U1is U1e Law or the Sea Commission 
has altered position to when: it now recognises U1c importance or market forces in rcsoum: 
~;pluration. Gillespie. A The ll/11sio11 <~{ Progress (2001) 145. 
__ \ !bill. 
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Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities. The result 
of this conllict was an attempt hy the Parties to draft a document that addressed the 
needs of all memhers. This involved a balancing of the needs of the developing 
countries and the Claimant States. An example of this balancing act is seen in the 
membership of the Regulatory Committees. 
2(c) the Regulatory Committee shall. ... consist in total of 10 members. 
(i) four members identified by reference to Article 9(b) which assert rights or claims ... 
(ii) six members which do not assert rights or claims as described in Article 9(b) ... 
3 make a recommendation to the Commission concerning the membership of the 
Regulatory Committee 
(b) adequate and equitable representation of developing country members of the 
Commission. having regard to the overall balance between developed and developing country 
members of the Commission. including at least three developing country members on the 
Commission ... 222 
However despite the recognised necessity of balancing the needs of all parties the 
subsequent document contained special rights for the Claimant States. As Argentina 
claimed: 
At the same time. my Delegation takes note that tl1e territorial claims in Antarctic are the 
basis for a variety of provisions in tl1e Convention that cause certain effects on tl1e application 
of tl1e regime that regulation Antarctic mineral resource activities. Those provisions establish 
that States Parties claiming sovereignty in Antarctica shall exercise certain specific rights in 
fixed stages of the application of the Convention in regard to tl1e area of Antarctica tllat tl1ey 
arc claiming.223 
Although the drafters of the Convention believed they had reached a compromise that 
would prevent future conllict, the statement of Adriaan Bos, Head of the Netherlands 
Delegation, indicates evidence would suggest that if the Convention had come into 
force and mineral exploration had proceeded the Convention may not have been 
sufficient to totally remove conllict over resource sovereignty. 
22 ' Artide 29. Convention on tl1e Regulation or Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities. 1988. 
The Article 9 group consists of the seven claimant states plus America and Russia. 
223 Antarctic Treaty System. "Statement of Alberto Daverede. I lead or Dekgation from Argrntina" 
Final Repurl SATCM on A,uarctic Minerals held 2 June 1988 at Wellington 30. 
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It was U1en:fon: disappointing Uial al U1e momenl when the procedures for U1is conference 
were established lhc Non-Consullalive Parlies lo the Anlarclic Trealy were denied full 
participalion in lhe adoption of lhe Treaty and U1at U1ey are excluded from U1e final 
decision .... We are disappointed Uial in several places in U1e text a distinction is made between 
Consultative and Non-Consullative Parties wiU1 regard lo subjects which are dearly of equal 
intcresl to Consultative and Non-Consultative Parties o U1e Antarctic Trealy. 22 .1 
4.4 Conclusion 
The non-entry into force of the Minerals Convention and the subsequent mining ban 
established under the Environmental Protocol has forestalled any contlict over 
minerals sovereignty in the Antarctic, however the potential for conflict at a future 
date still exists. The date of this contlict is likely to be 50 years hence when the 
Environmental Protocol is subject to review. Article 25(2) of the Madrid Protocol 
states; 
If, after U1e expiration of 50 years from U1e date of entry into force of this Protocol. any of the 
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties so requests by a communication addressed to the 
Depository, a conference shall be held as soon as practicable to review the operation of this 
Protocol. 22 ' 
This Article preserves the rights of the ATCPs to lift the mining ban at a future date. 
As such the sovereignty issue in Antarctica has not been resolved it has merely been 
postponed until 2041. If at this time an attempt was made to lift the mining ban the 
developing contlict has the potential to tear the ATS apart. This makes the issue of 
the legitimacy or the A TS one of major importance, because a strong organisation is 
more likely to weather such a crisis. 
22 .1 Antarctic Treaty System. "Stalemenl of Adria:m Bos. Head of Delegation from U1e NeU1crlands" 
Final Report .\JJecia/ Antaraic Cun.rnlw1i1·e Meeting on Anwrctic Mineral Resources ltelcl 2 June 1988 
in Welli11gto11 18. 
225 Article 25(2) Environmental Protocol to U1e Antarctic Treaty. supra n 24. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM 
5.1 Conflict in Antarctica 
While there had always hecn some degree of conflict between the Parties with 
territorial claims or other interests in the Antarctic by the late 1940s early 1950s the 
contlicts had developed to a point where they had become a matter of major concern. 
At this time two of the adverse relationships had reached the point where an 
escalation of the conflict to all out aggression was a real possibility. The two areas of 
concern were the bitter tripartite dispute hetween Britain, Chile and Argentina 
concerning the disputed parts of their respective claims and the growing tensions 
between the United States and Russia. These conflicts are central to the legitimacy 
dehate because it was the desire to resolve these conflicts that defined the 
membership of the group that drafted the Antarctic Treaty. It was subsequently the 
exclusive nature of the membership of this group that became the driving force 
behind the first attack on the legitimacy of the ATS. 
5.1. l Britain, Chile and Argentina 
A major source of conllict in the Antarctic, both historically and currently, are the 
overlapping claims or Argentina, Britain and Chile. Because Argentina and Chile 
both consider themselves to he the only legitimate heirs to the old Spanish territories 
in Antarctica they have in the past come into contlict, however this historic situation 
seems to have been resolved by the 1984 Treaty or Peace and Friendship. 226 As a 
result or this alliance the majority or the current conflict has seen Argentina and Chile 
' 26 Tn:aty or Pean: and Friendship bctween Argentina and Chile 1984 ILM 24: I. 
Article l.S: In J\ntafftica. Articles l to 6 of the present Treaty shall apply. ( the peace and friendship 
provisions) The remaining provisions in no way affect. or may be interpreted in a sense U1at affect. 
(i 1 
lined up against Britain. 227 In this regard they assert that regardless or whom is the 
rightful Spanish heir to the region, Britain under the terms of the Treaty of Madrid 
1670 has no right to any territorial claims in the region. 228 Prior to 19.58 the instances 
or contlict between these three sovereign nations229 were numerous and often led to 
open confrontation. 230 While Britain made frequent offers to adjudicate the problem 
through the use of the international legal establishment which both Chile and 
Argentina declined. 231 
5.1.2 United States and Russia 
By the early 1950' s the increased activities of Russia and America in the Antarctic 
had raised fears that the Cold War rivalry between the two superpowers could be 
d d h · 2,2 exten e to t e reg10n. - During the 1940's America's Antarctic policy centred 
around prevention of any Soviet participation in the administration of or settlement in 
the Antarctic, this included preventing any Russian attempt to establish territorial 
directly or indirectly. U1e sovereignty. or rights or legal positions of ilie Parties or delimitations in U1e 
Antarctic or in their adjacent maritime areas. including the soil and U1e subsoil iliereof. 
227 Hanessiru1. supra n 136 at 27. 
228 The Treaty was signed between Britain and Spain and was a conunitment on ilie part or U1e British 
to remove their official support or pirate activities in U1e Caribbean. but U1e up shot was that each party 
agreed to recognise U1e 0U1ers territorial claims. According to Argentina and Chile U1is included 
Spain's territorial rights under the Treaty ofTordesillas. Ward. A Prothero, G :md Leatl1es, S (eds) 
Cambridge Modem Hi.Hon· \fol X ''The Restoration" (1934) 272. 
' 2" It is probably more accurate to say two nations as Chile has very much taken a back seat and U1e 
majority of the conllict is bi-partisan between Argentina and Britain. 
' 1" In 1942 Britain sent a ship to Arllarctica to deny Germ:Ul raiders access to sheltered points in U1e 
region and to ensure U1at Gennan friendly Argentina did not seize control or U1e Drake Passage. 
l lowever by the time U1e British arrived U1e Argentines had already left, leaving behind several brass 
pla4ues representing U1eir recently defined claim. In 1943 the British ambassador returned one of the 
pla4ues to U11.: Argentine government. In 1947 U1e conflict rose to U1e point were Argentina sent two 
cruisers and six destroyers escorting troopships to Deception lslcmd ,md commenced U1e building or a 
station ac..Toss U1e bay from U1e British base. By the time a British cruiser and a frigate had arrived U1e 
Argentine ships had departed. In l 952 ;m Argcntirmm naval ol'ficcr fired a machine gun over the 
heads of a British party attempting to l:md supplies in I lope Bay. A year later British forces tore down 
Argentine and Chile:Ul huts U1at had been built a few hundred yards from U1e British base and arrested 
ru1d deported two Argentines. I Ianessi:m. supra n 85 at 27-30. Quigg. supra n 14 at 121. 
2·11 In May 1955 U1e United Kingdom made a unilateral application to U1e International Court or Justice 
which was subsequently refused by hoth U1e other parties. Quigg. Ibid. 
' 12 1 lanson. supra n 30 at 186. 
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claims. m This policy is rdkcted in a U S National Security Council memorandum. 
which .stressed the need for: 
Orderly progress toward a solution of the territorial prohlem of Antarctica, which would 
ensure control by the US and friendly parties ... ' 3; 
In 1946 the Americans conducted military manoeuvres in the Antarctic. 'Operation 
High Jump· was designed to prepare troops for possible confrontation with USSR 
across the Arctic Basin. This was followed by another military operation in 1947.235 
In response to the open resentment of their presence in the region the Russians 
resisted what they considered attempts to deny their historical rights in the region. 
On June 7 1950 Russia sent a note to America and the other Antarctic powers stating 
that "the Soviet government cannot recognise as lawful any decision on the Antarctic 
regime taken without its participation."236 
5.2 The International Geophysical Year 
At the same time that the national governments were addressing conflict concerns the 
world's scientists had developed a level of co-operation that put aside political 
differences. As a result of this co-operation the International Council of Scientific 
Unions (ICSU), which represented the major scientific organisations of the world, 
developed an initiative that resulted in the formation of a program of international 
scientific study, designated the International Geophysical Year (IGY). From the 
outset it was stressed that each representative in this program was representing their 
science not their country. 237 To advance the goal of international scientific study the 
ICSU created the Comite Special de I' Annce Geophysique International (CSAGI) to 
co-ordinate activities. The Antarctic was recognised hy this committee as ·'a region 
of almost unparalleled interest in the field of geophysics and geography. and hence 
worthy of a significant scientific initiativc.'' 2' 8 On .July l 1957 the venture hcgan 
2D Beck. supra n 178 at 40. 
,.H Ernest. G I Iearings on U1e Expedition to t11e Antarctic Regions. House Commillee on 
Appropriations. 2 June 1939. RL·printed in Quigg. supran 14at IJ7. 
2·15 I1anessim1. supra n 136 al 27. 
,,(. Beck. supra n 178 al 40. 
' 17 Ibid. 48. 
2J8 Ibid. 47. 
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wilh parlicipalion from Lhe scienlific communities of 64 countries. Three World Data 
Centres were set up to ensure the free exchange of information; one in the US, the 
second in Russia and a third that was sub-divided hetween western Europe, Australia 
and Japan. 
The International Geophysical Year activities were carried out with a spirit of 
enthusiasm and co-operation and from the outset the hope was expressed on both 
sides of the iron curtain that the spirit of co-operation would extend to other 
spheres. 239 The year was in fact so successful that on the recommendation of Russian 
scientists it was extended for another year (International Geophysical Cooperation 
Year). 24° For this second year a new body, the Special Committee for Antarctic 
Research (SCAR), replaced CSAGI in relation to the Antarctic. This group which 
was intended to provide a permanent mechanism for scientific co-operation and 
research in the Antarctic was renamed the Scientific Committee for Antarctic 
Research in 1961.241 SCAR later took on a principle role within the ATS. 242 
The success of the International Geophysical Year eased the tensions, at least in 
Antarctica, between Russia and the United States and as a result of the spirit of co-
operation they both developed similar policies for the region. They would both 
remain in Antarctica and pursue scientific investigation, both would recognise no 
23~ Fogg. supra n 139 at 99. 
240 Ibid. 175. 
241 Beck. supra n 178 at 51. 
242 SCAR' s position within the ATS is unusual in that it has become a major component of the system 
but its role has never been formalised U1rough inclusion in ,my of the ATS Treaty instruments. Its 
position was however defined hy the Parties at J\ TCM I in l 961. 
'The Representatives agree. wiU10ut prejudice to tl1c rights of Governments. to make such 
:UT:mgements as U1ey may deem necessary to rurU1er U1e objectives of scicntilic co-operation set forU1 
in U1e Treaty: 
( l) U1at U1e free exchange of information and views among scientists participating in SCAR. and U1e 
recommendations concerning scientific progrmnmes ,md co-operation formulated by this body 
constitute a most valuable contribution to international co-operation in Antarctica: 
(2) Uiat since U1ese activities of SCAR constitute U1e kind of activity contemplated in Article III of the 
Treaty. SCAR should he encouraged to continue U1is advisory work which has so ellectivdy 
facilitated international co-operation in scientilie investigation. 
Antarctic Treaty System. ··Recommendation I-IV'' Final Reporr ATCM I held I0-14 July 1961 at 
Canberra. Australia. 
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territorial claims and would likewise refrain rrom making such claims hut reserved 
their right to do so at a later date 24 ' 
~ . 
5.3 Development of the Antarctic Treaty 
Despite the scientific success of the IGY the twelve states active m Antarctic 
exploration244 realised that the political situation as it existed in the Antarctic still had 
the potential to turn the region into a source of international cont1ict. A<; a result they 
decided to formalise the spirit of scientific co-operation that had developed during the 
IGY into a political alliance. The Antarctic Treaty was the result of this alliance and 
the Parties combined desire to remove the Antarctic as a source of international 
conflict and preserve it for scientific use. Although as Beck pointed out it would be 
narve to suggest a direct cause and effect relationship between the IGY and the 
drafting of the Antarctic Treaty. The IGY did have the effect of bringing the 
Antarctic to the attention of the world and providing an international climate in which 
h T . . Id 24~ t e reaty negottattons cou commence. · 
However the success of the IGY was not the only factor that contributed to the 
commencement of treaty negotiations. In the mid to late 1950' the Antarctic Nations 
became concerned about the level of interest being expressed in the Antarctic by 
nations with no record or activity in the region. This concern was triggered by 
India's 1958 move to have Antarctica placed on the UN Agenda and the fact that 
Brazil, Uruguay and Peru had expressed interest in tiling sovereignty claims. 246 
In February and March 1958 the parties met to discuss their concerns at which time 
the United States put forward a proposal for the development or an Antarctic regime. 
As a result of these meetings in May 1958 the United States invited those eleven 
"~1 Ibid. 41. 
"~~ Although 67 nations were involved in U1e International Geophysical Year only twelve of those 
where active in U1e Antarctic. The seven claimmll states: Australia. Argentina. Chile. France. New 
Zeal,md. Norway and Uu: United Kingdom :md Russia. Japan. United States. Belgium. South Africa. 
Ibid. 49. 
~~~ Ibid. 53. 
~~6 RoUnvell. D The Polar Regions and the Dnelopment of !11tematio11a/ Lall' ( 1996) 68. 
nations ··who had expressed a direct interest in Antarctica through patticipation in the 
IGY' to a meeting to discuss the future of the continent. 2..i 7 All eleven nations 
accepted the invitation and within a month representatives or the invited governments 
commenced, what was to be a series of 60, secret and informal preparatory 
negotiations in Washington DC.2..i 8 It was the limited scope or participation and the 
secret nature of these meetings that was to years later add fuel to the first attack on 
the legitimacy of the ATS. That is that it is a closed and exclusive club. Formal 
negotiations for the treaty began in Washington on 15 October 1959 and the 12 
nations signed the Antarctic Treaty on 1 December 1959. The Treaty entered into 
force 23 June 1961. 




LEGITIMACY AND THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM 
The first twenty years of the ATS appear to have been relatively free of legitimacy 
challenges. However in coming to this conclusion I am relying on the apparent lack 
of criticism rather than the presence of open supp011.249 There was occasional debate 
from Parties both within and outside the ATS surrounding the ATCPs control of the 
Antarctic however the issue was not pursed with any vigour. 250 Internal legitimacy 
was at its peak because the Parties themselves were still under the influence of the 
spirit of consensus and cooperation from which the Treaty developed. 251 However 
this situation changed in the early eighties when the increase in the World's 
dependence on natural resources and the need for new sources of exploitable minerals 
drew the attention of the international community to the last earthly wilderness. 
In 1982 Malaysia moved to have Antarctica put on the UN agenda for the 1983 
session. Malaysia maintained that Antarctica and its resources should be either 
placed directly under UN control or that the ATCPs should be considered '"trustees 
for mankind as a whole." Those patties supporting the Malaysian position further 
argued the resources of Antarctica should come under the 'common heritage of 
mankind'. The Malaysian action had potentially dire consequences for the ATS. 
249 Prior to U1e drafting of U1e Antarctic Treaty both New Zealand (1950) and tl1e US ( 1948) had made 
recommendations that tl1e Antarctic be placed under UN Trusteeship. 1 larris. S 'The Influence of the 
United Nations on the Antarctic Treaty System: A Source of Erosion or Cohesion?" in Jorgensen-
Dahl. A and Ostreng. \V (eds) The A111arcric Trea/Y Sys1e111 in World Poli lies ( 1991) 309. 
In 19.56 New Zealand Prime Minister, Walter Nash. again proposed the ncation or Antarctica as a 
"world H:rritory" under tl1e trusteeship or the UN. This view was repeated during treaty negotiations 
however despite support from tlie UK the proposal was dropped when il hccame clear tliat it lacked U1e 
support of the oilier Claimant States. Beck, supra n 178 at 273. 
25'' Sri L,mka raised Ilic issue of UN involvemc:nt in Antarctica in ESCSOC and UNGA in 1975. 
Harris stated tliat there is evidence that in 1972 New Zealand raised tl1c issue or Antarctica as a "world 
territory'· at Ille 7' 11 ATCM in Wellington. New Zt:aland. (I larris. supra n 238). There is however no 
mention of tl1is t:vent in U1e Final Report or the meeting. 
251 Review of the early meeting reports give no indication of any tensions hctween tl1c Parties. Or at 
least ,my tensions tl1at were reported. 
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Because for the first time the issue had heen raised as the legitimacy or the ATS's 
exclusive control or Antarctic affairs. 
Since the Malaysian event the legitimacy of the ATS has remained on the 
international agenda. In the following chapters I will address a range of issues I 
helieve have the potential to raise questions as to the continued legitimacy of the 
ATS. Because some of these issues effect both the internal and external legitimacy of 
the ATS rather than divide the discussion into its internal and external components I 
have chosen to structure the analysis so as to begin with a description, with detailed 
suppotting evidence, of each issue. This will be followed in each instance by the 
application of the facts to Stokke's categories of legitimacy. The issues addressed 
will be: 
a) The criticism that the ATS membership constitutes a closed club and exclusive 
club. 
b) Whether Article IX(2) of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty conflicts with the new 
principle of Antarctic conservation. 
c) The difficulties associated with the establishment of a permanent Secretariat. 
d) The inability of the ATCPs to develop a liability annex to the Environmental 
Protocol. 
c) The possible effects of the non-compliance of China with the recommendations of 
CCA.Ml,R. 
t) The issue of jurisdiction and in particular the inability of the Treaty Parties to 
control tourism and other activities from non-party states. 
g) The UN relationship with the ATS. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM: A CLOSED AND 
EXCLUSIVE CLUB OF RICH AND POWERFUL STATES? 
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In order for an international ~)rganisation to maintain its external legitimacy it is 
necessary that its '·normative and structural components'' comply with the major 
developments within the international community and that the rules of the 
organisation be recognised by actors outside the organisation. 252 The purpose of this 
chapter is to investigate the closed club criticism in order to access whether the 
criticism is justified and if so does this prevent the ATS from complying with the 
normative structural requirements of the international community, thus raising 
questions as to the legitimacy of the organisation. The closed club criticism will also 
be investigated in regards to the effects it has on the acceptance of the ATS by 
outside actors. 
7.1 Origins of the Closed Club Criticism 
The 1982 Malaysia initiative in the UN 253 has been considered by many to be the first 
major attack on the external legitimacy of the ATS. Part of that critique was the 
contention that the ATS is a closed and exclusive club of rich and powerful states. 254 
This issue is related both to the closed nature of the invitees to the Treaty drafting 
meetings and the apparent subsequent reluctance of the ATPs to expand their 
membership. z:-:'i During the decade 1981-91, with the addition of 19 new memhers256, 
the ATCPs did appear to he making a concerted effort to expand their membership in 
2'' Stokke. supra n 40 al 24. 
2 ' 1 Supra 6.1 :md 68. 
,q Vidas. D "The Anlarclic Treaty System in U1c In1ema1ional Conununity: An Overview" in Stokke. 
0 and Vidas. D (eds) Gol'erning rhe Anwrcric: The l:jfecri1·enes.1· and Legirimac,· ci{rhe .4.nrarctic 
TreCII\' Srstem (19%) 51. Also sec UN doc. J\/J7 /PV. I 0. 
2') In l lJ60 11H:re were twelve original signatories to the Trcaly. Five new members acceded in the 
decade 1961-71 wiU1 a furU1er 6 in 71-81. Equating to 11 new members in 21 years. 
" 0 SCJ\R. "Treaty Membership" (4/5/2(Xll) <hllp://www.scar.orgrrrea1y/Signatories>. 
an efforl lo address lhe Malaysian crilicism. Wilh lhe admission or Papua New 
Guinea, China and India lhis decade also saw lhe rirsl admissions of developing 
countries to the Treaty System. 257 However in the subsequent decade there where 
only four new signatories. 258 Therefore while the drive for new members was 
apparent during the height of the closed cluh criticism it appears to have subsequently 
lost its momentum. As such the criticism has not been totally defused. As Stuart Prior 
stated in 1997; 
t11e expanding Antarctic Treaty membership over tlle decade 1981-1991 did help to move it 
away from tl1e appearance, or reality. of a small club of like-minded countries. But more was 
needed. and needs. to be achieved. 259 
7.2 The Modern Version of the Closed Club Criticism 
The closed club criticism has however changed a little over the years and is currently 
concentrated more on the absence of developing countries from the decision making 
process rather than their absence from the ATS as a whole. The continued absence of 
developing countries from this group is largely due the very nature of the Antarctic 
Treaty. 
Article XIll(l) of the Treaty states that accession to the Treaty is open to all Member 
States of the United Nations and any other State which may he invited to accede to 
the Treaty. 260 However Article IX(2) restricts the representation or the Pa1ties at 
Treaty Meetings. 
257 Ibid. 
Each Contracting Party ... shall he entitled to appoint representatives to participate in t11e 
meetings ... during such times as t11at Contracting Party demonstrates an interest in Antarctica 
by conducting subst;mtial research activity there. such as establishment of a scientific station 
or Ilic dispatch of a scientific expedition." 261 
258 Ukraine 1992. Turkev 1996. Venezuela 1999 ;md l~stonia 2001. Ibid. 
25<} Prior. S Antarcrica: 1/iewfrom a Ga1e1mr (1997) 6. 
2611 Switzerhmd. tJ1e only non-UN Member who is party to the Treaty was invited to accede to it in 
1990. 
261 Antarctic Treaty 1959. Article IX(2). 
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This article in effect estahlishes a two-tier memhership system within the treaty. 
Firstly Consultative Parties, heing those Contracting Parties who are active in 
suhstantial Antarctic research and therefore have the standing to make policy and 
vote in decision making matters. Secondly are those defined as non-consultative 
Parties, who have acceded to the Treaty hut are not engaged in substantial Antarctic 
research. 262 Resolution I of the First Special Consultative Meeting held in 1977 
defined 'substantial research' as the "establishment of a scientific station or the 
despatch of a scientific expcdition."263 However review of the reports from Special 
Consultative Meetings where new ATCPs were recognised indicates that the 
establishment of a scientific station 1s in fact a requirement for admission. This 
contention is supported by Resolution II of the First Consultative Meeting which 
granted Poland consultative status. 
The Representarives of lhe Consultative Parlies, ... 
Noting that the Polish People's Republic established a pennanent scientific station ... and that 
the Polish People's Republic thereby demonstrates its interest in Antarctica ... 
Record U1eir acknowledgement that the Polish People's Republic has fulfilled the 
requirements established in Article IX, paragraph 2 of the Antarctic Treaty and that, as a 
consequence has U1e right to appoint representatives in order to participate in Consultative 
Meetings ... 264 
The Consultative Parties again discussed the issue of meeting participation at ATCM 
XVII held November 1992 in Venice, Italy. 265 The result of the debate was a revised 
set of Rules of Procedure, which again stipulated that only those parties who 
complied 1rith the requirements of Article IX (2) of the Treaty could participate 111 
decision making at Treaty meetings. Rule one of the revised rules states: 
Meetings held pursuant to Article IX of U1e Ant.arctic Treaty shall be known as Antarctic 
Treaty Consultative Meetings. Contracting Parties entitled to participate in those meetings 
shall be referred to as ·'Consultative Parties"; other Contracting Parties which may have hcen 
invited to allend U1ose meetings shall he referred to as ··non-Consultative Parties".266 
262 Non-Cpnsultative Parties were granted ohservcr status at ATCM XII in 1983, U1is entitles them to 
take part in policy dehates hut no! to participate in U1c vote. Antarctic Treaty System. Final Report 
ATCM Xll para 39. 
263 Antarctic Treaty System. Final Report First 5,'pecial Cons11/tati\'e Mee1ing held 25-29 July in 
London. Englm1d 4. 
2(,~ Antarctic Treaty System. "Resolution II" Final Reporl First .\JJecial Cons111fa1il'e Meeting 5. 
265 Antarctic Treaty System. Final Report of ATCW XVI! held Nov 11-20 1992 in Venice. Italy para 
61-6-l at 26-27. 
266 Antarctic Treaty System. "Revised Rules or Procedure" Final Report of ATCM XV/1419. 
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Ru le 21 runher states that: 
Decisions of the Meeting on all mailers of procedure shall be taken by a majority of the 
Representatives of Consultative Parties participating in the meeting. each of whom shall have 
'67 one vote. -
Rule 28 removes any douht as to the position of non-Consultative parties in relation 
to decision making: 
Non-Consultative Parties are not entitled to participate in the taking of decisions. 268 
While the research requirement for admission to Consultative Status may have been 
legitimate when the purpose of the ATS was solely to advance scientific research it is 
not conducive with the current diverse interests in the region. The scientific research 
requirement of the Treaty essentially excludes from the decision making process any 
Party that is unable or unwilling to maintain an active scientific research program. 
This ATS opponents maintain is a violation of the rights they claim under 'common 
heritage of mankind' doctrine. 
7.3 Common Heritage of Mankind 
This principle is based on the belief that the common areas of the world are not 
owned by any person or sovereign. Regions that are defined as global commons are 
subject to five tenets: 
1. Because the commons is beyond national jurisdiction, but is owned by all, it is not 
subject to national appropriation. 
2. Common spaces must be used exclusively for peaceful purposes . 
.3. Scientific research must he free, open and non-damaging to the environment. The 
benefits or such research belong to mankind and not a pa11icular government. 
4. Economic benefits of common areas must be shared with all peoples. (This aspect 
of common heritage is the one most focused on by the developing countries) 
5. Exploration and exploitation or the commons must benefit the present as well as 
the future generations. As such the commons is held on trust.269 
267 Ibid. 424. 
268 Ibid. 425. 
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Typically the management or a glohal commons would he performed hy a 
supranational management and monitoring agency, such as the International Seabed 
Authority created under the 1982 UN Law of the Sea Convention. 270 The paradigm 
of the commons is an unusual one in that it has "attained little international credibility 
through state practice" therefore it functions mainly as a principle of treaty law, yet as 
a philosophical and political, he it unpractised, concept it has within the past three 
decades had a incredible rise into mainstream international law. 271 
Ambassador Shirley Hamilton Amerasinghe of Sri Lanka first raised the contention 
that Antarctica was a global commons in 1976 while serving as Chair of Third 
Conference on the Law of the Sea. 
There are still areas of this planet where opportunities remain for constructive and peaceful 
cooperation on the part of the international community for the common good of all rather than 
for the benefit of a few. Such an area is the Antarctic continent. .. Antarctica is an area where 
the now widely accepted ideas and concepts relating to international economic cooperation. 
with their special stress on the principle of equitable sharing of the world's resources, can find 
ample scope for application, given the cooperation and goodwill of those who have so far 
been active in the area.272 
It was six years later in 1982 that the Malaysian government, on behalf of the 
developing world, launched the first salvo of the attack on the right or the ATS to 
administer the commons of Antarctica. Prime Minister Mahathir-bin Mohammad in a 
speech to the UNGA proposed that Antarctica should either be brought under the 
administration of the UN or that the present management team should be considered 
trustees for mankind. 
Uninhabited !mu.ls ... the largest of which is the continent of Antarctica ... do not legally belong 
to the discovers as much as U1e colonial territories do not belong to U1e colonial powers.'73 
He then criticised the Antarctic Treaty as an agreement between select privileged 
states and demanded that a new international treaty he negotiated. m In August 1983 
' 6 ,i Joyner. C Gm·erning the Fro-:.en Commons: The Antarctic Regime and Em'irunmenrnl Protection 
( 1998) 32. 
nu Ibid. 
' 71 Ibid. 32. 
' 7 ' U.N. Doc. N30/PV 2380 (1975). IJ-15.Reprinted in Joyner. Ibid at 236. 
' 73 MahaU1ir Bin-Mohammad. United Nmiuns General A.uembh- OJ]icial Records, 3711 ' Session. U.N. 
Doc A./3 7 /PV. I O (1982) 20. Reprinted in Joyner. supra n 228 at 236. 
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Antigua and Barhuda, and Malaysia sent a letter to the Secretary-General of the UN 
requesting that the question of Antarctic be placed on the UNGA agenda for the next 
session. The letter stated that there was. 
a need to examine the possibility for a more positive and wider international concert to ensure 
that activities carried out in tlie Antarctic were for tlie benefit or mankind as a whole.27 ' 
This action resulted in the adoption of UNGA resolution 38/77: 
The General Assembly, 
Having considered t11e item entitled ''Question of Antarctica", 
Conscious of the inc.Teasing international awareness of and interest in Antarctica, 
Bearing in mind Ilic Antarctic Treaty and Ille significance of the system it has developed ... 
Requests tlie Secretary-General to prepare a comprehensive. factual and objective study on all 
aspects of Antarctica, taking fully into account t11e Antarctic Treaty system and other relevant 
factors. 276 
7.4 Expanding Antarctic Treaty Consultative Party Membership 
The ATCPs have addressed the issue of the closed nature of the consultative 
membership by admitting more developing countries to Consultative Status.277 
However, there remains questions as to whether these actions truly represent a desire 
by the A TCPs to extent their membership to the developing world or whether they are 
mere tokenism in order to quite the criticism. 
To this end one would have assumed that in view of to all the criticism levelled at 
them by the developing world that hoth sides would have made a great show of the 
admission of Brazil and India as Consultative Parties at ATCM xn in 1983. 
However the opposite appears to have been the case. Neither India nor Brazil 
mentioned anything about the developing world in their inaugural opening 
addrcsscs278 and the references made by the other Parties were very low key. as is 
demonstrated by the response from Australia: 
2H Jo111er. supra n 256 at 236. 
275 UNGA, ··Antarctica" Yearbook ()j'the United Nntions Yol 37 (1983) 387. 
276 UNGA ... Resolution 38/77" Ibid. 
' 77 Brazil (1983) China ( 1985) Ecuador (199)) India ( 198.1) Sout11 Korea ( 1985). Final Report of 
ATCM XX/1 held 25 Mav-5 June 1998 in Tromso. Norwav. 224. 
' 78 Antarctic Treaty Sysiem. Final Report uf A TCM XII h~ld 13-17 Scptembn 1983 at C;uihcrra. 
Australia. 
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It is. or course. highly gratifying too that Brat.ii and India have taken tJ1eir place amongst us 
as Consultative Parties..... The presence here or Delegations representing a wide range or 
countries witJ1 ditkring political and economic systems is a clear sign to the international 
community that tJ1e Antarctic Treaty System is alive ,Uld well and effectively carrying out its 
responsibilities in Antarctica. 27'1 
Argentina added: 
Ladies and Gentleman, here in our midst we have developed and developing countries, 
capitalist and socialist countries of IJJe NortJ1 and S0utJ1 ... a healtJJy combination. ilie result of 
which has been to strengtJ1cn unity within tl1e Systcm ... which represents a model of 
democratic exchange al tl1e international level. .... 280 
France made a low key comment about the 'closed club criticism': 
I should, first of all. like to express tl1e particular satisfaction of my delegation al Brazil and 
India acquiring ilie status of Consultative Parties ... Contrary to tl1e opinion held by many, the 
members of ilie Washington Treaty do not form a 'closed dub' ... It was tlrns in a spirit of 
openness iliat the applications of these two States were received.281 
The situation was identical when China attended its first ATCM as an ATCP in 1985. 
While the Chinese delegation made only an inferred reference to the closed club 
issue. 
The Chinese Government holds ilial ilie purposes and principles of the Antarctic Treaty are 
good .... Nevertheless, tl1e Antarctic Treaty System needs to be perfected with fresh ideas so as 
to meet tl1e development requirements of the international community. 282 
The majority of the other opening address contained nothing more than the normal 
paragraph or welcome for the new ATCPs (Uruguay was admitted along with China). 
The exception to this was the representative from India who made a direct reference 
to developing countries. 
It is a mailer of great pleasure and honour f<)f my Delegation to extend a very warm welcome 
lo the great country of the People's Republic of China and tl1e very impornmt developing 
country. tl1e Oriental Republic of Uruguay lsicl for achieving IJJe Consullative Status and for 
joining tl1is Meeting ... tl1e Treaty mechanism represents 32 states in tJ1e world and witJ1 U1e 
admission of China and India. a very significant portion or U1e world population stands 
represented by till' Treaty. I Iowever. we hope tJiat as time passes. tJ1ere will he a still wider 
participation of m~rny more slates so as lo make U1e Antarctic Treaty more open and 
effeclive. 283 
27'! Antarctic Treaty System. Opening Address of Bill I layden. Minister or Foreign Affairs for 
Australi:L Fino! Report <>/ATCM Xll. 49. 
:s,, Antarctic Treaty System. ··Opening Address of Carlos Blanco or Argentina" Final Report <!I ATCM 
X/158. 
:si Antarctic Treaty System. "Opening Address of Bernard Dorin of France" Final Report l!{ATCM 
X/170. 
282 Antarctic Treaty System. "Opening Address: China. Mr Xu Guang Jian" Final Report o/ATCM 
XII/ held 7-18 Octoher 1985 in Brussels. Bel!!ium 13 2. 
:s.1 Antarctic Treaty System. "Opening Addre;s: India. Dr S Qasim" Final Repcm of ATCM Xlll 144. 
The admission or India. 13razil and China as Consullative Parties has put a serious 
dent in the argument that maintains the A TS is a closed and exclusive cluh. 
However, if you compare the admission or India and Brazil with that of other J\. TCPs 
there appears to he a procedural anomaly present. Poland acceded to the Treaty 1961 
and did not ohtain Consultative Status until 1977 after it had established a research 
station as required hy Article IX(2) of a Treaty. This constituted a lapsed time or 16 
years. India on the other hand acceded to the Treaty in August 1983 and hecame a 
Consultative Party in September of that year. India and Brazil, although Brazil's wait 
was 7 years, were recognised as having achieved the requirements of Consultative 
Status not by establishing a hase but by virtue of their plans to do so. 
Noting that U1e Republic of India has firm plans during the 1983-84 season to establish U1e 
'Dakshin Gangolri· pennancnt manned station at !at 70°45'S, long l1°38'E; 
Noting that Ule Federative Republic of Brazil has finn plans during U1e 1983-84 season to 
establish U1c ·commandante Ferraz' summer station on an island of U1e Palmer Archipelago 
cast of the Newnayer Channel. and U1al the station will have U1e capacity to be expanded into 
a permanent station; 
Recognizing that the Republic of India and the Federative Republic of Brazil on U1e Basis of 
scientific expeditions U1ey have dispatched lo Antarctica and of U1e stations U1ey will establish 
during the forU1coming swnmer season, thereby demonstrate U1eir interest in Antarctica in 
accordance wiUl Article IX, paragraph 2 of Ule Treaty: ... 
Record their acknowledgement Uial Ule Republic of India and U1e Federative Republic of 
Brazil have fulfilled U1e requirements ... as a consequence Uley are entitled ... to appoint 
representatives to participate in U1e Consultative Meetings ... 284 
While it is a valid argument that the Consultative Parties are fully entitled to change 
the requirements for consultative status and it was simply a coincidence that the 
change coincided with the applications of India and Brazil. This does not explain 
why after the admission of India and Brazil to Consultative Status the ATCPs 
returned to the prior precedent. That is the estahlishment of a scientific station. In 
1985 hoth China and Uruguay were admitted to Consultative Status only after 
establishing scientific stations. 285 The estahlishment of a permanent station also 
:s4 Antarctic Treaty System. Final ReporT £!{The Fifth Special Antarctic Treatr Co11s11ltmil'e Mee/ing 
held 12 Sept 1983 in Canberra. Australia. Electronic version ( 11/07/01) 
<hllp://currentaspire.nvi.net/gendoc.plx?l l= I 1)87 &db=3>. 
' 8' Noling that the People's Republic of China had estatilished on 2U Fetiruary 198.'i The Great Wall 
Station· on Fildes Peninsula. King George Island ... 
Nu1i11g U1at on 1-1- lkcember 198..J. the Oriental Republic of Uruguay had established U1c Scientific 
Antarctic Base · Artigas· on Fildes Peninsula. King George lslm1d ... 
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allowed for Lhe granLing of ConsulLaLive SLatus Lo Ciermany and llaly in 1987 28 c', 
Spain and Sweden in I 988 287 . Peru, Korea and finland after eslahlishing scientific 
stations were granted Consultative Status al the Special Consultative Meeting in 
1989,288 however at the same meeting Ecuador and the Netherlands were denied 
Consultative Status because a consensus could not be reached as to whether their 
activities met the requirements of Article IX(2). Consensus could not be reached 
because neither of these countries provided documentation that showed the 
establishment of a research station. 289 
The conclusion to be drawn from this situation is that rather than representing a 
fundamental shift in ATCP philosophy towards the inclusion of developing countries 
there were in fact an ulterior motive behind the admission of Brazil and India to 
Consultative Status. This is particularly true of India who as one of the dominant 
members of the Non-Aligned Movement was one of the more outspoken critics of the 
ATS. As such India's admission to Consultative Status gagged one of the ATS's 
major critics and with the added advantage of the removal of Brazil from this group 
significantly weaken the alliance of developing countries. 290 
Recognising Lhat the People's Republic or China :md the Oriental Republic of Uruguay, on the basis or 
the scientific programmes Lhey have undertaken. the stations U1ey have established ... U1ereby 
demonslrate their interest in Antarctica ... 
Antarctic Treaty System. Final ReporT of the Sixth Special Antarctic Treaty Con.mltath·e Meeting held 
7 October 1985 in Brussels, Belgium. ElccLronic version. (l l/07/0 l) 
<http://currentaspire.nvi.net/gcndoc.plx'!l I+ 1987 &db=3. 
286 Antarctic Treaty System. Report of the Se1•e111h Special Antarctic Con.mltative Meering held 5 
October 1987 in Rio de Janeiro. Brazil. Electronic version. (l 1/07 /0 I) 
<http://currcntaspire.nvi.net/gendoc.plx'!I I+ 1987 &db=3>. 
287 Antarctic Treaty System. Report q/the Eighlh Special Antarc1ic Conrnl!a!il'e Meeting held 20-21 
Sept 1988 in Paris. France. ElccLronic version. (11/07/01) 
<http://currcntaspirc.nvi.net/gcndoc.plx'!I I+ 1987 &db=3>. 
288 Antarctic Treaty System. Report of the Ninth Special Alllarctic Cons11//mil·e Meeting held 9 
October 1989 in Paris. France. Electronic version. ( 11/07/01) 
<http://currcntaspire.nvi.net/gendoc.plx'!l I+ 1987 &db=3>. 
289 Antarctic Treaty system. Repor! of the Ni111h Special Anwrctic Cons11//atil'e Meeting held 9 Octol'lC:r 
1989 in Paris. Fr:mcc. ElecLronic version. ( 11/07/01) 
<http://curren1aspirc.nvi.net/gcndoc.plx'!l l + 1987 &db=3>. 
2'"' For more information on India and Uie Non-aligned movement sec 7.7 infra al 78. 
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7.5 Under-Representation of the Developing World 
While the inclusion of India and China in Lhe consullalive membership has removed 
some of the pervious inequities in the Treaty System there conlinucs lo he inadequate 
representation of the developing world in the Anlarclic decision making process. 291 
This contention is supported by an analysis of the ATS Consultative Membership. As 
of ATCM XXIV (Russia, 2001) the ATS consisted of 45 members, 27 of which had 
Consultative Status. This number represents the five Super Powers and 22 other UN 
Nation States.292 The economic status of ATCPs fell into the following groupings. 
Fourteen have the World Bank classification of high income economics, 293 four have 
a World Bank classification as upper-middle-income economies,294 five have a World 
Bank classification as lower-middle-income economies,295 two countries fell within 
I l · · )96 d d 297 t 1e ow-mcome economies category- an two were unreporte . These numbers 
equate to 66.6% of ATCPs being classified as upper-middle or high income while 
33.4% could be classified lower-middle or low income countries. This represents a 
disproportionate over-representation of wealthy countries among the A TCPs. This 
ratio is the exact opposite to that represented by the UNGA membership, where 70% 
of members could be classified as low-middle/low income and 30% as upper-
middle/high income. 298 
291 In 1983 for Lhe first time Conlracling Parties were invited 10 attend ATCM as observers (Final 
Report ATCM XII held 13-27 September 1983 in Canberra) this situation was later formalized al U1e 
ATCM XIII in Brussels. They continue however to have non-voting slalus. The principle lhat only 
ATCP have decision-making auU10ri1y is carried into U1c Environmental Protocol. Article I 1(2) of U1e 
Protocol states that each member shall be entitled to appoint a represcnlalive lo the Committee for 
Environmental Protection. However Article 12 slates Urnt U1e function of the Commitlee is lo provide 
advice lo U1c Parties and formulate recommendations for consideration al U1e ATCM. Therefore ii is 
clear U1a1 the ATCP have retained U1e decision-making auU10rity. 
N 2 The Super Powers arc delincd by U1eir status as permanenl members of U1e UN Security Council. 
United Kingdom, United States. China France ,md Russia. <http://www.un.org>. 
>jJ These arc counlries wiU1 GNP per capita alxwe US$6000. Thomas. A Third World Arias (2"ct cd) 
(1995) 15. 
204 These arc counlries wiU1 GNP per capita between US$2200 and US$6000. Ibid. 
20 ' These arc counlries wiU1 GNP per capita between US$545 and US$2200. Ibid. 
c% These arc counlries wiU1 GNP per capita below US$545. The two counlrics in U1is group were 
China imd India. Which gives China a hit of a split personality as ii classifies as lx)th a Super Power 
and a Developing Nation. Ibid. 
:,7 The two unreported counlries were Bulgaria ,md Russia. 
298 This is based on a rough calculation balancing Lhc number of UN l\kmbers against U1e number of 
counlrics considered. using U1e World B,mk 191)0 figures. to be low-middle/low income economies. 
There are 189 UN Member States listed on U1c LJN website and of U10se 83 can be subtracted because 
78 
Given Lhe proporlinn or low-middle/low income countries in Lhc United Nations in 
order for the A TS to totally remove the criticism that they are an exclusive cluh of 
rich and powerful nations they would need to amend the membership ratio or the 
ATCP to more accurately represent that in the international community at large. As 
was pointed out in a 1991 New Zealand working paper on Antarctica; 
Parties are still vulnerable to the charge that Antarctica is governed under a regime 
determined by a self-selected and unrepresentative group of countries. Wider subscription to 
the Antarctic Treaty should add to its legitimacy ... The concerns raised, first by Malaysia 
have, however not been allayed for all time.299 
It could be claimed that given their current attitude toward environmental 
conservation in their own territories the inclusion the developing countries in the 
Antarctic may not necessarily be a good thing for the Antarctic environment. There 
are three responses to this criticism. Firstly this observation suggests that the 
developed countries are pure in their environmental attitudes. Japan for example is a 
developed nation and an A TCP but we are all aware of their current attitudes toward 
to preservation of cetaceans. Their stance during negotiation of the Minerals 
Convention also makes it quite clear that for them Antarctic environmental issues run 
secondary to economic gain. 
Japan views Antarctica as a potential reservoir of substantial amounts of minerals. 
Consequently. given the magnitude of Japanese interest in Antarctica, [ilf minerals or oil are 
discoverable in exploitable quantities. Japan will wish to be ;unong the first generation of 
exploiters ... ,,J(l(I 
Secondly if the developing countries did have undesirable intentions towards 
Antarctica then it would he much easier to control their behaviour if they were 
memhers or the ATS. As internal actors in the ATS the developing countries would 
be subject to a level of peer pressure that could not be exerted against external actors. 
tl1ey were unreported. eitl1er because their governments do not provide tl1e information or tl1e World 
Bank dropped tl1em because their populations were less thlm one million. Of tJ1c remaining 106 
countries 70 (66q) could he classified as low-middle/low income economics. 
2')" Prior. supra n 246 at 7. 
'""Gillespie.A ··Antarctica: Environmentalist's Victory or llidden Agendas"!" (7/9/01) 
<http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/-llzwch/TEXTAG.HTM>. 
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Thirdly, democracy is the rounding principk or international law and democracy 
demands equal representation. 
7.6 Recognition of the Needs of Developing Countries 
The ATCP's appear to have recognised that despite their attempts in the 1980s to 
develop a more adequate representation for the lower income economies an inequity 
still exists in the current system. They attempted to remove some of this inequity 
when they drafted the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource 
Activities in 1988. Article 29 of the Convention, which addresses the establishment 
of regulatory committees to control mineral activity, makes specific reference to the 
inclusion of the developing countries. 
29(3)Upon identification of an area ... t11e Chainnan of t1le Commission shall.. .make a 
recommendation concerning t1le membership of t1le Regulatory Committee ... Such 
recommendation shall comply witll t1le requirements of paragraphs 2 and 4 and shall ensure: 
29(3)(b) adequate and equitable representation of developing country members of t11e 
Commission. having regard to tlle overall balance between developed and developing country 
members of tllc Commission, including at least tllree developing country members of the 
Commission. 301 
That the fact that the Convention never entered into force does detract from the 
ATCPs recognition of and attempt to deal with the inequity that existed within the 
ATS. Also while the recognition of the developing countries in the Minerals 
Convention fell short of what would be necessary to totally remove the closed club 
criticism, it is likely that the ATCPs have taken sufficient steps in this regard to 
remove any substantial threat to internal legitimacy on this count in the near future. 
This fact is highlighted by the address of Antonio Guerreiro, the Head of the 
Brazilian Delegation to the Minerals Meeting in Wellington: 
... In many respects ii falls short or what we believe should have ocen achieved. For instance 
in tenns of reflecting t11e interests of a group or countries - in particular t11e developing 
countries ... Yet for t11e first time wit11in t11e Antarctic Treaty system t11e Convention we have 
just adopted recognizes t11at t11e developing countries have specific and legitimate interests 
which arc to oc taken into account ... this is far from what we thought ideal. But, having 
entered t11cse negotiations at a late stage ... Brazil takes some pride in what it and ot11er 
3111 Antarctic Treaty System. Final Repon of r/Je Fu11rr/J S/Jecial Anrarcric Treaty Co11s11IWTi\'e Meering 
on Antarctic Mineral Resources held 2 June 1988 in Wellington. New Zealand. 72. 
80 
counlfies eventually achieved as far as having Uie interests of developing counlfies 
accommodated. 111 ' • 
The ATCPs during the drafting of the Minerals Convention acknowledged that an 
inequity existed within the current system. As a result of this recognition the ATS 
members from developing countries appear content to wait and give the A TCPs more 
time to deal with this problem. Unfortunately this is not true of the developing 
countries outside the ATS. 
7.7 Continued External Criticism 
The level of external criticism of the ATS decreased with the admission of China and 
India as Consultative Parties because this action divided what had up until then been 
a solid front of developing countries. 303 However criticism continues to be expressed 
by some countries within the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). 304 The 1984 address 
of the representative from Antigua and Barbuda to the UN make it apparent that the 
ATCP' s current policy of admitting developing countries to consultative status is not 
going to totally remove the criticism concerning the closed nature of the ATS. 
The World has vastly changed since Uie Antarctic Treaty was signed in 1959. There are now 
159 Member States of the United Nations, most of which are developing counlfies. In 1959 
Uiey had neither the opportunity nor the sovereign competence to participate in the events in 
Antarctica. It is not only unfair. it is unjust to suggest U1at we should abide by decisions made 
302 Antarctic Treaty system. Final Report of the Fourlh Special Antarclic Trear-.· Con.m/1a1i1·e Meeting 
on Antarctic Mineral Resources held 2 June 1988 in Wellington, New Zealand. 26. 
M Vidas claims U1at the admission or India and China as Consultative Parties has prevented Uie use of 
the rich NorUi v Uie poor South argument in relation to the legitimacy or the A TS. Vidas, D "The 
Antarctic Treaty System in Uie International Community: An Overview" in Stokke, 0 and Vidas, D 
(eds) Gmwning !he Anwrclic ( 1966) 55. 
·1'A The Non-Aligned Movement is ,m organisation of predominantly Asian and African States. which 
was established in Uic 1960s wiUi a focus or reducing Uie East-West contlict. However since Uie 1970s 
U1eir focus has shirted to Uie restructuring of Uie global system in order to decrease U1e NorU1-S0uU1 
inequities. 
There is also potential for Uie organisation to have spill over effects on U1e inH:mal legitimacy of the 
ATS as it wunts mnong its current membership nine ATPs. four or whom are ATCPs. India. Chile. 
Peru. S0uU1 Africa. Ecuador. Papua New Guinea. Korea-DPR. Guatemala. and Colombia. WiU1 a 
rurU1er 3 ATP" shaving observer status. Brazil. China and Uruguay. Non-aligned Movement 
"l\:lcmhership" ( 15/12/01) <hllp//:www.rnun.org>. 
India is a s1rm1g member or U1e non-aligned movement U1ercfore since its admission as an ATCP has 
been able to defuse some of the niticism aimed al the ATS. India seems her position wiU1in Uie ATS 
as a more effective way or advancing Third World interests in Antarctica. Beck. P The !111enw1io11a/ 
Pulil ic.1· of A.nwrclicu (1986) 198. 
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without our involvement. .. It is in the interests of glohal peace ,UHJ stability to address tJ1e 
democratization of Antarctica now.'''' 
During the 199 l UN Session Malaysia, a driving force within the NAM, continued its 
criticism of the ATS hy stating that the Protocol on Environmental Protection 
"[m]erely duplicated the flaws characteristic of the so-called restrictive, unequal, and 
discriminatory ATS. 30" 
In a follow on from Malaysia's comments Indonesia commentated that; 
As a result a minority of states has continued to exclude tJle vast majority from decision-
making processes. despite tJ1e fact tJ1at activities in Antarctica will have a world-wide 
impact. 307 
Malaysia's address to the UN in 1993 indicates that their position on the ATS may be 
mellowing a little. However, while they commented in that address of the continued 
support of the developing and non-aligned countries for the ATS, they continued to 
maintain their desire to see the Antarctic under international control. 
The entire international community acting under tJle auspices of ilie United Nations should be 
involved in efforts to consider and decide on tJle future of Antarctica. The international 
community must shoulder tJ1e main responsibility for safeguarding tJ1e environment of 
Antarctica.308 
7.8 International Recognition of Needs of Developing Countries 
It is accepted that a limitation on the membership of an international regime does not 
. . If d t· I · ' l · · '09 m 1tse etract rom t 1at regime s eg1t1macy. · However, the apparent acceptance 
hy the ATCPs of the A TS's limited representation from developing countries can be 
related directly to Stokke's contention that to obtain external applicability and 
305 UNGA NC l/39 PV.50. p6. 28 Nov 1984. As reprinted in Beck. P The lntematiunal Polirics of 
Anrnrcrica ( 1986) 184. 
3" 6 Beck. P .. The 1991 UN Session: tJ1c environmental protocol fails to satisfy the Antarctic Treaty 
System·s critics"' 28 Polar Record 307. 309 . 
. M Ibid. 
3118 Address or Malaysian delegate to tJ1c 48'11 UN Session. United Nations General Assembly Records 
48' 11 session. 33rd meeting or tJ1e First Committee. AC! 48/SR32. as reprinted in Beck. R ·The United 
Nations ,md Antarctica 1993: continuing controversy about the UN"s role in Antarctica" 30 Polar 
Record 257,259. 
Jo,• Jorgensen-Dahl. supra n 34 at 29 l. 
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therefore legitimacy requires that the '"nurmative and structural components or the 
regime'' comply with major developments in the international community.' 10 
There has recently heen an increased recognition hy the international community of 
the importance or including the Developing Nations in international decision making. 
This has resulted from a realisation that any attempt at obtaining a global goal cannot 
be achieved without the support of a group of countries than represent 70% of the 
membership of the UN. As a result actors associated with numerous international 
instruments, particularly those in relation to environmental protection, have 
recognised the need for the inclusion of this sector of the international community. 
We can say wilh certainty that no country on its own is able to pay the cost of environmental 
damage ... Given this situation, contemporary international jurists have clearly realized that the 
seulement of environmental issues ... must take into account the contributions and the needs of 
third-world countries. The participation of third-world countries in international 
environmental protection, legislation. and implementation of internalional environmental law 
is very relevant. 311 
There has also been an associated increase m the participation of developing 
countries in international affairs. 
We, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Heads of Delegation of the countries of the Non-
Aligned Movement. .. Reaffirm the unity and cohesion of the Non-Aligned Movement as the 
highesl political forum of the developing world and the most effective mechanism of dialogue 
between NAM members with the industrialized countries and other actors of the international 
community in the face of the challenges of a changing world ... with the end of the cold war 
tl1e Movement has grown in stature and has come to play an increasingly important role in 
every forum in U1e world. in particular wiU1in the UN system and in tl1e direct and frank 
dialogue initiated with tl1e Group of Seven on economic issues. 31 c 
The participation or the developing countries in international affairs through 
organisations such as NAM has placed them in the position or some influence. NAM 
currently has 113 mcrnhcrs, 31 ' with the UN having a current membership of 189 that 
310 Vidas. supra n 288 at 55. 
311 United Nations llnivnsily. "The Status of Third World States in International Environmental 
Legislation and it lmplementalion" in United Natiuns U11iversitr Prugramme Report 011 H11111a11 
Di111e11siu11s cif"G/obal Change (2001) electronic version 
<h llp://www. un u. edu/un upress/un upbooks/uu25ee/un 25ee0j .hUn>. 
31 ~ NAM Ministers. ··A Message from Cartagena De lndias'" Press Releasejiwn /998 NAlvl Meeting. 
(20 May 1998) <http://www.nam.gov.za/cartagena98.hunl>. 
313 NAM Membership List. (20 May 2001) <hllp//:www.nwn.org>. 
means that as a hlock N/\M controls 60ll< ur the UN voting powcr. 11 ~ Opinions will 
vary as to whether this situation is beneficial or not in relation to environmental 
protection, however no matter what your opinion it is necessary to recognise that such 
numbers can not simply he ignored. The effect of this block or intluence must he 
addressed in order to use it to the best advantage for all. The influence of NAM has 
already been seen in relation to Antarctic politics. It was due to supp011 from the 
NAM countries that Malaysia originally succeed in having Antarctica placed on the 
UN Agenda in 1983. 11 :; Because of their growing level of intluence in international 
affairs the continued criticism of the ATS by groups such as NAM has the potential 
to erode the external legitimacy of the organisation. 
7.9 Assistance of Developing Countries Necessary to Ensure Environmental 
Protection in the Antarctic 
The necessity for the inclusion of developing countries in the decision making 
process is already evident in relation to the Antarctic environment. It has become 
particularly obvious that any attempts to stop illegal fishing in the Treaty area cannot 
be successful without the assistance of the developing countries. While it is 
recognised that it is not only the developing countries that have a history of non-
compliance with the fishing regime established hy CCAMLR, having the support of 
NAM in combating non-compliance will go a long way to solving the current 
problem. ln the CCAMLR report to ATCM XXII the Commission made specific 
reference to its attempts to get two problem countries (hoth members of NAM) to 
participate as observers at Commission meetings: 
The Commission also decided to invite U1e Governments of Mauritius and Nan1ihia to 
participate as observers at the SevcntcenU1 Meeting of the Commission wiU1 a view to 
encouraging U1ese States to accede to U1e Convention m1d also to cease providing port or 
landing facilitates for vessels which carried out unregulated fishing in U1e Convention Area. 116 
These two countries, along with Belize, Chile and China. are the ones most often 
associated with reports of illegal fishing in the Antarctic. With the exception or 
m Background on NAfvl. (20 May 2001) <http//:nam.org>. NAM states one or its principal goals as 
Urnt or showing a unified front in U1c UN. 
31 ' Myhre . .I 71~1! Anrarcric TremY Srsrem: Policies, urn· and Diplonwc,· (1986) 111. 
316 Final Report ATCM XXII. 240. 
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China all these countries arc memhers or the NJ\M. 117 This appeal hy the CCAMLR 
Commission did in fact meet with great success as it resulted in hoth Mauritius and 
Namibia attending the 1998 and 1999 meetings of CCJ\MLR as ohservers. 318 
Namibia subsequently acceded to CCAMLR in 2000319 and although Mauritius as yet 
to do so their government has announced that they will implement the Catch 
Documentation Scheme.320 These events represent prime examples of what can be 
achieved when the developing countries are actively invited to pa1ticipate. 
The developing countries have also received recognition of their importance from the 
Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC), an organisation of NGOs 
associated with Antarctic issues. In 2000 as part of their recognition of the 
importance of developing countries to the effective functioning of NGO's and 
Antarctic environmental protection, ASOC established new regional offices India and 
Chile. 321 
All this evidence points to the inescapable conclusion that the international 
community is experiencing increased participation by the developing countries in 
international affairs and the decision making process. As such the inclusion of the 
developing countries in the decision making process could be deemed to have 
become part of the normative structure of the international community. A11, such in 
order for the ATS to maintain external legitimacy the structures and procedures of the 
organisation must change to rcllect that norm. 
317 China. however while not been a member of NAM docs have observer status mid as such allends 
NAM meetings. Membership List (20 May 2001) <hllp//:www.nam.org>. 
Greenpeace. "Latest News". 5 April 2001 <greenpeace.org/-oceans.hUn>. 
m Secretariat of ASOC. Antarctic Project Nrn·sfetter Vol 8 Issue J-4 Dec 1999. Electronic version 
<hllp://www.asoc.org>. 
31 ') Secretariat of ASOC. Antarctic Projecr Nelt's/etler Vol 10 Issue l April 2001. Electronic version 
<hllp://www.asoc.org>. 
321 ' Secretariat of /\SOC. Antarctic Projecl Nell's!etrer Vol 9 Issue J-4 Dec 2000. Electronic version 
<hllp://www.asoc.org>. 
The Catch Documentation Scheme is a CCAMLR progr:unme adopted under Conservation Measure 
170/XIX to help control illegal fishing in the Southern Oce:m. The scheme establishes a method of 
tracking U1e source of toothfish Uiat is harvested in the Southern Ocean. 
321 ASOC. "Report to Special Antarctic Consultative Meeting'' l l-15 September 2000. 
7.10 The Antarctic Treaty System Represents 80% of the World's Population 
Aside from their attempts to include the developing countries in the decision making 
process the ATCP"'s have adopted a second defence to the closed club criticism. This 
approach is to point out that the present make-up of the ATCPs represents 80% of the 
world's population. 322 While this statement is true by virtue of the fact that the 
ATCPs count among their membership seven of the world's twelve most populous 
countries, 323 in international law population size does not equate to the right to 
govern. This is based on the principle of sovereign equality that was developed by 
Vatell in 1758. 
Since men are naturally equal, and a perfect equality prevails in their rights and obligations, 
as equally proceeding from nature - Nations composed of men, and considered as so many 
free persons living together in a state of nature, are naturally equal. and inherit from nature 
the same obligations and rights. Power or weakness does not in this respect produce any 
difference. A dwarf is as much a man as a giant; a small republic is no less a sovereign state 
than the most powerful kingdom. By an necessary consequence of that equality, whatever is 
lawful for one nation is equally lawful for any other; and whatever is unjustifiable in the one 
is equally so in the other. 324 
Therefore it is clear that population size has no effect on a nations standing in 
international law. Indeed under the principle of sovereign equality China would have 
no more standing in an international forum than Nauru. As such the population of 
the ATS countries is irrelevant to the legitimacy of the ATS as the system of 
governance for the Antarctic. 
7 .11 Conclusion 
The issue of the participation of developing countries in the Antarctic Treaty is at this 
time not an active assault on the internal legitimacy on the ATS. This is because at 
this point the developing countries that are Parties to the Treaty have recognised the 
procedural advances that the ATCPs have made to date and are willing to wait and 
322 Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade Bilateral and Regional Relationships. ( 1.7.01) 
<http//: www. 111 rat. gov. na/forcign/rcgions/ An tarctica/trcat y. h 11111>. 
' 2·1 1992 total world population was 5.4 billion (I) China 1.165.888.000 (2) India 889. 700.000 (3) 
USA 255.414.000 (5) Brazil 15U81.000 (6) Russia 148.469.000 (8) Japan 124.:BO.OOO (12) 
Gcrm,my 79.122.000. Thomas. supra n 252 at 157. 
sec what further steps develop. However the speech of Antonio Guerreiro makes it 
clear that they will not wait forever. If the ATCPs do not make a more concerted 
effort to remove the inequity that still exists within the J\TS in relation to the 
involvement of developing countries in the decision-making process then the ATS 
could face an internal legitimacy crisis in the future. This is because if the developing 
countries who are party to the Treaty do not feel they are adequately represented in 
policy development they are not going to feel an obligation to comply with the 
procedures established by the ATS bodies. By refusing to comply with ATS policy 
the developing countries would he demonstrating that they believe they have no duty 
to "acknowledge and adhere to the rules and procedures"32 :'i of the ATS, thus 
removing its internal legitimacy. 
The continued criticism concerning the involvement of developing countries in the 
decision-making process from actors outside the Treaty system does however create 
doubts as to the external legitimacy of the ATS. This is particularly relevant in 
relation to what Stokke has termed the applicability of the regime. For an 
organisation to have applicability in relation to external legitimacy requires that the 
"normative and structural components of the regime"326 comply with the major 
developments in the international community. There is a trend in the within the 
international community toward the inclusion of developing nations in international 
decision-making. Thereti:lre the inclusion of this group would be considered 
normative and structural components of the international community. As there 
continues to he a lack of involvement by the developing countries within the confines 
or the A TS the organisation is not complying with the normative and structural 
requirements of the international community. Therefore placing its external 
legitimacy in question. 
The continued external criticism concerning or the level of participation hy 
developing countries within the A TS also has the potential to adversely effect the 
32 ~ Valid. The u111· of Nm ions ( l 7.'i8) Preliminaries para 18-19. 
125 Stokke. supra n 36 at 24. 
32 (, Ibid 24. 
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external legitimacy or ATS in relation to acceptance. Acceptance relates to the extent 
to which third parties believe that an international instrument applies to them and is 
judged by the degree of criticism levelled at the organisation. In light of the level of 
external criticism surrounding non-participation of developing countries in the 
decision-making process of the ATS it is unlikely that the developing countries that 
are not party to the Treaty will feel that the Treaty applies to them. As a result not 
only will they feel no obligation to comply with the principles of the Treaty but also 
due to their lack of recognition the ATS runs the risk of losing its external legitimacy. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Article IX(2) Conflicts with the New Environmental Protection 
Role of the Antarctic Treaty System 
There is another legitimacy issue, besides the non-participation of developing 
countries, that arises as a result of the exclusive nature of the consultative 
membership established under Article IX(2) of the Treaty. Article IX(2)"' 27 restricts 
the representation of the acceding parties at Treaty meetings to those that are 
conducting substantial research in Antarctica, as demonstrated through the 
establishment of a research station. The purpose of this chapter will be to investigate 
the possibility that Article IX(2) conflicts with the environmental protection role of 
the ATS thereby effecting the ATS's legitimacy under the applicability category. 
The research requirement for ATCP membership was not a problem, in relation to 
legitimacy, when the Treaty was first established because the purposes of the treaty 
were clearly stated in the preamble to the Treaty. 
The Governments of ... 
Recognising Umt it is in U1e interest of all mankind U1at Antarctica shall continue forever to be 
used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of 
international discord: 
Ack1101r/edging U1e suhstantial contributions to scientific knowledge resulting from 
international cooperation in scientilic investigation in Antarctica: 
Com·inced U1at U1e establishment of a linn foundation for U1e continuation and development 
of such cooperation on U1e freedom of scientific investigation ... accords wiU1 U1e interests of 
science and U1e progress of all mankind: ... 328 
Over the years however in response to international pressun/ 2'> the ATS has moved 
toward a policy of environmental protection. an issue that was never addressed in the 
initial Treaty. Article 3( l) or the Environmental Protocol states: 
327 Supra at 6.'i. 
·12 ~ Premnble to Antarctic Treatv 1959. 
32 ,, In 1989 Ule UN First Conlll;ittee. which debates Antarctic issues. recognised U1e import:mcc of the 
Antarctic to U1c world environment. The Committee debate ended in U1c presentation to the UNGA of 
Resolution A44/l24I3 which stated Uiat U1e "General Asscmhly believes that Antarctica·s significant 
The protection ol the Antarctic environment ,md dependent and associated ecosystems and 
tJ1e intrinsic value of Antarctica. including its wilderness and acst11etic values as an area for 
tJ1c conduct of scientific research. in particular research essential to understanding t11e global 
environment. shall he hmd,unental considerations in !lie planning and conduct of all activities 
in U1e Antarctic Treaty area. 1311 
Therefore commentators have expressed the opinion that environmental protection 
has become an objective for which the ATS exists. 
Since U1e end of U1e Cold War. in 1991, U1e issue of environment has emerged as U1e 
additional core value of the Treaty, as countries have grown to accept Antarctica provides 
uniquely important information for understanding U1e global environment. 331 
The ATCPs in Article 22(4) of the Environmental Protocol have made ratification of 
the Protocol a requirement for consultative status. This action would tend to confirm 
the opinion of those commentators who maintain that environmental protection has 
become an aim of the ATS. 
After the date on which this Protocol has entered into force, the Antarctic Treaty Consultative 
Parties shall not act upon a notification regarding t11e entitlement of a Contracting Party lo U1e 
Antarctic Treaty to appoint representatives to participate in tJ1e Antarctic Consultative 
Meetings in accordance with Article IX(2) of tlle Antarctic Treaty unless tlial Contracting 
Party has first ratified. accepted. Approved or acceded lo this Protocol. 332 
As such when it comes to policy decisions environmental protection should be on an 
equal footing with scientific research. However as the situation currently stands 
Article IX(2) of the Treaty is in direct contlict with this new environmental protection 
objective and as such places the internal legitimacy or the ATS in question. This is 
because in order to maintain internal legitimacy the rules and procedures or the 
impact on U1e global environment mem1s U1at a comprehensive environmental protection convention 
should only be negotiated wiU1 the full participation of U1e international community ... " Beck. P '"The 
UN Goes Green on Antarctica: U1e 1989 session" 26 Polar Record 323. 
At this time U1e ATCPs refused to participate in First Committee debates on Antarctica because or 
U1eir continued calls to have South Africa removed from t11e Treaty system. Antarctic Treaty System. 
Final Repurl ofATCM X\/ll held 11-20 November in Venice 45. 
Hugh W}11dhmn in his opening address as Head of the Australian Delegation stated 'The conclusion of 
U1e Protocol has been particularly valuatile in sending a signal to U1e world that U1e Antarctic Treaty 
has been ahle to resolve a politically difficult issue and allunc itself to meeting internatilina.l concern 
for t11e environment." This sentiment was expressed in t11e majority of the opening statements in 
Bonn. Antarctic Treaty system. Final ReporT of ATCM XVI held 7-18 October 1991 in Bonn 152. 
330 Protocol on Environmental Protection to t11e Antarctic Trcatv. 1991. 
331 Prior. supra n 246 at 6. · 
33 ~ Article 22(4) Antarctic Treaty. supra n 24. 
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organisation must address the prnhlcms for which that organisation was cslahlishcd. 
Currently under Article Xl(2) of the Treaty in order lo he admiucd lo consultative 
status and participate in the decision-making process at Treaty meetings a Patty to the 
Treaty must ·conduct suhstantial research activities'. This requirement not only 
specifically excludes from the decision making process any Party whose Antarctic 
interest is conservation rather than science hased, but means that the A TS can not 
possibly be adequately addressing their environmental protection objective. This is 
because the definition of 'substantial research' necessitates the establishment of a 
permanent research facility in the Antarctic region,333 and it stands to reason that any 
increase in the numher of research facilities cannot be is consistent with 
environmental protection. 
I believe that this current conflict between the scientific and environmental protection 
ohjectives of the ATS is due in part to the reluctance of the ATCPs to come to terms 
with their new environmental protection goal. This reluctance is apparent in the 
opening address of Brazil at ATCM XVI: 
If on the one hand, Mr Chairman, the Antarctic Treaty has withstood the test of time. on the 
other. we have to acknowledge the fact tl1at most of us have just signed in Madrid an 
instrument which will, when it becomes effective. as we believe will soon happen, alter in a 
fundamental way the functioning of t11e Antarctic Treaty system, ll'iTlw11t 1a111pering with its 
f11nda111enral premises and objeclil'es. The Protocol on t11e Protection of t11c Antarctic 
Environment strengt11ens tlle Treaty and supplements it in fields where it was needed to put 
into legally binding language a number of measures .... 334 (my italics) 
South Africa at ATCM XXI expressed the belief that environmental protection 
should not interfere with scientific investigation: 
It is t11e view of my delegation tlrnl t11ere can no longer be :my doubt as to tlle importance of 
providing a mech:mism t11a1 would help Lo ensure t11e comprehensive protection of that 
uniquely fragile yet hostile Antarctic environment. At /he same lime ll'e 11111sr also ensure 1hm 
mch a regime does 11u1 becume an impecli11u.'11f 10 lhe cond11c1 <~( scienrijic inl'esrigalion ... m 
(my italics) 
m Supra at 6.'i. 
B~ Antarctic Treaty System ... Opening Address of Henrique Valle. I lead of the Delegation of Brazil". 
Final Reporr ATCM X\'I 156. 
mJ\ntarctic Treaty system ... Opening Address of Dr F Ilanckom. lleaJ or t11e Dekgation of the 




The apparent contlict hetween Article [X(2) or the Treaty and new environmental 
protection objective or the ATS has ramifications for both the internal and external 
legitimacy of the organisation. In order to maintain internal legitimacy the rules and 
procedures of the organisation must adequately address its ohjectivcs. The ATS 
through the adoption of the Environmental Protocol now has an objective of 
environmental protection as well as scientific investigation. However, the ATS 
cannot be meeting its environmental protection objective when the rules for the 
admission of Parties to consultative status require them to establish a research 
facility, an activity that is in direct conflict with the goal of protecting the Antarctic 
environment. 
The current conflict between the objectives of the ATS also has ramifications for the 
external legitimacy of the organisation. This is in relation to the level of acceptance 
of the organisation by the international community. While currently the international 
community is generally pleased with the environmental protection advances made 
with the adoption of the Environmental Protocol. This acceptance could soon fade if 
they perceive that the ATS, despite adoption of the Protocol, is continuing to advance 
scientific investigation to the detriment of environmental protection. 
CHAPTER NINE 
The Difficulties Surrounding the Establishment of a 
Permanent Secretariat 
The difficulties that the ATCPs have had in establishing a permanent Secretariat has 
potential ramifications on the legitimacy of the ATS in three ways. Firstly during the 
debates on the establishment of a permanent Secretariat both Argentina and Britain 
made allegations that the principles and spirit of the Treaty had been violated. 
Therefore the first section of this chapter is to investigate these allegations and as the 
principles and spirit of the Treaty could be considered analogous with rules and 
procedures determine if their violation constitutes a loss of international legitimacy 
for the ATS. Following this will be a discussion as to whether the failure of the 
Parties to adequately address the Secretariat issue in a timely manner has had any 
adverse effects on the internal and external legitimacy of the organisation. 
9.1 Background 
There is no provision in the Antarctic Treaty for the establishment of a permanent 
S . 116 , ecrctanat.· · This is because when the Treaty was drafted the Parties did not teel 
one was necessary. However, over the years the Parties have recognised that a 
permanent Secretariat is necessary both to remove the secrecy criticism that the ATS 
races and to allow for improved functioning or the ATS as a who le. :m 
A new element in the international scene is pressing for changes in Uie Antarctic Treaty 
System ... Although based on erroneous assumptions. we must admit tJiat U1is criticism has 
been caused. to a large extent. by the altitudes of the Consultative Parties Uiemselves who, 
until n:cently. had not realised fully Uie import:mce of explaining lo others tJie nature and 
scope or the Antarctic Treaty System. The Antarctic Treaty and its related instruments give 
expression to principles universally recognised to be in Ilic interest or mankind. Thus. U1ere 
seems to Ix: no fund;unental reason for secrecy in our deliberations ... Uie lack or public 
information on Ulc Treaty during U1e first twenty years of its existence was due mainly to U1e 
rn Currently it is the role of Ilic host country to arrange and fund Uic ATCM. Watts. A !11rerna1iu11a/ 
u111· and 1/11: An1arcric Tret1t1· S\·srem ( 1992> 35. 
317 Vidas. supra n 288 at 58. · 
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absence or interest ol the international community at large. Now that such ;u1 interest has 
become 1mmifcst. we must respond clkctivcly. 11s 
To meet these objectives in 1987 the Parties began debating the possibility of 
establishing some type of permanent infrastructure for information dissemination. 
The meeting ... examined U1e possibility of sharing U1e costs of Consultative Meetings. U1e 
possible need for some more permanent infrastructure and Uie possibility of holding regular 
Consultative Meetings with greater frequency ... emphasis was placed upon the question of a 
possible permanent infrastructure, wiili a diversity of views expressed as to ilie need for such 
infrastructure. 339 
However little progress was made until 1991 when the development of the 
Environmental Protocol made the establishment of a Secretariat a matter of grave 
importance. Luis Porras, Head of the Delegation from Peru at ATCM XVI in 1991, 
during his opening address expressed the importance of the establishment of a 
Secretariat. 
... ilie increasing complexity of ilie system and Uie exponential growU1 in U1e amount of data 
to be handled and circulated make it advisable to set up an administrative body responsible 
for ilie information and co-ordination. This had already been discussed at earlier Meetings 
and even at U1e Preparatory Meeting in April. but approval of Uie Protocol on ilie 
Environment now makes it imperative. Whetlier it is called a Secretariat or whatever is of no 
importance: what is needed is a body Uiat handles. centralizes and circulates information .... 340 
The issue of the establishment of a permanent Secretariat was on the agenda for that 
meeting and during the debate it was established that: 
lllhere was widespread support for U1e establishment of a small. modem. cost-effective 
Secretariat responsible to m1d under U1e auiliority of U1e Consultative Meetings ... Most 
delegates felt its cTeation as urgent. .. The question of location was mentionetl by several 
delegation. Some delegations were or the view Uiat U1is question should remain open for U1e 
time being. OU1ers stated U1at no aspect should be isolated ... NoneU1cless. U1ere was no 
consensus on U1e immediate establishment or a Secretariat. .. The meeting agreed U1is question 
should be rurU1er considered at the next meeting. 341 
The issue was subsequently debated at each successive ATCM 3.u with the Parties 
unable to consensus'-11 concerning the issue until ATCM XXIV in 2001. However it 
m Antarctic Treaty system. ··opening Address of David Silveira Da Mota. Ambassador from Brazil". 
Final Report ATCM XIII ( 198:i) 126. 
rn Antarctic Treaty System. Final Reporl ATCM XIV (1987) para. 24. 
14''Antarctic Treaty System ... Opening address of Luis Porras Head or U1e Delegation from Peru" Final 
Repo11 ofATCM XVI held 7-18 October 1991 in Bonn. Gcnrnmy 184. 
rn Antarctic TreatySystem. Final Report ufATCM XVI held 7-18 October I 991 in Bonn. Gcnnany 12. 
_q, Antarctic Treaty System. Final Report of ATCM X\111 held 11-20 November 1992 in Venice. Italy. 
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is not the lack or consensus itself that has resulted in a possihle loss or legitimacy hut 
the allegations that during the dehates certain Parties violated the principles and Spirit 
of the Treaty. 
9.2 Violation of the Spirit of the Treaty 
While all the Parties agreed that a permanent Secretariat was necessary there was 
disagreement as to the location. All of the Parties with the exception of Britain 
supported Argentina as the host country. 344 This was despite concerns raised by some 
Parties that the Secretariat might be more legitimate if placed in a non-Claimant 
State. 345 What resulted from this situation was a bi-partisan conflict between Britain 
and Argentina in which both Parties accused the other of violating the 'spirit of the 
Treaty', by refusing to apply the procedural requirements of consensus decision-
making. The undercurrents of the debates also indicate that both Britain and 
Argentina may have violated the convention that Antarctic decisions were not to be 
influenced by factors from outside the Antarctic region. 
Antarctic Treaty System. Final Report ATCM XVlll held 11-22 April 1994 in Kyoto, Japan. 
Antarctic Treaty System. Final Report of ATCM XIX held 8-19 May 1995 in Seoul, Korea. 
Antarctic Treaty System. Final Report ofATCM XX held 29 April-JO May 1996 in Utrecht. 
Netherlands. 
Antarctic Treaty System, Final Report of ATCM XXI held 19-30 May 1997 in Christchurch. New 
Zealcmd. 
Antarctic Treaty System. Final Reporr (){ATCM XX/l held 25 May-5 .lune 1998 in Tromso. 
Norwav. 
m Ru!~ 24 of the Rules of Prcx.:edure for Consultative Meetings requires consensus in Uiese matters. 
"'Without prejudice to Rule 21. Measures. Decisions mid Resolutions ... shall he adopted hy the 
Representatives or all Consultative Parties present ... " Antarctic treaty system ... Rules of Procedure" 
<http://currentaspire.nvi.net/engine/research/new584.htm>. 
m .. I would like to express Uie deep satisfaction and gratitude of Ule Argcntinemi Government for U1e 
almost un:mi..mous support U1e offer of Buenos Aires as headquarters for U1e Secretariat has received." 
Antarctic Treaty System ... Opening address of Orlando Rehagliati Uie I lead of Ule Delegation of 
Argentina" Final Repor/ ()/ATCM X\ll/1 held 11-22 April 1994 in Kyoto. Japan 57. 
w "a decision on U1e location should he taken in such a way that U1ere will not he U1e remotest 
possibility of its giving rise to any doubt or suspicion :md that U1ere will likewise he no duplication 
with U1e location or the Depository Government or of any 0U1er organisation or hody of the Antarctic 
Treaty system. Accordingly. as an initial indication. I U1ink that consideration should he given to Uie 
idea Uiat U1c host country of such a hody ought not to he one of the major powers or a country with 
soven:ignty claims ... ". Antarctic Tn:aty System ... Opening Address of Luis Porras I lead of U1e 
Delegation from Peru" Final Repon ofATCM X\1/ held 7-18 October 1991 in Bonn. Gennm1y 184. 
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In an address Lo J\ TCM XXI in 1997 Argentina asserted Lhal I3riLain' s cDnlinued 
rdusal to suppott Argentina as the site for the Secretariat, showed an unwillingness to 
reconcile themselves to the view of all the other Patties and was both a violation of 
the spirit of co-operation encased in the Treaty and the convention that political 
activities outside the auspices of the ATS will not effect nations policies within the 
confines of the treaty. 
Let me underline ... U1e almost unanimous support to U1e proposal Uiat Buenos Aires be 
designated as headquarters of U1e Secretariat ... This overwhelming support has persisted over 
the years. It is U1erefore not at all appropriate for the consolidation of U1e spirit of cooperation 
which has always prevailed in our meetings, Uiat in U1is specific case, the will of such an 
overwhelming majority be tilwarted. Non interference of matters alien to U1e Antarctic has 
been a common and necessary practice for over 35 years and it is ... one of the essential 
elements of the success of the Antarctic Treaty System ... .This healtily practice must therefore 
be preserved. 346 
Britain responded the following year by arguing that it was Argentina who was 
violating these principles by refusing to withdraw their candidacy in the face of 
Britain's opposition. 
The UK had very much welcomed U1e agreement at ATCM XVIII tilat there should be a 
permanent Secretariat. The UK had always supported U1e idea, and remained firmly of tile 
view that a permanent Secretariat was essential. In contrast until 1992 Argentina had been 
opposed even to tile principle of a permanent Secretariat. In 1991 U1e UK Government 
decided tilat it would not be appropriate for tile UK, as one of tile three counter-claimants. to 
be a candidate for host country of the Secretariat. We indicated very strongly to Argentina 
that if she were to offer herself as a candidate U1is would inevitably result in tension. 
Unfortunately. Argentina did not heed U1is warning. UK has already made it clear that it is 
prepared to join a consensus in favour (ofJ any of the 0U1er 24 ATCPs being the host country. 
In contrast. Argentina has made it clear on a number of occasions U1at it will not consider ,my 
other candidate. This inflexible position is quite contn11T to the spirit of the ATCM: if 
consensus on a proposal cannot he reached. efforts are (sic/ should he made to achie1•e 
consensus on an alternatil'e. (my italics/47 
In an attempt to resolve Lhe impasse developed over the location of the Secretariat in 
1998 the Australian Government offered Hobart as a possible alternative. q 8 
'~" Antarctic Treaty System. "Opening Address of Horacio Solari. Head of the Delegation or 
Argentina" Final Report of ATCM XXI held 19-30 !\lay 1997 in Christchurch. New Zeal,md 142. 
'· 1 Antarctic Treaty System, Final Report ofATCM XXII held 25 May-5 June 1998 in Tromso. 
Norway. 27. 
348 .. Australia noted U1at in offering I lohart as a possible location, it was conscious of U1e generous 
offer of Buenos Aires which has heen on U1e tahlc since 1992. Australia also noted. however. U1at it 
was e4ually conscious Uiat unfortunately. and despite widespread support for Buenos Aires. Treaty 
Parties were no closer to agreement on U1e location of U1e Secretariat than they had been in 1992. 
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However, in a move lhal furlhered Britain's claim concerning Argentina's lack or 
consideration for the spirit or co-operalion incorporated into lhe Trealy Argentina 
made it very clear thal they would not support any alternative location. 
Argentina stated: 
• That it considers that Buenos Aires continues to be the quickest lane to a solution and 
that alternative sites would introduce unnecessary delays. 
• That the support of the vast majority of the Consultative Parties. which time has 
consolidated. is an important aspect which must be considered. 
• That it does not seem a healthy practice for the Antarctic Treaty System that the 
reservation on one single State, which has not gathered support, be allowed to prevail 
over the will of tl1e rest of tl1e Consultative Parties ... 
• That Argentina is not in a position to accept consideration of alternative solutions in 
relation to tl1e geographical location of tl1e Antarctic Treaty Sec..Tetariat whilst it firmly 
reiterated its most ample disposition and llexibility in relation to all other aspects 
pertaining to tl1c establishment of tl1c Secretariat in Argentina ... 
• ... Argentina expressed tl1at independently of its intrinsic merits, Hobart's candidacy is 
not consistent with the prevailing opinion that Antarctic bodies should have a balanced 
geographical distribution. 349 
The preceding statements from both countries indicate that in fact both of them have 
probably violated both the spirit of the Treaty and the convention that political issues 
outside the Antarctic should not colour Antarctic governance. While this situation 
could be considered analogous to a violation of the rules and procedures of the 
organisation the evidence in this case is not sufficient to support a loss of legitimacy. 
However the ·schoolboy' behaviour or the two countries, in delaying the formation of 
the Secretariat, could still have ramifications for the legitimacy of the ATS. 
9.3 Frustration of the Members and NGOs with delay 
The delay in the formation of a Secretariat caused hy Britain and Argentina's little 
squabble has resulted in some or the ATCPs questioning the effectiveness of the 
current system which could have repercussions for the internal legitimacy of the ATS. 
Australia was keen to do what it could to assist Treaty Parties each early agreement on tl1is issue.'' 
Antarctic Treaty System. ··Presentation by tl1c Delegation or Australia" Final Report of ATCM XXII 
held 25 May-5 June 1998 in Twmso. Norway 26. 
m Antarctic Treaty System. "Presentation by the Delegation of Argentina" Fino/ Report 4 ATCM 
XXII ( 1989) 26. 
The geographic balance mentioned in tl1e Argentinea.n presentation is rekrence to tl1e fact tl1at U1e 
Secretariat for CCAMLR is located in Hobart. 
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The Opening Address or C ieorges Duquin of the French Delegation at ATCM XIX in 
1995 gives voice lo these concerns. 
The French Delegation insists in this respect on underscoring two concerns which are shared 
by other delegations: The efficiency of the Consultative Meeting proceedings ... The decline 
in the efficiency of the Consultative Meeting proceedings is to be deplored. U1is is mainly due 
to U1e lack of adequate instruments and, primarily. the lack of a Treaty Secretariat. ... France 
would like to express its wish that the Secretariat be set up at the earliest opportunity .... 
France hopes this attitude will prevail for. without it, U1e Antarctic System will be missing an 
altogether essential operating mechm1ism ... 350 
The NGOs also expressed frustration with the delay in establishing a permanent 
Secretariat because they saw it as essential for the effective implementation of the 
Madrid Protocol. This concern has been voiced by the ASOC351 on a number of 
occasions: 
ASOC is concerned U1at another year has gone by wiiliout discernible progress in setting up 
U1e Secretariat for ilie Treaty, which is crucial to the proper implementation of the Protocol. 352 
We note with disappointment U1e continuing failure to establish a Secretariat, which could 
greatly contribute to ilie implementation of ilie Protocol and assist wiili 0U1er aspects of U1e 
Treaty's work. 353 
The IUCN354 has also stressed the importance of the establishment of a Secretariat in 
its 1996 report to ATCM XX. 
A small permanent Secretariat for ilie Antarctic Treaty is essential for the efficient operation 
of the mechanisms established under U1e Protocol. .. In addition. IUCN believes U1at many 
aspects of the management of Antarctica ... would benefit from a more integrated, 
international approach. Establishing a permanent Secretariat to provide the necessary 
administrative support would greatly facilitate U1e development of a more integrated approach 
to U1ese uses of Antarctica.355 
Because these two groups represent a high percentage of the NGO activity in the 
Antarctic region if they elevate their remarks from reported comments of concern to 
351' Antarctic Treaty System, Final Reporr of ATCM XIX ( 1995) 155. 
351 The Antarctic and S0uU1em Coalition is an association of 230 NGO' s from 49 countries who are 
concerned wiU1 U1e environment of Antarctica mid U1e S0uU1em Ocean. Membership includes 
Greenpeace. World Wildlife Fund and New Zealand's Fish and Bird Society 
35 ~ ASOC. " ASOC Report to ATCM" Final Report of A TCM XIX 278. 
m ASOC .. ASOC Report to ATCM" Final Report ufA TCM XX!l 210. The statement was repeated in 
U1c ASOC Report to ATCM XXII. Final Report of ATCM XX!l 276. 
N The World Conservation Union is a partnership of States. government agencies mid NGO's 
estahlished in 1948. /\s or 1996 it had 800 memhers including 160 state and government agencies 
from IJU countries. IUCN ... Report of IUCN to ATCM XX" Final Repo11 ATCM XX 213. 
3~5 IUCN. --1UCN Report to ATCM XX" Final Repon <ifATCM XX 215. 
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open criticism this could have negative repercussions for the external legitimacy of 
the J\TS. 
While the apparent frustrations of the ATCPs and the NGOs could have had potential 
ramifications for both the internal and external legitimacy of the ATS this issue 
appears to have resolved itself. On July 17 200 l at ATCM XXIV Britain announced 
that they had reached an agreement with Argentina and were ready to support Buenos 
Aires as the location for the Secretariat. 356 
9.4 The Secretiveness Criticism 
There is another area where the lack of a permanent Secretariat has had the potential 
to threaten the external legitimacy of the ATS. This is because according to Stokke 
the degree of acceptance of an organisation by external actors can be assessed by the 
level and persistence of the criticism levelled by them. 357 The ATS has for some time 
been subject to criticisms of secretiveness358 and the ATCPs saw the establishment of 
a permanent Secretariat as a means of silencing some of this criticism by making 
information more readily available to both Parties and non-Parties to the Treaty. 
Australia mentioned this need for openness and transparency during their opening 
address to A TCM XVI in 1991. 
AnoU1er major emphasis falls in U1e category of public perception or the Treaty itself, in view 
of inlTeased international and public interest in Antarctica and U1e fact that the Treaty 
continues to attract criticism from some quarters. While the Treaty recenlly received 
international commendation for its success in negotiating l11c environmental Protection 
Protocol. l11ere is still a need to show l11e broader community that it can live up to its 
responsibilities by demonstrating inlTeased competence. efficiency and imporumtly. 
356 Antarctic Treaty System. Final Report ATCM XXIV. held 9-20 July 200 I at St Petersburg, Russi:m 
Federation. Para 20-24. 
3q Stokke 25. 
358 To a certain extent l11e secrecy argument goes hm1d in hand will1 U1e .. exclusive club debate" in so 
far as U1e information developed within l11e ATS was available only to the limited class of ATS 
members. Therefore l11e roots of the argument lie in the prior exclusion of non-ATCPs from ATCt-.·1s. 
Also in stating U1is argument it must be noted that there is a line line between secrecy and 
conlidentially and to establish wheUH:r U1e ATS has crossed 1l1e line between U1e two is a subjective 
raU1er Uia.n iui objective assessment. however l11e J\TS has attempted to address U1e LTiticism by 
making its procedures more trm1sparent. Jorgensen-Dahl. J\ ·The legitimacy or Uie ATS in Jorgensen-
Dahl. A mid Ostreng. W (eds) (1991) 293. 
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lnmspan:ncy in m,magerrn:nt. It is importmll Uiat Treaty Parties continue to make availahlc Lo 
U1e puhlic documents relating to Treaty decisions ,md operations. 1''' 
This sentiment was repeated hy France at ATCM XIX in 1995. 
The need to keep up an increasing exchm1ge of information not only between U1e parties but. 
henceforU1. wiU! U1e rest of the international community and wilh puhlie opinion leaders. 
should also he taken into account. A Treaty secretariat is lherefore hecoming a dire 
necessil y. 300 
And again by Korea at A TCM XX in 1996. 
A Secretariat will enhm1ce exchange of information among lhe Parties, and improve the 
awareness of U1e glohal community with regard to lhe measures taken in lhe Antarclic to 
preserve its unique ecosystem. 301 
To a certain extent the secrecy criticism has been weakened by three earlier actions of 
the ATCPs, that is the inclusion of non-Consultative Parties362 and NGOs363 at 
ATCMs, and a concerted attempt by the Parties to make information more readily 
available to external actors.364 However, the lack of a permanent Secretariat makes 
the dissemination of this material to interested parties difficult. Under the present 
system any entity/individual requiring information must make a request to either the 
359 Antarctic Treaty. ''Opening Address of Hugh Wyndham. Head of U1e Australian Delegation" Final 
Repo11 ATCM XVI 153. 
360 Antarctic Treaty. ··Opening Address of Georges Duguin. Head of U1e Delegation of Fnmce" Final 
Report ATCM XIX 155. 
361 Antarctic Treaty. ''Opening Address of Chun Yong-Due. Head of the Delegation from U1e Republic 
of Korea" Final Report ATCM XX 124. 
36l Non-Consultative Parties were for U1e first time invited to allend U1e ATCM as observers. Draft 
Rules or Procedure were prepared in order to allow this practice to continue. Antarctic Treaty. Final 
Repo11 of ATCM Xll held 13-27 1983 November in Canberra. Australia 14. 
363 NGO's were gnmted very limited status by the 1987 Rules or Procedure. Antarctic Treaty. Final 
Repo11 of ATCM XIV 5 and 239. 
The rules of procedure were amended in 19<)2 to give experts from international organisations an 
extended role. Antarctic Treaty. Final Repon ATCM X\lll 428. 
36~ Recommendation XII(6) resolved lhat copies of the Final Report of each ATCM he submitled to all 
Contracting Parties and U1e UN St:cn:tary-General. Resolution XI1(6) also calls for U1e ATCPs lo make 
meeting information availahh:: to U1e "public relevant lo U1e scientific or technical interest which Uiat 
agency or organization has in Antarctica. Antarctic Treaty. Final Report ofATCM Xll held 1.1-27 
1983 November in Cm1hcrra. Australia. 
The Final Report of ATCM XVII contained a list of national contact points from which ATS 
information could he ohtained. 
At A TCM XIX U1e ATCPs agreed to make all meeting documents available to U1e public wiU1out 
exception. Antarctic Treaty. Final Report ()/ATCM XIX. 
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Host Government of each J\ TCM or their national contact puinL. However due to a 
variety of factors the information is not always rorthcoming_'<,s 
With the estahlishment of a permanent Secretariat given the go ahead at ATCM 
XXIV it is likely that the ATCPs have adequately address the secrecy issue. 
However it is to soon to access whether the new Secretariat will totally remove 
criticism on this point. This is because to date the ATCPs have yet to release 
information as to the structure and function of the Secretariat. 
9.5 Conclusion 
Although the legitimacy issues that existed in relation to the lack of a permanent 
Secretariat have not all been permanently removed by the actions of the Parties at 
ATCM XXIV they have effectively been suspended. In order for this threat Lo 
legitimacy to become permanent the Parties must establish the planned Secretariat 
and make its structure both accessible and transparent. 
36 ' Access to information is therefore currently governed by U1e degree of cooperation/ ability to 
cooperate given by individual governments. The availability of information is also limited by the 
extent lo which U1e national contact point has U1e resources necessary to make all information readily 
available to U1e public. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
The Inability of the ATCPs to Develop a Liability Annex to the 
Environmental Protocol 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate whether the inability of the ATCPs to 
adopt a liability annex to the Environmental Protocol has had any adverse effects on 
the legitimacy of the ATS. This issue will be approached from three different aspects 
of legitimacy. The first section will evaluate whether the lack of a liability annex 
implies that the ATS is failing to meet its environmental protection objective. This 
will be followed by an assessment of whether the failure of the ATCPs to develop a 
liability means that the ATS does not comply with the normative structure of the 
international community. The third section will investigate the extent to which the 
absence of a liability annex has effected the acceptance of the ATS by the 
international community. 
10.1 Background 
Article l 6 of the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 
requires the Parties to establish a liability annex lo enhance the protection of the 
Antarctic Environment: 
Consistent wiU1 the objectives of U1is Protocol for comprehensive protection of the Antarctic 
environment mid dependent and associated ecosystems. the Parties undertake to elaborate 
rules mid pruceoures relating to liability for oamage arising from activities taking place in the 
Antarctic Treaty area and covered by U1is Protocol. Those rules mid proceoures shall be 
included in one or more Annexes to be adopteo in accordance wiU1 Article 9(2). 166 
The ATCPs have been debating the question of liability since the drafting of the 
Protocol in 199 i.•(, 7 During Special Consultative Meeting XI held in Madrid for the 
purpose of drarting the Environmental Protocol, 
ir,r, Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treatv. Article 16. 
1(, 7 Antarctic Treaty System. Fino! Report ufATCM XVII held 11-20 NoYembcr 1992 in Venice. Italy. 
Antarctic Treaty System. Final Report ATCM X\1/ll held 11-22 April 199-4 in Kyoto. Japan. 
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the meeting unlkrlined the commiunent of U1e Parties to U1e Protocol in its /\rlide 16 to 
elahorate rules mu.I procedures relating to liahility tor d,unage arising from activities taking 
place in U1c Antarctic Treaty area mid covered hy the Protocol. wiU1 a view to their inclusion 
in one or more Annexes and expressed U1e wish Uiat work on U1eir elahoration could begin at 
an early stagc.168 
Despite this commitment by the Parties they have yet to draft a liability annex that is 
acceptable to all Parties. This inability to draft a liability annex has specific 
ramification for the internal and external legitimacy of the ATS, under both the 
applicability and acceptance categories. 
10.2 Internal Legitimacy 
An essential component of internal legitimacy requires that the rules and procedures 
of the organisation address the objectives for which the organisation was designed. 
We have established earlier that one of the primary objectives of the ATS is 
environmental protection. 369 The Environmental Protocol was drafted specifically to 
meet this objective . 
. . . it was necessary to establish a legal framework as soon as possible which would serve to 
guarantee the protection of U1e Antarctic environment. The instrument which we are 
contemplating, togeU1er wiU1 its annexes, is wiU1ou1 doubt the keystone of U1is legal 
framework ... m, 
While the drafting of the Protocol was considered a giant step toward ensuring the 
protection of the Antarctic environment the Parties stated at its signing that the 
subsequent drafting of a liability annex was an integral part of the level of 
environmental protection desired from the Protocol. 
The objective of comprehensive protection of the Antarctic.: environment will only be 
achieved by actual application of U1e Protocol. .. provisionally apply the Protocol from now on 
Antarctic.: Treaty System. Final Repurt ufATCM XIX held 8-19 May 1995 in Seoul. Korea. 
Antarctic.: Treaty System, Final Report of ATCM XX held 29 April- JO May 1996 in Utrecht. 
Netherlands. 
Antarctic Treaty System. Final Report uf ATCM XXI held 19-30 May 1997 in Christchurch. New 
Zealm1d. 
Antarctic Treaty System. Final Report uf ATCM XXll held 25 May-5 June 1998 in Tromso. 
Norway . 
.1r,s Antarctic Treaty System. Final Report of Special Con.rnltati1·e Meeting XI. final session held 3-4 
October 199 l in Madrid. Spain. l 09 . 
.1r," Supra at 86. 
m, Antarctic Treaty System. ··Address of Palacio De S,mla Cruz" Final Repo11 <Jf"SATCM XI. held 
199 l in Madrid. Spain. 105. 
and lhal we mainlain momenlum by lhc devclopmenl of addilional ,urnexes. especially on 
liabilily as required by /\nicle 16 of U1c Prolocol. .. 171 
The Head of the Danish Delegation added: 
The comprehensive regime. however. has nol yet been completed. My delegation has at 
several occasions emphasized t.he importance of a liability regime. which unfortunately could 
not be included in t.he Protocol. These rules and procedures should be elaborated at the 
earliest possible date.372 
However despite the recognition by the Parties of the importance of the liability 
annex, ten years after the drafting of the Protocol and three years after its entry into 
force the Parties appear to he are no closer to finalising a liability annex than they 
were in 1991. Several delegations noted the need to continue the important work on 
the liability annex at ATCM XVIII in 1994. 
The Chinese Delegation notices U1at U1e Liability Annex to Uie Protocol on Environmental 
Protection has been listed as an important subject of Uiis meeting. We appreciate U1e effort 
made ... and 0U1er legal experts ... to develop a draft annex. We understand that U1ey 
encountered unexpected difficulties ... The Chinese Delegation believes U1at U1e establishment 
of a liability regime is very significant for U1e comprehensive protection of Ule Antarctic 
environment and dependent and associated ecosystems. There is no doubt Ulat furUler 
exchange of views is necessary. 371 
Dietrich Granow, Head of the German Delegation added: 
[T)he signing or Uie Protocol on Environmental Protection to t.he Antarctic 
Treaty ... undoubtedly one of U1e greatest successes since U1e Antarctic Treaty system came 
into being, should be no reason for us to relax our efforts to improve Ule system ... Whilst the 
Protocol ... ims in preparation all contracting parties ire re aware thm full protection for the 
Anwrctic could not he achieved ll'ithout a sensible liability regime regarding environmental 
damage, and that ire 11·011/d fo1feit our credihilitr if ire did not immediatelr swrr to create 
one ... We feel that U1is aim should now be vigorously pursued in order to obtain tangible 
results as soon as possible which will prove !hat UH: Antarclic Treaty States are determined to 
follow a consistent line in securing protection for U1e Antan:tic.m (my italics) 
Similar comments have been made hy the delegations at all the successive J\TCMs. 
The drafting of the annex was once again the subject or extensive dehate at J\TCM 
XXIV in 2001, however all the delegates managed to agree on was a decision to 
continue the discussions. 
Taking inlo accu11111 Decision 3 (1998), which ea.lied on Working Group I to elaborate draft 
texts for an ,urnex or ,mncxes on liability for environmental d,-unage: 
371 ··stalemen1 or John McCarthv (Australia)" Ibid. 165. 
37 ~ "Statement of J.R. Lilje-Jen~en ( Denmark)" Ibid. 197. 
371 Anlan:tic Treaty System. "Opening Address by Ambassador Xu Guangjian. llead of Delegation of 
China" Fino! Report A 1'CM X\!l/l held 11-22 April in Kru/u Japan 65. 
m "Opening Address by Anlbassador Dietrich Granow. Head or Delegation of Germany". Ibid 71. 
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E11cm1rugecl hy the progress made in the meetings or Working Group I ;md in informal 
consultations on a liahilily annex lo tlH: Environmental Protocol: 
Conscious of the lllTd to continue U1e negotiations on U1is issue. which were 1rnmdated in 
Article 16 of the environmental Protocol: 
Decide: 
1 . .To invite ilie Chairman of Working Group I to elaborate a draft text of an annex ... 
2. To furU1er invite U1e Chairman ... to explore the possibility of holding intcrscssional 
consultations in 2002 ... 
3. To continue and conclude the negotiations on a draft annex on ilie liability aspects of 
. I . 'bi 31, env,ronmenta emergencies as soon as poss, e... · 
The continued inability of the ATCPs to draft a liability annex rises questions as to 
the legitimacy of the Protocol and by association the internal legitimacy of the ATS. 
The ATCPs have stated that the Environmental Protocol cannot be expected to 
function adequately without a liability annex. If the Environmental Protocol is not 
functioning adequately then this raises questions as to whether the ATS is meeting 
one of its primary objectives. As such while congratulating the ATCPs on their great 
work in establishing the Protocol the continued absence of a liability annex must raise 
questions as to its legitimacy. 
10.3 External Legitimacy 
10.3.1 Applicability 
There is also a question as to whether the external legitimacy of the ATS is threatened 
under the applicability category of legitimacy. This requires that the rules and 
procedures of the organisation comply with the normative structure of the 
international community. It would appear from a review of other international 
environmental instruments that the application of liability for environmental damage 
has become part or the normative structure or the international environmental 
regimes. Currently, in relation to liability, the international environmental 
agreements appeared to he divided into two distinct groups. Those that are concerned 
primarily with the preservation of wildlife 376 which appear not to subject the Parties 
m Antarctic Treaty System. "Decision 3" Final Report A. TCM XXIV, Annex B held 200 I in St 
Petershurg. Russia. 
m This group includes: The Convention on Biological Diversity 1992 ATS 1993 No 32. Convention 
on Wetlands or International lmport;mce Especially as Waterli)wl Habitat 1971 (R.AMSAR) ATS 1975 
No 48. Convenlion on the Trade in Endangered Species or Fauna and Flora 1973 (CITES) ATS 1976 
I O.'i 
Lo any form of liahilily whik those thal are concerned with aclivities Lhat could cause 
damage to the physical environment generally appear to carry some form of 
liabiliLy' 77 . Indeed the ATCPs when they drafted the Convention on the Regulation 
of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities in 1988 established a strict liability regime 
in order to protect the environment. Article 8 of the Convention states: 
l. An operator undertaking any Antarctic mineral resource activity shall take necessary and 
timely response action, including prevention, containment, clean up and removal 
measures, if the activity results in or threatens to result in damage to U1e Antarctic 
environment or dependent or associated ecosystems .... 
2. An Operator shall be strictly liable for: 
(a) damage to U1e Antarctic environment. .. arising from its Antarctic mineral resource 
activities. including payment in U1e event U1at there has been no restoration to the 
status quo ante: 
(d) reimbursement of reasonable costs by whomsoever incurred relating lo necessary 
response action ... 
3. (a) Damage of the kind referred to in paragraph 2 above which would not have occurred 
or 
continued if the Sponsoring State had carried out its obligations under this 
Convention wiU1 respect to its Operator shall, in accordance wiU1 international law, 
entail liability of that Sponsoring State. Such liability shall not be limited to Uiat 
portion of liability not satisfied by the Operator or otherwise. 378 
This evidence suggests that the establishment of liability regimes in relation to 
environmental protection may have become part of the normative structure of 
international environmental law. If this is the case then the A TCPs in failing to draft 
a liability annex to the Environment Protocol are not complying the normative 
structure of the international community, thus raising questions as to the external 
legitimacy of the ATS. 
l 0.3.2 Acceptance 
The inability or the Parties to establish a liability annex to the Environmental 
Protocol is also likely to have consequences for the external legitimacy of the ATS 
No 29. Convention on Migratory Species of Wild Animals 1979 ATS 1991 No 32. The lnll:mational 
Convention for U1e Regulation of Whaling 1946 161 UNTS 72. 
377 This group includes: The Convention on U1e Control ofTransboundary Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes and U1cir Disposal 1989 ATS 1992 No 7. International Convention on Civil Liability for 
Bunker Oil Pollution Dmnage 200l(Bunkers Convention) International Conference on Liability mid 
Compensation for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, March 2001 LEG/CONF 12/20. International 
Convention on Liability and Compensati()ll for Dmnage in Connection wiU1 the Carriage of llazardous 
;md Noxious Substances 1996 35 lLM 1 .. io6. 
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under Lhe acceplancc category. N(i()'s such as J\SOC and lUCN have heen 
addressing the lack of a liahilily annex at each successive J\ TCM since l 995. 
ASOC has locused substantial attention and resources on U1e question or a liability annex to 
U1e Protocol. This is a key gap in U1e overall system of "'comprehensive" protection U1at we 
all desire, and is of course a commitment contained in the Protocol.JN 
ASOC is extremely concerned about U1e slow rate of progress Parties are making towards a 
completed annex and by several Parties' support for a very weak final instrument, which we 
believe would undermine ilie comprehensive nature of the Protocol. 380 
1l1is annex will be an essential part of ilie Protocol, ensuring Urnt clear legally binding 
obligations on liability are elaborated for Parties conducting activities in the Antarctic. 
Negotiations for U1e completion of U1is annex need to be pursued by the Parties with 
considerably more urgency. 381 
ASOC continues to direct substantial attention and resources to the question of a liability 
annex to U1e Protocol. An effective liability regime is an essential component of ilie 
comprehensive commitment to environmental protection called for in U1e Protocol. Existence 
of that annex will help to ensure compliance with the provisions of ilie Protocol. Wiiliout it, 
ilie mandate of Article 16 is being ignored. 382 
While the comments made in these reports could not be considered strong criticism it 
has however been persistent. 383 The tone of the J\SOC report to the Special Antarctic 
Treaty Consultative Meeting in 2000 however was sterner and could be considered an 
indication that the NGOs are tired of waiting for the development of a liability annex. 
Regretfully. we observe that nine years after U1e adoption of the Protocol, and more U1an two 
and a half years after its entry into force, Parties have yet to honour U1eir commitment to 
elaborate rules and procedures relating to liability for damage in Antarctica ... U1is meeting 
commences wiUiout ~my evident agreement on ilie form of a liability regime, far less a time 
line for its negotiation. 
From outside U1is system. it must look like the discussion of liability has failed. ASOC hopes 
Urnt Parties to the Antarctic Treaty are not awaiting Uie occurrence of a serious. high prolile 
incident causing damage to U1e Antarctic environment before Uiey are persuaded to put in 
place this regimi.:. 184 
378 Convention on U1e Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities 1988. Article 8. Not entered 
into force. 
rn ASOC. "Report of The Antarctic and S0uU1em Oce;m Coalition" Final Report ofATCM X/X 278. 
38'' ASOC. "Report or The Antarctic mid SouU1ern Occ:m Coalition" Final Report of ATCM XX. 2 JO. 
381 IUCN. "'Report of The World Conservation Union" Final Report ATCM XX 214. 
Js2 ASOC. "'Report or The Antarctic mid Southern Ocean Coalition" Final Report of A. TCMXX/1 276. 
383 It should be noted when accessing U1e strengUi or these criticisms U1at the above references arc from 
reports submitted to ATCMs mid Uie presence of NGOs at ATC'Ms is solely at U1e discretion of Uie 
ATCPs. 
m ASOC. "'Report of the Antarctic and S0uU1em Ocean Coalition" Special Anwrctic Treatr 
Cons11ltmive Meeting Repon 11-15 September 200 in The I !ague. Netherlands. 
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The tone or the NCi<)'s EC018 ' newspaper is much more critical than that displayed 
in ASOC' s reports to the A TC Ms. 
Eight years after signing U1e Protocol; Sen:n years arter discussions on liability began ... U1e 
week-long negotiating session in Working Group I here at XXIII ATCM in Lima has 
achieved ... well. noU1ing actually ... has been reduced to a sterile annual ritual wiili no 
conclusion in sight. .. ll1e report of ilie liability discussions last week must rank as one of U1e 
most ilireadbare documents to emerge from ,my session of an ATCM ... The conclusions U1at 
ilie ECO - and presumably outside observers- must draw are iliat U1e ATCPs are not taking 
liability seriously; that U1e "specialness" of Antarctic does not as we all iliought warrant 
additional protection: iliat narrow self-interest prevails over concern to protect U1e Antarctic 
environment; and U1at U1e legally binding commitment to complete a liability regime is 
insincere. As a result ilie Protocol is rendered less effective and ilie credibility of ilie 
Antarctic Treaty system as U1e appropriate forum for U1e govem;mce of Antarctica is furU1er 
undermined ... 386 
While these NGO reports contain constant criticism of the ATS in regards to the 
absence of a liability annex it is very low level criticism and as such has probably not 
reached the point where it currently threatens the legitimacy of the ATS. The ATCPs 
should however heed the warning that is contained within these reports because it is 
clear that while the NGOs are currently content to wait for ATCP action they will not 
wait forever. 
38 ' ECO is an NGO newspaper published to coincide with each ATCM ,md SATCM. 
rn; ·The Good. The Bad and The Ugly" (1999) 197 ECO (24 May-4 June) Lima. Peru Nwnhcr l. 
( 14.8.01) <http://www.asoc.org/currentpress/ecol l 999.htm>. 
CHAPTER ELEVEN 
Non-compliance of China with the Convention on the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
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Some readers may be thinking that China's refusal to comply with the Convention on 
the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) is irrelevant to 
the legitimacy of the ATS because CCAMLR is a separate legal entity. This to a 
certain extent is true however, I believe there is sufficient evidence linking the two 
organisations to support my belief that non-compliance with the first directly rctlects 
by association on the legitimacy of the later. Because China is an ATCP their 
Antarctic activities will always ret1ect on the ATS. 
The relationship between the ATCPs and CCAMLR is unusual in that it was not 
created intentionally and probably has no legally binding effect never the less a 
relationship does exist that intertwines the reputations of the two groups. The nature 
of this relationship was discussed in a paper presented by Dietrich Granow at the 
International Symposium on the Future of the Antarctic Treaty System in 1995: 
The CCAMLR Commission has litsJ own legal personality (see Article VIIl) ... But despite 
this authority or U1c Commission. privileges which U1e Consultative Parties have reserved for 
U1cmselves block further institutionalisation ... Even U1ough CCAMLR is open for accession 
to any state interested in research and exploitation of the marine living resources falling under 
U1is rnnvcnlion. such a state that is not party lo the Antarctic Treaty is specially obligated to 
recognise ... t11e ''special obligations and responsibilities" of the ATCPs (Article V) ... This 
means tlial t11e ATCPs c,m act outside the purposes of t11c Convention and can assume a 
higher status by taking from U1c other parties to CCAMLR tJ1e auU10ri1y for decisions for 
which arc in t11e realm of t11e ATCM. As a consequence t11c ATCPs can decide which states 
will be admitted and. to some extenL U1e subst:mce of decisions ... Because all ATCPs are 
members or the Commission t11ey can effectively prevent deviation from t11eir policy by 
exercising a veto. 187 
187 Dietrich Grm10w ... A paper hy Ambassador Granow'' in Australi;m Antarctic Foundation (cd) On 
the Anwrctic Hvri:011: Proceedings of the International Sn11posi11111 011 the F11111re c!f the A11tarc1ic 
Trem,· Srstem I 1995) 67. 
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This special relation is also evident if you analyse the memhership or hoth CCAMLR 
and the Commission, which sets policy and regulates fishing activity in the 
Convention area. 388 While all signatories to the Convention arc entitled to sit on the 
Commission189 currently of the 31 signatories only 25 sit on the Commission. Of the 
25 Commission members 22 are ATCPs390 and one is an ATP. 191 There are six 
signatories who choose not to sit on the Commission, four arc A TCPs 392 and 2 are 
A TPs. m At present there are two Parties to the Convention who are not Parties to 
the Antarctic Treaty. 394 There are currently 27 ATCPs in the A TS of which only two 
are not parties to CCAMLR. 395 
This evidence points conclusively to the fact that although CCAMLR was established 
as a separate entity the CCAMLR Commission is never the less under the direct 
control of the ATCPs, as such any illegitimacy of this organisation must reflect on the 
legitimacy of the ATS. 
Further, comments made at ATCM XIII provide evidence that the ATCPs believe 
that CCAMLR is a component part of the Antarctic Treaty. 
The meeting agreed that. with the inliease in the components comprising tl1e Antarctic Treaty 
System. it would be appropriate ti:>r consultative Meetings to be made formally aware of 
developments tluoughout tl1e system, duly taking into account tlle relationships between its 
various components. Witl1 tl1is object in mind, the meeting reached consensus on 
388 CCAMLR applies to an area larger tl1an tl1al covered by tl1c Antarctic Treaty. Article VI of tl1c 
Antarctic Treaty states U1at U1e Treaty applies to all areas souU1 or 60° Soutll Latitude. While Article 
l (1) of U1c Convention extends tl1is coverage to U1e area south of 60° S0uU1 Latitude and all marine 
living resources between tl1at area and the Antarctic Convergence. 
In scientific terms tl1e Convergence is a transition zone Uiat circumvents U1e Antarctic and is LTeated 
where U1e cold Antarctic waters meet and sink beneatl1 tl1e warmer norU1em waters. Due to its nature 
tl1e Antarctic Convergence docs not have a scientifically defined boundary, however a legal delinilion 
of U1e area is defined in Article 1(4) of CCAMLR. Elliott. L International Em'iro11111ental Politics: 
Protecting t//e Antarctic (1994) 94. 
38~ Convention on tl1e Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 1980. Article VII. 
wr, This consists of 21 ATCPs: Argentina. Australia. Bclgium.~Brazil. Chile. France. Gennany. India, 
New Zeahmd. Norway. Poland. Russi:m Federation. Soutll Africa. Spain. Sweden. Italy. Japan. Korea, 
UK. USA and Uruguay. CCAMLR. "Membership" ( 1.6.01) 
<http://www.ccmnlr.org/l:nglish/e_m_ship/e_membcrship.hlrn>. 
)'II Ukraine. CCAMLR. "Membership" (1.6.0 l) 
<http://www.ccarnlr.org/English/e_m_ship/e_memhcrship.htrn>. 
3"~ Bulgaria. Finllmd. NeU1erlands and Peru. 
m Can~da ;md Greece. 
1" 4 Nmnihia and tl1e European Community . 
. N, China and Ecuador. 
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Recommendation XIIl-2. which provides for reports to he m:uk to future Consultative 
Meetings CO\'ering developments in U1e respective areas or competence of the various 
components of U1e system. 
These reports will contrihute to U1erc heing a clear overview or the operation of U1e Antarctic 
Treaty system at each consultative Meeting. Recommendation XIIl-2 invites U1e Commission 
for Uie Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources to appoint its Chairman ... to 
represent Uie Commission as an observer for U1e specific purpose of presenting such a 
report. 396 
This association between the two entities has been made even stronger relation to the 
efforts to control illegal fishing. This association was established in a resolution 
proposed by Australia and adopted at A TCM XXIV in 200 l . 
. . . Recalling also U1at U1e Preamble to ilie Protocol on Environmental Protection to U1e 
Antarctic Treaty (the Madrid Protocol) reaffirms ilie conservation principles of the Convention on ilie 
conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources. 
Recognising iliat ilie Objective of Uie Protocol (Article 2) is for Parties to commit themselves 
to Uie comprehensive protection of U1e Antarctic Environment and dependant and associated 
ecosystems: ... 
Recommend that: All Parties to ilie Antarctic Treaty which are not Contracting Parties Lo Ule 
Convention or Members of Uie Commission. and whose flag vessels fish for tooilifish or who are 
involved in Uie trade of tooUifish. implement ilie CCAMLR Catch Documentation Scheme for 
Dissosticlws spp.397 
11.1 Development of The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine 
Living Resources 
The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources was 
developed as part of the Antarctic Treaty System in l 980. 398 CCAMLR resulted from 
a realisation on the part of the ATCPs that if something was not done the historic 
pattern of over-exploitation or the Antarctic resources was likely to continue . 
.lust 200 yrnrs ago Captain Cllok rnnfidently forecast that the Antarctic was useless lo man. But twice 
since then man has over-exploited Antarctic waters and virtually wiped out first the populatiun of fur 
396 Antarctic Treaty System. Final Report ATCM Xl/l held 8-18 October 1985 in Brussels. Belgium. 
Electronic \'ersion. ( 11/07/01) <http://currentaspire.nYi.net/gendoc.plx?l l = l 985&db=.h. 
3" 7 Antarctic Treaty System. "Resolution 1(2001) Final Reporr ATCM XXIV Annex 13. 
3" 8 CC AMLR. '"General Information'' (25 May 20UO) <11ttp://www.cc:unlr 
.org/English/e_generaJ_intro.h trn>. 
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seals am] then the slucks of Antarctic baleen whales. Are llmsc saJ stories lo he n:pcalcJ m can we be 
wiser than uur forefathers·> 1'1'' 
At the time the Convention was drafted the Parties were mainly concerned with the 
possible over-exploitation of the krill fisheries. 400 
Fisheries activities have already begun in the southern Ocean; operations to explore the 
practical problems of krill exploitation are under way. And several countries. including some 
from outside U1e Treaty forum; have become active in U1is field. If we delay. we risk allowing 
U1e development of U1e same situation that occurred wiU1 the rapid expansion of whaling 
operations between the Wars. where massive investment had already been made before 
anyone devised a regulatory framework in which rational exploitation could take place. I 
need not, I U1ink, here refer to the consequences of that order of events.401 
The ATCPs at ATCM VIII expressed concern over the possibility of over-
exploitation due to unregulated fishing in 1975.402 However, the issue became urgent 
when commercial harvesting of krill commenced in the 1976/77 season403 with no 
mechanism in place to prevent over-exploitation. At ATCM IX in 1977 the ATCPs 
adopted Resolution IX-2 which called for the adoption of a conservation regime. 4 0--1 
399 Antarctic Treaty System, ··opening Address of Ted Rowlands. United Kingdom Minister of State 
for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs" Final Report of ATCM IX held 19 September-7 October 1977 
in London, England 23. 
400 Krill is Ule major source of energy in the Antarctic marine food chain. as such it is recognised U1at 
any reduction in the stock numbers could have a disastrous effect on U1e entire Antarctic marine 
ecosystem. CCAMLR. ··General Information" (25 May 2000) 
<http://www.cGunlr.org/English/e_general_intro.htm>. 
401 Antarctic Treaty, "Statement by Dr J Heap, Australian Delegation" Final Report of ATCM IX 40. 
401 The Representatives ... 4. They urge U1e Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR). 
U1rough U1eir National Antarctic Committees. to continue its scientific work ... and to consider 
convening, as soon as practicable. a meeting to discuss current work ,md report on programmes for the 
study and conservation of Antarctic marine living resources. Antarctic Treaty System. Final Report of 
ATCM Vlll held 9-20 June 1975 in Oslo. Norway 40. 
403 The peak catch for krill was during U1e 198-1/82 when 528.000 tonnes were harvested. since U1en 
due to economic issues U1e harvest has dropped. I lowevcr even with U1e reduced catch in 1998 krill 
fishing was U1e principle economic activity in U1e SouU1em Ocean. Billen. G and Lancelot. C 'The 
Functioning or U1e Antarctic Marine Ecosystem a Fragile Equilihrium" in Verhoeven. J Sands. P and 
Bruce. M The Antarctic £111'iru11ment and International Lmr 42. 
4c,~ The Representatives. Recalling U1e special responsibilities conferred upon the Consultative Parties 
in respect or the preservation mid conservation of living resources in U1e Antarctic hy virtue of Article 
IX paragraph l(t) of the Antarctic Treaty; . . . III Establishment of a Definitive Conservation Regime 
I. A definitive regime for U1c Conservation or Antarctic Marine Living Resources should be 
concluded hcfore U1e end of 1978. 2. A Special Consullalive Meeting he convened in order to 
clahorate a draft definitive regime ... 3. (a) U1e regime should explicitly recognize U1e prime 
responsibility of the Consullative Parties in relation to U1e protection ,md conservation of the 
environment in U1e Antarctic Treaty area ,md U1e importance or the measures recommended by the 
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The series meelings40~ held under Lhe auspices or Resolulion IX-2 lead Lo Lhe 
eslahlishment of the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources which was signed in 1980. The principles governing the Convention arc 
set out in Article II: 
( 1) The objective of this Convention is the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources. 
(2) For the purposes of this Convention, the term "conservation" includes rational use. 
(3) Any harvesting and associated activities in the area to which this Convention applies 
shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Convention and with the 
following principles of conservation: 
(a) Prevention of decrease in the size of any harvested population to levels below U10se 
which ensure its stable recruitment. For U1is purpose its size should not be allowed 
to fall below a level close to that which ensures U1e greatest net annual incTement: 
(b) Maintenance of the econological relationships between harvested, dependent and 
related populations of Antarctic marine living resources and the restoration of 
depleted populations to the level defined in sub-paragraph (a) above; 
and 
(c) prevention of changes or minimization of the risk of changes in the marine 
ecosystem which are not potentially reversible over two or three decades, taking into 
account U1e state of available knowledge of the direct and indirect impact of 
harvesting, the effect of the introduction of alien species, the effects of associated 
activities on the marine ecosystem and the effects of environmental changes. with 
the aim of making possible the sustained conservation of Antarctic marine living 
resources. 406 
11.2 Illegal Fishing 
In 1999, in response to the increasing incidents of illegal catches407 in the toothfish 
fisheries, the Commission adopted Conservation Measure 170/XIX.408 The measure 
established a catch documentation scheme for Dissostichus spp (toothfish) in the 
Southern Ocean. The scheme requires each Contracting Party to identify the origins 
Consultative Parties to U1is end ... Antarctic Treaty System. Resolution IX-2 Final Report of ATCM IX 
held 19 Sept-7 Oct 1977 in London Englcmd 13. 
4n, Antarctic Treaty System. Final Report Second Special Consulrmil·e Meeting held 1978 in 
Canberra. Australia; 1978 in Buenos Aires. Argentina and 1980 in Omberra, Australia. 
4116 Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources l 980, Article II. 
41)7 More th:m 50% of t11e total tooth fish catch (AU0$760 million) is caught illegally. in some areas U1e 
illegal catch may be as high as 90'k of the total catch. In one year illegal fishing reduced U1e tooth fish 
population around Crozet hy 25'k. Catches in U1e area are estimated to be 12 times U1e legal limit. In 
1998 U1e fishery had reached U1e point or commercial extinction. Scientists believe that as a result or 
illegal fishing tooth fish could be commercially extinct in two years (2001 /. ASOC. ··ECO 2. 
CCAMLR XVIII. 27 October 1999 llohart. Australia" (27 Oct 1999) 
<http://www.asoc.org/currentpress/eco299.htm>. 
~118 CCAMLR Commission. Conservation Measure 170/XIX 
<http:1/ecamlr .org/English/e_cds_ 1999/e_cds2k_p 1.htm>. 
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or all toothfish impo11ed into or expo11ed from its territory in order to determine 
whether fish caught within the Convention Area was harvested in a manner consistent 
with CCAMLR. 409 Suhsequent to the adoption or the documentation scheme, which 
is open for non-CCAMLR countries to participate in, China informed CCAMLR that 
it would not participate in the documentation program. China's refusal to participate 
has been interpreted as ''laying out the mat for pirate fishers". 410 While China as a 
non-party to CCAMLR is under no legal obligation to participate in the scheme, 
resolution 1 of ATCM XXIV411 means that their non-participation has ramifications 
for the ATS as a whole. 
China's involvement in the toothfish trade has been slowly increasing over the years 
with the majority of the exports going to Japan and the USA.412 While the 
documentation scheme will to some extent hamper China's export activities as the 
situation currently exists they have not been totally closed down. This is because 
while the United States has adopted the documentation scheme Japan has announced 
that while it will require the necessary documentation from CCAMLR parties, non-
parties to CCAMLR will not have to verify the source of their catch.413 
While it does not appear that China has given any official reason for its present 
behaviour there is anecdotal evidence that may suggest a reason. As has already been 
stated China has heen increasing its activities in relation to toothfish harvesting in 
recent years, this comhined with the rumour that China is building a new 200 vessel 
fishing tleet for the Southern Ocean gives a fairly good indication or what their 
reason could he. 414 However due to China's position as an A TCP, whatever the 
4'J'' Conservation Measure 170/XIX (I). 
4111 ASOC. ··southern Ocean Fisheries Campaign Update" Antarctic Project Ne\vsletter Vo! 9 Issue 2 
Aug 2000. Electronic version. <hllp://www.asoc.org/currenlpress/augnewlct. htm>. 
411 Supra at 103. 
41 ~ In 1998 the USA and Japm1. both or whom are parties to CCAMLR. were reported to be the 
recipients or 90Ck of the illegal tooU1fish catch. 
rn ASOC. Antarctic Project Ncwslcllcr Vol 9 Issue 2Aug 2000. Electronic version. 
<hllp:// www.asoc.org/cum:ntpress/augnewlct.hun.>. 
rn ASOC. ··Crisis for Patagonim1 Toothlish" Current Issues (2.8.0 I) 
<http://www.asoc.org/c.unpaign/marinc.htm>. 
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reason, iLs refusal Lo hoLh hecome a party Lo and Lo comply with the recommendations 
or CCAMLR raises questions in relation to Lhe internal legitimacy or the ATS. 
11.3 Conclusion 
The acceptance arm of internal legitimacy requrres that the Pa1ties acknowledge, 
implement and adhere to the rules and procedures of the organisation. 415 While it is 
accepted that CCAMLR is a free standing and essentially independent organisation416 
the debate and resolutions surrounding its drafting and signing indicate clearly that 
the ATCPs strongly believed that its existence was essential for the prevention of the 
over-exploitation of Antarctic marine resources. The comments of the delegates at 
the Antarctic Treaty Second Special Consultative Meeting in 1978, which was 
convened to commence drafting of CCAMLR, clearly indicate that the Parties fully 
intended the preservation of the marine ecosystems to be directly related to the ATS 
and the Consultative Parties. The Chilean Delegate stated that: 
The international community has tacitly accepted the administration of Antarctica by the 
Consultative Parties over those two decades ... The -explicitly- their competence in ecological 
matters. Accordingly, we must not operate outside the Treaty. separate from its regime 
fundamental aspects of Antarctica. and internationalize U1e Antarctic problem piecemeal.417 
The French Delegation added 
I, for my part. sec U1is Special Consultative Meeting as a sign of U1c vitality of tile Treaty 
signed at Washington in 1959 ... My country considers U1at U1c consultative Parties. faiU1ful to 
U1c spirit as wdl as to t11c text of that Treaty. must dearly and openly exercise U1c 
responsibilities U1ey assume in Antarctica.418 
New Zealand also stressed the special responsihilitics or A TPs in relation to Antarctic 
conservation; 
The Antarctic Treaty places special responsibilities upon its parties in respect or preservation 
and conservation or living resources in Antarctica.419 
415 Stokke. supra n 36 at 24. 
416 As referenced by the establishment of its own Commission (Article VII) Scientific Committee 
(Article XV) ;md Secretariat (Article XVII). 
m Antarctic Treaty System ... Opening Statement by the Leader or U1e Chilcm1 Delegation. His 
Excellency Sr Fern;mdo Zegers" Interim Repun of the Second Special Cuns11/ratil'e Meeting held 27 
Fcbruary-16 March 1978 in Canberra. Australia 12. 
418 Antarctic Treaty System. "Opening Statement by Patrick Henault. Leader of the French Delegation" 
Interim Repol1 of the Second ,\JJecial Cons11/tatil'e Meeting 13. 
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While China did not hecome an ATCP until l 985, and theret'orc was not present at 
the 1978 meeting, hy accepting ATCP status they have implied acceptance of prior 
consensus decisions of the group. Resolution 1 of ATCM XXIV~ 20 clearly indicates 
that the ATCPs intended for all ATS members to comply with the CCAMLR Catch 
Documentation Scheme therefore by refusing adhere to the scheme China is failing to 
adhere to the rules and procedures of the organisation. It is likely that such a failure 
could have direct ramifications for the internal legitimacy of the ATS. The potential 
challenge to legitimacy is given more significance by the fact that China is an ATCP. 
41 ,; Antarctic Treaty System. "Opening Statement by Leader of the New Zealand Delegation. Nlr G 
Hensley" lllferim Repor/ uf the Second Special Consullari\'e Meeting 16. 
4~'-' Supra at !08. 
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CHAPTER TWELVE 
Jurisdiction and Tourism in Antarctica 
Jurisdiction is a contentious issue within the ATS because it is associated so closely 
with sovereignty. The subject of who has jurisdiction over individuals who travel to 
the Antarctic has been discussed unsuccessfully by the Parties since the Treaty was 
first ratified. Jurisdiction is addressed in Article VIII of the Treaty, but only relates to 
scientific personal. 
In order to facilitate the exercise of their functions under the present Treaty, and without 
prejudice to the respective positions of the Contracting Parties relating to jurisdiction over all 
other persons in Antarctica. observers ... and scientific personal exchanged ... and members of 
staffs accompanying any such persons, shall be subject only to the jurisdiction of the 
Contracting Party of which they are nationals in respect of all acts or omissions occurring 
while they are in Antarctica for the purposes of exercising their functions. 411 
The provisions of Article VIll(l) were sufficient for the early years of Antarctic 
exploration because visitors to the ice were there as either employees or guests of the 
contracting Parties. Today the improvements in science and technology have allowed 
not only for the development of a flourishing tourist industry but also an increase in 
the number of private expeditions to the ice. Although tourism and private 
expeditions were not a problem in the early days of the Treaty the Parties did 
recognise that there was a potential for non-scientific activity to interfere with the 
conduct of science in the area. As such the issue of Antarctic tourism has heen raised 
at almost every ATCM since the initial meeting in 1961 _-m These discussions in each 
case usually resulted in a similarly worded resolution. 
The Representatives, 
Recognising that tourists and other persons not sponsored hy Consultative Parties are visiting 
U1c Antarctic Treaty Arca in incTeasing numbers; ... 
Recommend Lo U1eir Governments U1at: 
1. They use U1cir hcst cndcavors to ensure Uiat all U10sc who enter U1e A.nwrctic Treaty 
Area ... arc aware of U1e Statement of Accepted Practices and U1c Relevant Provisions of the 
Antarctic Treaty ... 
2. They req11es1 (my emphasis) all organizers of tourist groups ... 
a. visit only those Antarctic stations for which pcnnission has hcen sought and granted ... 
~' 1 Antarctic Tn.:atv 1959. Article Ylll( I). 
~'' Conclusion cst~hlishcd following review of meeting reports from 1961-2000. 
t 17 
b. land only with Lhc Areas or special Tourist Interest listed or defined in Annex B ... .1,, 
The Trealy Parties made it quite clear that they expected each Contracting 
Government to conlrol the aclivities of their own nationals, primarily through control 
at their point of departure. However, despite continued debate the Parties have been 
unable to develop a plan that adequately controls tourist activity from non-Treaty 
countries. As is the case with many facets of the ATS the current control mechanisms 
are recommendations and lack the means of enforcement and while controlling the 
access of tourist to the research stations they do little to regulate their activities in 
other areas of the continent. 
In 1979 the Parties established a working group to discuss the issue of tourism in the 
Treaty Area and the result was the development of the Guidelines for Antarctic 
Visitors. 424 Once again however these were just recommendations and had no way of 
been binding on the non-governmental visitors to the Antarctic. In 1983 the ATCPs 
attempted to draft a resolution concerning the jurisdiction over tourists and non-
governmental parties in Antarctica but the draft recommendation was dropped due to 
an inability to reach consensus:m 
The A TCPs addressed lhe issue of increased tourism again at A TCM XIV in 1987 hut 
once again could come to no agreement as to how to deal with the problem. They 
agreed instead to continue the debate at the next meeting and to meantime renew their 
efforts to promote compliance with the existing measures. -t 26 In 1992 the Parties 
.1, 3 Antarctic Treaty System. '"Recommendation YIII-9" Final Report ATCM Vil/ held 9-20 June 1975 
in Oslo. Norway 38. 
m Antarctic Treaty System. ··Resolution X-8" Final Reporr ATCM X held 17 Sept-5 Oct 1979 in 
Washington DC USA 22. 
e, A view was also expressed Uiat responsibility for compli;mcc hy non-governmental expeditions 
with U1e provisions of U1e Antarctic Treaty and Recommendations adopted at the Consultative 
Meetings should be placed upon U10se States whose physical or juridical persons org,mize such 
expeditions or participate in U1em. Since U1ere was no agreement as to where responsibility for non-
governmental expeditions should lie. U1e draft Recommendation which had been tabled was 
withdrawn. Antarctic Treaty System. Final Repon cf ATCM XII 12 . 
.1,o Antarctic Treaty System. Final Re pun ATCM XIV hdd 5-16 October 1987 in Rio de Janeiro. Brazil 
53. 
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stated the op11110n that the prov1s10ns or the Environment Protocol and its annexes 
would apply to all activities in Antarctica, including tourism and non-governmental 
activities_-1 27 However they did not address the issue or how to enforce compliance on 
those groups not associated in any way with a Treaty Patty, in this light some Parties 
suggested that legally binding regulation was necessary to control these activities.428 
They proposed this be done through the establishment of a tourism annex to the 
Environment Protocol. However even if consensus on the conclusion of an annex 
could have been reached such an instrument would still not have clarified the issue of 
jurisdiction over groups that failed to comply with the annex.429 
The proceedings of ATCM XVIII in 1994 show that the Parties are very reluctant to 
address the issue of jurisdiction primarily because they perceive this may be an issue 
that could upset the current delicate balance within the system. The Head of the 
Delegation from Switzerland observed that: 
The Uruguayan delegation has suggested that the issue of jurisdiction be placed on the 
Agenda of the ATCMs. We know that this problem has only been solved under Article VIII, 
paragraph I of the Antarctic Treaty, for two categories of individuals: the scientific personnel 
associated wiU1 the stations or expeditions and the observers in charge of carrying out 
inspections, for which the jurisdiction of U1e national State prevails. However, the array of 
people undertaking activities in the Antarctic is much larger. It includes fisherman, hunters, 
tourists, tour operators, film makers. to mention a few. The issue put forward by Uruguay is 
therefore increasingly important and should be discussed without delay, despite any 
controversy it may provoke between the Contracting States and the others. In fact, there is no 
reason why a community of States which has succeeded in overcoming such antagonism on 
several occasions ... could not do so again.· 30 
However, despite the recognition of the need to resolve the jurisdiction problem the 
delegates declined the opportunity to debate it. 
Item 16 - Questions related to U1e Exercise of .Jurisdiction in Antarctica 
The Meeting recognised the importance of this question. U1e solution of which was left 
deliberately open in Article IX( I) of U1e Antarctic Treaty. But it was also understood U1at U1e 
question raises some delicate and sensitive problems which need more. and careful, 
deliberations. 
• 27 Antarctic Treaty System. Final Report ofATCM X\/ll 41. 
• 28 Antarctic Treaty System. Final Report ofATCM X\/ll -H. 
•ell Antarctic Treaty System. Final Report ofATCM XV// 41. 
• 30 Antarctic Treaty System, "Opening Address by Ambassador Lucius Callisch. I lead of the 
Delegation of Switzerland" Final Report of ATCM XVI/I 111. 
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Thi: l\ki:ting 1111:rdixe agri:ed to leave U1e item out or the Agenda of U1e XIXth ATCM and 
put ii again on 1111: Agenda nr the XXU1 ATCM in ordi:r to givi: all Parties sufficient lime to 
elaborate ways and means or how to approach the qui:stion again in order 10 find ;m agri:eable 
solution_.iii 
The question of jurisdiction was placed on the Agenda for ATCM XX however it was 
not discussed. The delegates agreed that they had not yet had sufficient time to 
consider the matter and decided to omit it from this meeting and all subsequent 
meetings until they were requested by a Consultative Party to reinstate it.432 
Subsequent meeting agendas contain no indication that this issue has to date been 
readmitted for discussion at Consultative Meetings. 433 
12.1 Tourist Numbers 
The failure of the A TCPs to address this issue given the current status of tourism in 
the Antarctic region is a matter of some concern and has associated effects on the 
external legitimacy of the ATS. An analysis tourism statistics for Antarctica clearly 
show that this is an issue that must be dealt with and soon. In the 1999-2000 tourist 
year 14,762 people travelled to the Antarctic in private expeditions, an increase of 
46% over the pervious year.434 14,402 travelled on commercially organised tours. In 
that season there were 20 Commercial Tour Vessels operating in the region. Eight of 
those vessels were registered in non-Treaty countries435 , therefore the Treaty Parties 
had no control over their activities. Sixteen of them were however members of 
IAAT0436 , a voluntary association of Antarctic tour operators. There were two 
vessels making regular visits to the Treaty area that were neither registered in a 
Treaty country or members of IAATO. These two vessels had a combined passenger 
rn Antarctic Treaty System. Final Report of ATCM XVI/I 29 . 
.1 3~ Antarctic Treaty System. Final Report of ATCM XX 15. 
m Antarctic Treaty System. Meeting Agendas for ATCMs XXI. XXII. XXIII and XIV. 
rn International Association or Antarctica Tour Operators. Oven·ie1r of Anlarctic Tourism 2000 (2000) 
electronic version. <h11p://www.iaato.org/xxii_iaato_over2000.hunl>. IAATO however pri:dicted and 
11 % dccTease in tourist numbers for U1e 2000-01 season . 
.i.i, Bahmnas mid P;man1a . 
.iir, IAATO members voluntarily comply with U1e n:quirements t1r U1e Antarctic Treaty and U1e 
Association provides U1e ATCM wiU1 ;m mmual report under Artidc 11(2) or the Treaty and provides 
environmental assessments of tourism activities. <http://www.iaato.org>. 
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capacity of 1650 people."m This means that at any given time during that year from 
commercial tours alone there was a potential for the presence of 1650 persons over 
whom nobody had legal jurisdiction. There arc also a significant number or people 
travelling to Antarctica by private yacht. IAATO had reports of visits from 23 yachts 
carrying a total of 221 passengers."438 IAATO predicts that with the increase in the 
size of the vessels travelling to the Antarctic tourist numbers will continue to grow 
over time but was unable to predict how many off these visitors will actually land on 
the continent. Their best estimate is that by 2005 there will be 16,000 people making 
multiple landings in the region. 439 
The ASOC as the representative of environmental NGOs in the Antarctic region 
appears particularly concerned about the lack of jurisdiction over tourists to the 
Antarctic. 
As many national programmes are looking to demonstrate their commercial relevance at 
home domestic economic pressures have in<..Teasingly driven Antarctic policy in a number of 
member states. Additionally, the unresolved sovereignty - and consequential complex 
juridical situation - means that tl1e emergence of an ever larger and more powerful tourism 
industry poses real risks. There exists a temptation for states to attempt to strengtl1en their 
sovereignty claims as they consider the two major Antarctic industries - fishing and 
tourism .... The thin juridical environment in Antarctica means that Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) has been left as the sole gatekeeper for Antarctic access... Otl1er 
mechanisms apply in the case of activities supported by national programmes - ethical 
committee approvals ... logistic and funding processes ... administratively and/or politically 
accountable .... But tl1is is not the case witl1 tourist industry proposals in Antarctica. Unless 
constrained by the EIA process (and. significantly. not one tourist EIA has resulted in a 
decision to substantially modify - far less cancel -proposed activities), tourist proposals 
proceed witl10ut further ado.44c, 
12.2 Conclusion 
The legitimacy of the ATS in relation to the jurisdiction is al best questionable, 
especially when discussed within the context of tourism regulation. As Vidas stated; 
m International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators. 01'e1Tie1r of'Anrarcric Tourism 2000 (2000) 
electronic version. <hllp://www.iaato.org/xxii_iaato_over2000.hUnl>. 
438 InLernational Association of Antarctica Tour Operators. 01·ervie1r of Anrarcric Tourism 2000 (2000) 
electronic version. <http://www.iaato.org/xxii_i,1ato_over2000.hunl> . 
. u, International Association of Antarctica Tour Operators. 01·en'ie11' 0JA11rarcric Tu11ris111 2000 (2000) 
electronic version. <http://www.iaato.org/xxii_iaato_over2000.hunl>. 
H" ASOC. "Antarctic Tourism ASOC Information Paper'' tabled at ATCM XXIV. St Petershurg. 
Russia. July 2001. Electronic version. (14.8.01) <http//:www.asoc.org/currentpress/IP40tourism.hUn>. 
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wide acceptance was actua.lly made possible only at considerable expense to the t110rough 
regulation of Antarctic tourism in an ATS tourism regime. This has been t11e factor 
legitimising U1e most recent ATS regulatory solution on Antarctic tourism. as adopted at t11c 
1994 Kyoto Consultative Meeting; and t11is is in fact not much more tl1,m a restatement on 
already existing ATS regulation. This was t11e only solution acceptable to all U1e Consultative 
Parties mid at the same time welcomed by interested Antarctic tour operators.441 
Therefore the ATCPs have attempted to ensure the external legitimacy of the ATS by 
not regulating tourism thereby gaining the support and acknowledgement of the 
majority of Antarctic tour operators442 however in doing so they have overlooked the 
other equally important aspects of legitimacy. That is that the rules and procedures 
must be compatible with the major developments in the international community. 443 
I believe we have already shown that the international community is extremely 
concerned with environmental protection in the Antarctic region and that they see the 
inability to resolve the issue of jurisdiction over individuals who travel to the region 
as a threat to that environmental protection. This is particularly true in light of the 
assertion made by ECO that IAA TO has eased its membership obligations and is now 
granting membership to tour operators who use very large vessels and adventure tour 
operators who are noted for using new ports of entry into Antarctica.444 In the past 
the NGO's have felt that IAATO was setting acceptable standards for transportation 
to and activities in the Antarctic. However they now fear that with these changes this 
. I 44, 1s not t 1e case. · IAATO in response to the NGO criticism claims that it made the 
446 changes in response to pressure from the states. These events could be an 
indication that the voluntary system for the control of tourism in the Antarctic could 
be breaking down. As such the inability of the ATCPs to resolve the jurisdiction 
issues and adequately control tourism in a manner that will adequately ensure 
continued environmental protection in the region must have a negative effect on the 
external legitimacy of the organisation. This is because if the ATCPs cannot 
adequately control tourism and the industry starts to have adverse effects on the 
rn Vidas. supra n 241 at 318. 
442 This support is evidenced by IAATO" s presence at ATCMs as ,m observer since ATCM XX in 
1996. 
m Stokke supra n 36 at 23. 




Antarctic environment these is likely Lo he a increase in the international criticism of 
the ATS's ahilily to ellectively govern Lhe region. 
There is also potential for the jurisdictional issues and the non-regulation of tourism 
lo have an adverse effect on the internal legitimacy of Lhe ATS. This is because a 
necessary component of internal legitimacy is that the rules and procedures of the 
organisation address the problem for which the organisation exists.447 Therefore as 
environmental protection is one of the objectives of the ATS if it can be shown that 
the non-resolution of the jurisdiction issue particularly as it relates to tourism has had 
an adverse effect on the Antarctic environment then the ATS loses legitimacy. This 
is currently only a potential problem because to date there is no convincing evidence 
that tourism has adversely effected the Antarctic environment, however as the level of 
non-regulated tourism rises in the future this could indeed become an issue of major 
concern. 
mlbiu. 
w Stokke supra n 36 al 21 
CHAPTER THIRTEEN 
THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM AND THE UNITED 
NATIONS 
The modern era of UN interest in Antarctica began in 1983 when the Secretary-
General received a letter dated 11 August from Antigua and Barbuda, and Malaysia. 
The letter stated there was a need to examine the possibility of a "more positive and 
wider international concert to ensure the activities carried out in Antarctica were for 
the benefit of mankind as a whole" and therefore requested that the question of 
Antarctica be placed on the agenda for the 1983 General Assembly scssion.448 On 5 
October 1983 Australia, on behalf of the ATCPs, responded. Australia stated the 
"Treaty which was open to all countries and was of unlimited duration, served the 
international community well and had averted international strife and sovereignty 
disputes over Antarctica". The ATCPs therefore had reservations about the initiative 
and any attempt to revise or replace the Treaty.449 The question was subsequently 
placed on the agenda and resulted in the adoption of resolution 38/77, which was 
passed without vote in a session of the First Committee. Resolution 38/77 called 
upon the Secretary-General to prepare a report on all aspects of Antarctica for 
. I ') 9rh . 4~0 presentation to t 1e _"l session. · 
In October or the following year ( 1984) the Secretary-General received a copy of a 
final communique adopted at the Meeting of Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Heads 
or Delegations or Non-Aligned Countries. The document stated the Meet_ing 
welcomed UNGA Resolution 38/77 and hoped it would "contribute to widening 
international co-operation on that continent. In response the Secretary-General 
received communiques from three ATCPs451 reaffirming their intention to abide by 
mUnitcd Nations ... Antarctica" }'earhook of the United Nmions \lot 37 ( 19831 387. 
H<' Ihid. 
~'" United Nations. ··Antarctica'' Yearhook of the United Nations \lot 39 (19841 369. 
rn Fr:mcc. Bclgiwn and Norway. 
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I I. I J\ . T -t,2 t 1e terms o t 1e ntarcttc reaty. · As a result of the tabling or the Secretary-
General's repott the H.rst Committee adopted resolution 39/152: 
The General Assemblr, 
Ha1·ing considered lhe item entitled ·Question of Antarctica", 
Taking note of the study on the question of Antarctica. 
Conscious of the incTeasing international awareness of and interest in Antarctica. 
Bearing in mind U1e Antarctic Treaty and U1e significance of the system it has developed, 
Taking i1110 account the debate on this item at its thirty-nintll session, 
Convinced of the advantages of better knowledge of Antarctica, 
Affirming the conviction that, in U1e interest of all mankind. Antarctica should continue 
forever to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and tllat it should not become the scene 
or object of international discord, 
Recalling U1e relevant passages of the Economic Declaration adopted at tlle SevenU1 
Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at New Delhi 
from 7 to 12 March 1983, 
1. fapresses its appreciation to the Secretary-General for the study on U1e question of 
Antarctica: 
2. Decides to include in the provisional agenda for U1e fortieth session the item entitled 
'"Question of Antarctica".45 
In 1985 the Secretary-General received a communique from the Council of Ministers 
of the Organisation of African Unity which declared Antarctica to be the common 
heritage of mankind and calling on all OAU members to take steps at the 1985 
UNGA to seek its recognition as such. This resulted in the adoption of resolution 
40/156B. which called on the Consultative Parties to inform the Secretary-General on 
the progress of their minerals negotiations. Resolution 40/l56B passed by an 
overwhelming margin for two reasons; due to extensive suppott of the developing 
countries and because the A TPs chose lo register their dissatisfaction with the issue 
through non-participation in the vote rather than register adverse votes.454 
It soon hecame apparent that a pattern was evolving in the UN that involved the UN 
passing resolutions, sponsored by the developing countries, concerning the 
involvement of the international community in the Antarctic along with complaints 
surrounding the ATCPs exclusive management of the continent.4 -"-" As Beck stated in 
1989: 
4 '~ United Nations. supra n 4-B at >69. 
4 '' Ibid. 
N Beck. P .. Antarctica at lhc United Nations. 198.'i: The End of Consensus?" 23 Polar Record 
(1986)159. 162. 
~,, Beck. P ·The United Nations and Antarctica 1986" 23 Polar Record (1987) 683. 
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Annual discussion al the United Nations since 1983 on the .. Question of Antarctica". had by 
t<)89 hecomc somewhat routine. exerting only a slight impact upon U1c Antarctic scene. The 
Antarctic Treaty Parties ... relused either to participate in Uic UN discussions or to implement 
successive UN resolutions calling for wider participation in the Antarctic mineral 
regime .. ~'" 
This situation continued unchanged until 1994 when with the UNGA adopted 
Resolution 49/80.457 
The General Assembly, 
Having considered the item entitled "Question of Antarctica ... 
Welcoming the provision by the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties to U1e Secretary-
General of the final Report of the Eighteenth Antarctic Treaty Consultative 
Meeting ... 
Recognising the Antarctic Treaty. which provides. inter alia for ... 
Taking into account tl1e Protocol on Environmental Protection to tl1e Antarctic Treaty ... 
Welcoming tl1e designation in tl1e Protocol, of Antarctica as a natural reserve ... 
Commending the prohibition on mineral resource activities ... 
Welcoming the continued cooperation among countries ... to minimize human impacts on tl1e 
Antarctic environmenl. .. 
Welcomes tl1e practice whereby the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties regularly provide 
tl1e Secretary-General with information on their consultative meetings and their activities in 
Antarctica ... 
Requests tl1e Antarctic Treaty Parties to continue to make available information on 
Antarctica ... 
Urges tl1e Antarctic Treaty Parties to consider becoming parties as soon as possible to the 
Protocol. .. 
Urges countries whose nationals undertake activities in Antarctica to ensure that all such 
activities are carried out in a manner consistent with tl1e principles of the Protocol. .. 458 
This was also the point at which for the first time the ATCPs were pleased with the 
outcome of the annual UN debate on Antarctica. 
I am pleased to be here today to report on the developments or the ··Question of Antarctica" in 
tl1c United Nation ... The consensus resolution 49/80 ... which resulted in reasonable contents. 
is tl1e product or the dialogue and cooperation between the contracting parties and those 
countries who cast doubts on tl1c Antarctic Treaty System. Taking tl1is opportunity. r d like to 
thank 0U1er State Parties for their constructive attitude in elaborating tl1is resolution together 
with Malaysia ... The main points or the resolution arc as follows: ... Secondly. U1c resolution 
shows the Antarctic Treaty System as tl1e key actor to manage and to be responsible fi:ir 
Antarctica ... Thirdly. U1e item ·'Question of Antarctica" is not to be included in tl1e 
provisional agenda for tl1e next session. instead it will he included in Uic 51 sr session .. .The 
Beck. P "Another sterile mrnual ritual? The United Nations and Antarctica 1987" 24 Polar Record 
(1988) 207. 
Beck. P "Antarctica al tl1c UN 1988: seeking a bridge of understanding" 25 Polar Record ( 1989) 329. 
~'6 Beck. P "The UN goes green on Antarctica: U1e 1989 session" 26 Polar Record ( 1990) 323.323. 
m Beck. P .. Antarctica. Vina del Mar and U1e 1990 UN Debate" 27 Polar Record ( 1991) 211. 
Beck. P .. The 1991 UN session: the environmental protocol fails to satisfy the Antarctic Treaty 
System's critics" 28 Polar Record (l 992) 307. 
m United Nations General Assembly. Resolution 49/80. 15 December 1994. 
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n:solution properly rdkcts the positive henefits which U1e Antarctic Treaty provides for the 
maintenance of international peace ,md security ,md promotion of international co-
opcral ion. -t59 
It is evident from the UN debates that the A TS is gaining favour with the UN and is 
currently recognised by that institution as the principle organ of governance for the 
Antarctic. But continued activity by some UN member countries at the same time 
indicates that this acceptance is not absolute. However, despite the continued 
presence of dissenters in the UN ranks the ATS appears to have established its 
legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. 
~s" Ant.arctic Treaty. "'Report of the Convenor of the Informal Group of Treaty Parties in the United 
Nations" Final Report A.TCM XIX 238. 
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CONCLUSION 
I think it will be agreed hy most that it is common knowledge that the Antarctic is a 
unique wilderness whose environment needs protection from the encroachment or 
humanity. There is however a great deal of debate in the international arena as to 
which organisation is the best qualified to provide this protection. Currently that is a 
role maintained by the ATS. The purpose of this paper was to establish whether the 
ATS had the level of legitimacy necessary to ensure adequate environmental 
protection for the Antarctic region. I started my research with the preconceived 
notion that the present problems that exist within the ATS would provide sufficient 
evidence to support a conclusion that the ATS lacked legitimacy. This to my 
surprise has not been the case. While there are a few areas of concern that the ATS 
will need to address in the near future, at this point I believe that the A TS has retained 
the level of legitimacy necessary to protect the Antarctic environment. However, in 
order to maintain this level of legitimacy the ATS needs to address the following 
issues. 
In order to solidify their legitimacy in the region the ATCP need to resolve the 
sovereignty issue. The legitimacy of the territorial claims upon with the Antarctic 
Treaty was initially based have very little standing in international law and therefore, 
are at best questionable. While until recently Article IV or the Treaty had dealt with 
sovereignty in a non-confrontational manner with the emergence of the issue of 
Antarctic resources as the ·common heritage or mankind' it is likely that Article VI 
will no longer he adequate to prevent conllict in this arena. This contention is 
evidenced hy the recent emergence of the sovereignty issue as a major factor in the 
drafting of the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource 
Activities. It is therefore necessary for the ATCPs to recognise that the question of 
sovereignty is a potential !lash point area that needs to be dealt with. In this light in 
order to ensure the continued legitimacy or the organisation, particularly in relation to 
external legitimacy as gauged hy the acceptance of the organisation hy the 
international community, the ATS needs to adapt to the modern era of international 
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relations and adjust its current system of governance. This could he achieved by 
adapting the current system so that it does not give preferential standing to the 
Claimant States. It is possible that such a change would have no major ramifications 
for the position of the Claimant States within Antarctic politics. This is because they 
have behind them a history of successful Antarctic governance that should ensure 
they maintain their prominent positions within the System. However, by removing 
their privileged position these states would in the future be required to work 
diligently on Antarctic issues to ensure the maintenance of their position, rather than 
relying on the certainty of their position because of their territorial claims. Such a 
situation could only enhance environmental protection in the region. 
The ATCPs also need to address the continued under-representation of developing 
countries in the Antarctic decision-making processes. While it is acknowledged that 
the ATCPs have made significant progress toward wider participation and as such 
have removed any threat to the internal legitimacy of the System for the time being, 
their progress to date is not sufficient to hold off criticism on this count forever. The 
countries of the developing world desire a higher level of participation in the 
decision-making process and if the ATCPs are not forthcoming this issue could 
quickly become a threat to the continued internal and external legitimacy of the ATS. 
The ATCPs must be aware that in a system where the decision-making process is 
based on sovereign equality, propounding the fact that the Consultative Membership 
currently represents 80C.7r or the world's population is not enough it remove continued 
criticism. In order to fully remove the criticism concerning under-representation the 
ATS needs to ensure that their decision-making group conforms to the normative 
structure of the international community and better ret1ects the percentage or 
developing countries in both the ATS itself and the international community as a 
whole. 
Another area where the ATS needs to concentrate efforts in order to remove 
continued criticism is their environmental protection policy. The concept or 
environmental protection is relatively new to the ATS. having only developed as a 
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principle of the organisation with the adoption or the Environmental Protocol in 
1991. However, in order to ensure the continued legitimacy of the system the ATCPs 
must ensure that this new objective is adequately represented in the rules and 
procedures of the organisation. As such the current contlict that exists between 
Article IX(2) of the Treaty and the new environmental protection objective of the 
ATS if not resolved will have ramifications for both the internal and external 
legitimacy of the organisation. The current wording of Article IX(2) of the Antarctic 
Treaty effectively excludes those Pai1ies that are interested solely in environmental 
protection from membership in the consultative group. This is totally contradictory 
to the environmental protection objective. This oversight is due to the fact that 
despite the emergence of environmental protection as an objective of the ATS, the 
Parties to the Treaty continue to place emphases on their scientific objective. This is 
an area of major concern because the continued exclusion of those Parties interested 
primarily in environmental protection from the decision-making process places the 
legitimacy of the ATS in question under three out of the four legitimacy categories. 
In order to maintain internal legitimacy the rules of the organisation must address the 
problem for which the organisation exists. It is difficult to see how the ATS can 
achieve this goal when those Parties who are concerned with environmental 
protection are excluded from the decision making process. The maintenance of 
internal legitimacy also requires that the internal actors acknowledge and adhere to 
the rules of the organisation. These Parties are less likely to adhere to and 
acknowledge rules and procedures in which they had no part in drafting. H could be 
argued that if these Parties are truly interested in envi.ronmental protection they will 
adhere to the rules regardless or who drafts them. This is a good point but only holds 
true if the objectives or the two groups are identical. External legitimacy is related 
to the degree of acceptance or the organisation by outside actors. In the present 
situation those Parties outside the ATS, who are concerned with environmental 
protection, will he less likely to accept the system as legitimate if they perceive that 
those internal actors who are concerned with environmental protection have been 
excluded from the decision-making process. 
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There is a second aspect of the conllicl hetwecn Article IX(2) and the environmental 
ohjective of the J\TS that has ramifications for the internal legitimacy or the 
organisation. The current policy for compliance with Article [X(2) requires that in 
order to obtain Consultative Status a Party to the Treaty must establish a scientific 
station in the region. This directly conflicts with the environmental protection 
objective of the organisation because the expansion of the number of scientific 
stations on the continent is not necessarily conducive with environmental protection. 
While the conflict between Article IX(2) and the environmental ohjective of the ATS 
is not currently causing any legitimacy issue if not resolved it could do so in the 
future. Currently both the international community and the non-Consultative Parties 
to the ATS are pleased with the environmental policies initiated with the introduction 
of the Environmental Protocol but this acceptance could soon fade if they perceive 
that the environment policy decisions were been driven by the A TCP' s continued 
preference for scientific activities. 
The potential for loss of legitimacy due to the conflict over the establishment of the 
permanent Secretariat appears to have resolved itself as a result of the ATCPs actions 
at ATCM XXIV. Although the Parties appear to have resolved this problem it is not 
possihle at this point to state with certainty that this threat to legitimacy has been 
removed for all time. This is because resolution of the issues of transparency and 
access to information are going to depend on the structure and functioning or the 
Secretariat. To date these details have not heen finalised by the ATCPs. 
In order to maintain the legitimacy of their role in Antarctic governance the ATCPs 
need to address their inability to establish a liahility annex to the Environmental 
Protocol. This issue is currently the most persuasive argument supporting the 
contention that the ATS has lost or is losing its legitimacy. The continued inability of 
the ATCPs to estahlish a liability annex has consequences for both the internal and 
external legitimacy or the ATS. It has been rully recognised hy parties hoth inside 
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and outside the ATS that the Antarctic environment can not he adequately protected 
without the liahility annex to the Protocol. Therefore, hccausc the Protocol was 
drafted to meet the environmental protection objective or the ATS the lack of a 
liability annex means that the rules and procedures of the organisation do not reflect 
the objectives of the organisation, as such it lacks internal legitimacy. The inability 
to establish a liability annex also has consequences for the external legitimacy of the 
ATS, through both acceptance and applicability. Applicability requires that the rules 
and procedures of an organisation comply with the normative structure of the 
international community. The majority of international environmental instruments 
appear to have a liability component, therefore the lack of a liability annex to the 
Protocol makes it non-compliant with international norms, this casting doubts on the 
external legitimacy of the ATS. The inability to draft a liability has also drawn a 
great deal of criticism from those aspects of the international community outside the 
ATS, thereby also raising questions as to the external legitimacy of the organisation. 
While Parties both inside and outside the ATS are expressing concerns regarding the 
continued absence of a liability annex to the Environmental Protocol these concerns 
have not yet reached the point where they threaten the legitimacy of the organisation. 
However, if this issue is not resolved quickly through the drafting of a liability annex 
acceptable to all Parties this situation could soon develop into a direct threat to the 
legitimacy of the entire Antarctic Treaty System. 
Whether the non-compliance of China with CCAMLR is an issue that can effect the 
legitimacy of the ATS is itself matter that is subject to debate. However, no matter 
how you feel about the position of the issue within the legitimacy debate it must he 
recognised that at the very least it makes the ATS look had and in some situations 
looking had could in fact have more far reaching ramifications than a loss of 
1 · . -l60 eg1t1macy. China is not a Party to CCAMLR and therefore has no legal 
obligation to comply with the Convention, but as an ATCP it has a moral obligation 
~6" This woulLI be true in n:lation to U1e perception or the general puhlic. who may have no it.lea ahout 
lhe legitimacy issue hut woulLI question U1e hehaviour of China. as a Treaty Party. in relation to 
Antarctic resources. 
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to comply with the recommendations or CCAMLR. During the course of this 
investigation I have estahlished the unusual nature or the relationship between 
CCAMLR and the ATS. This has shown that though there is no legal connection 
between the two enough of a connection exists for me to make the proposition that as 
an ATCP China's refusal to comply with CCAMLR directly retlects on the 
legitimacy of the ATS. By failing to comply with CCAMLR China is not 
acknowledging, implementing or adhering to the rules of the ATS, therefore placing 
the internal legitimacy of the organisation in question. 
China's behaviour also raises questions in relation to the external legitimacy of the 
ATS. One of the gauges of external legitimacy is the degree and persistence of 
criticism levelled at the organisation. There has been quite extensive criticism 
levelled at CCAMLR and the ATS over the China situation. While it has not yet 
reached the level where it could be considered to be eroding the legitimacy of the 
organisation, it may be getting close to that point. In this regard the legitimacy of the 
ATS and CCAMLR is being preserved by their critics acknowledgements of the 
incredible advances already made in the conservation of Antarctic marine resources. 
Although they currently have acceptance the tolerance of their critics will only stretch 
so far and in order to maintain legitimacy on this count the other ATCPs need to find 
some way to bring China into compliance with the CCAMLR directives . 
.Jurisdiction on the Antarctic continent is another issue that reflects on the legitimacy 
of the ATS. While it is currently not an issue or major concern with the expected 
increase in the numhers of tourists heading to the continent it could he or significance 
in the near future. As the number of visitor increase, if their activities are not 
controlled, it is likely that their presence will begin to have adverse effects on the 
Antarctic environment. As such this will adversely retlect on the internal legitimacy 
of the ATS. This is because by not establishing policies to prevent tourists from 
harming the Antarctic environment the ATS has failed to adopt rules and procedures 
that will meet thdr environmental protection objective. The failure to adopt 
procedures to control tourist activity has already resulted in criticism from 
environmenlal NC10s hul lhe level of crilicism is currenlly nol sufficient lo shave 
adverse effects on the legitimacy or lhe ATS. This is largely due to two factors; the 
NGOs have been assured by the ATCPs that they will he able to adequately control 
tourist activities through the implication of the Environmental Protocol and the facl 
that to date no conclusive evidence exisls to indicate that tourist activity in Antarctica 
is causing environmental harm. This situation could change rapidly as tourist 
numbers climb therefore if the ATS wishes to maintain its legitimacy they need to 
ensure that their procedures prevent tourist activity from causing environmental harm. 
The final component the ATS needs to be aware of to retain their legitimacy is their 
position within the international community. This is particularly true in regards their 
relationship with the UN. In the past the ATS has not had a good relationship with 
the UN. This has mainly been due to the fact that the ATCPs were unwilling to 
acknowledge that the UN has any standing in the affairs of the Antarctic region. 
Recent events within the UN indicate that this situation may be changing. Both 
groups appear to he acknowledging the significance of the other in the governance of 
Antarctica. In this regard the A TS has managed to some extent to solidify its 
position as the legitimate organ of Antarctic governance. However, they must be 
aware that this situation will only continue if the UN believes that the ATCPs are 
governing the Antarctic for the benefit of humanity and not to advance lheir own 
polilical agendas. 
In summary the ATS has made many advances over the past years and as a resull has 
retained a degree of legilimacy sufficient lo maintain a levd of governance effective 
enough to ensure the adequate prolection of the Anlarctic environment. In saying this 
the ATCPs must be aware that their legilimacy is not ahsolute and they still have 
many issues that need to be deall with if they wish to maintain their lcgilimacy. 
Because if ldt unattended like small drops of water can erode a great mountain these 
small dents in legitimacy can erode a formally great Treaty System. l lhink the 
current situation in which lhe ATS finds itself is summed up best by the words of a 
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delegate to the International Symposium on the Future or the Antarctic Treaty System 
in 1995. 
It is true tJrnt tJ1e Antarctic Treaty System has made many great achievements. and it is also 
true tJ1at tJ1e system has dealt successfully witJ1 a number of challenges. But implicit in tJ1is 
successful chain of achievements and challenges tJ1ere is a dangt.'f of falling into some sort of 
self-congratulatory assessment of what tJ1e system has been. 
I tJ1ink tJ1at tJ1e interesting point is tJrnt tJ1e system is being confronted witll many questions 
about its effectiveness. There are instruments, treaties and recommendations tJ1at were quite 
appropriate at tlle time tJ1ey were devised. but whose effectiveness became questioned at a 
later point.461 
In closing let me say that I believe the only conclusion that can be reached based on 
the existing evidence is that the ATS is currently the legitimate organ of governance 
for the Antarctic. However, it must continue to adapt and resolve the potential 
legitimacy problems that effect the preservation of the Antarctic environment or be 
prepared to hand management of the continent over to a new organisation that can. 
461 Australian Antarctic Foundation. supra n 231 at 17. 
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